Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mauricio M.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; David Easterwood,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-1308 (ECT/JFD)
OPINION AND ORDER
Taylor Jon Volkman, I, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Mauricio M.
Denisha Devette Daughtry, DOJ-Civ, Washington, DC, and David W. Fuller, United States
Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd
M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
Petitioner Mauricio M. is a Mexican citizen who has lived in the United States since
approximately 2010. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 1, 14. The details of Mauricio’s entry into the
United States have not been provided. See Pet. According to the Petition, Mauricio “is not
[the] subject of a final order of removal.” 	Id. ¶ 14. On February 10, 2026, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents detained Mauricio in his Burnsville, Minnesota
neighborhood. 	Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. 	Mauricio alleges that he “was not shown nor provided a
warrant.” Id. ¶ 1. At the time of the Petition’s filing, Mauricio was “believed to be detained
in Minnesota,” id. ¶ 2, but Respondents’ answer states that Mauricio “had already [been]
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transported to the El Paso Service Processing Center – Camp East,” ECF No. 6 at 1, prior
to the Court’s order enjoining his transfer outside of this District, see ECF No. 3 at 2.1
Mauricio challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 4. He claims he
has been wrongly classified as an 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is
mandatory) rather than an 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary
and who is entitled to a bond hearing). 	Pet. ¶¶ 30–32; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F.
Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). 	According to
Mauricio, that misclassification and denial of a bond hearing violate his right to due process
under the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act. 	See Pet. ¶¶ 33–49. 	Mauricio seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
requiring his release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
that be released in Minnesota without release conditions, but with conditions to ensure his
safety, including advance notice to counsel and return of his personal effects; that
Respondents be enjoined from detaining him again “on any legal theory rejected by the
Court in adjudicating this Petition”; issuance of an order enjoining his transfer outside of
the District of Minnesota during the pendency of his Petition; that the Court retain
jurisdiction over the matter to decide a future motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs; and “any other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.” See id.
at 15–16.
1 	Aside from Mauricio’s present location, the existence of a warrant is the only
disputed fact in Mauricio’s Petition, as Respondents attached a copy of a warrant to their
answer. See ECF No. 6 at 1; ECF No. 6-1. That warrant is discussed infra.
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Respondents 	assert 	that 	Mauricio 	is 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). ECF No. 6 at 1. Recognizing that Mauricio’s Petition “raises legal and
factual 	issues 	similar 	to 	those 	in 	prior 	habeas 	petitions 	this 	Court 	has 	decided,”
Respondents rely on their arguments in the appeal of Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-3248
(8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025). 	See ECF No. 6 at 2. 	This raises an issue of statutory
interpretation2 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it
will be rejected here as well.
Mauricio has shown he has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than
§ 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Mauricio’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
two federal courts of appeals have ruled on the question, one reaching and one rejecting
this conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062
(7th Cir. 2025) (concluding that respondent was not likely to prevail on the merits that
petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)); Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026) 	(finding 	petitioner 	was 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2)).
Mauricio has lived in the United States for approximately fifteen years, Pet. ¶ 1, and I find
his detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).3
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D. Me. 2025), appeal filed (Nov. 6, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that
absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” Id.
(emphasis in original); accord Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025
WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me. Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025
3 	Respondents do not argue that Mauricio is subject to mandatory detention pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the
Petition would apply to Mauricio’s detention. See ECF No. 6.
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WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F.
Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D. Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest
warrant is issued” and that “[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the
subsequent provisions giving the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the
arrested alien’ are likewise not triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir.
July 11, 2023).
Respondents have attached a purported warrant for Mauricio’s arrest to their
answer, but the attached warrant raises several concerns. 	Respondents did not file a
declaration authenticating or describing the attached warrant—it was merely attached to
Respondents’ answer. See ECF Nos. 6, 6-1. The attached warrant is dated September 10,
2026—twice. See ECF No. 6-1 at 1. And Respondents make no legal argument about the
attached warrant’s legal effects. On these facts, the unauthenticated warrant is insufficient
to satisfy what I understand to be the requirements of § 1226(a). 	Respondents have not
advanced any other argument that Mauricio’s release is an unwarranted remedy.
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 264 (“Since the
Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a), [petitioners’]
immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same); Chiliquinga
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Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also Munaf, 553 U.S.
at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical
remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).4
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Mauricio M.’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),
and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the discretionary provisions of
8 U.S.C. § 1226.
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner remains detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of this
Order.
b. 	If Petitioner has been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioner to Minnesota and then release Petitioner from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 15, 2026, at 9:45 a.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Mauricio’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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