Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Alex H.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and David Easterwood, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration
and Customs Enforcement;
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-1255 (JMB/DTS)
ORDER
John Hayden, Quantum Lex PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Alex H.
David W. Fuller, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents
Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Alex H.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].) Respondents
Pamela 	Bondi, 	Kristi 	Noem, 	Todd 	M. 	Lyons, 	and 	David 	Easterwood 	(together,
Respondents) are named in the Petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants
the Petition in part.
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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FINDINGS OF FACT2
1. 	Alex H. is a citizen of Nicaragua who has lived in the United States since
October 2022. (Pet. ¶ 12.)
2. 	Alex H. has a pending asylum application and is scheduled for his initial
court appearance in July 2026. (Id. ¶ 13.) After surrendering to immigration officials in
October 2022, he was released on humanitarian parole. 	(Id.) 	He does not have a final
order of removal, and he has remained in full compliance with all reporting obligations.
(Id.)
3. 	On January 13, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained
Alex H. in Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 14.) There was no warrant for this arrest. (Id.)
4. 	Alex H. filed his Petition on February 9, 2026. (Pet.) He asks the Court to
immediately release him from custody or, in the alternative, to hold a prompt bond hearing
to determine whether he should remain in custody. (Id. at 13–14.)3
5. 	On February 9, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to respond to the
Petition by February 11, 2026, at 11:00 a.m. CT “certifying the true cause and proper
duration of Petitioner’s confinement and showing cause as to why the writ should not be
2 Because Respondents did not contest any of the factual allegations in the Petition, these
allegations are deemed admitted. 	See, e.g., Bland v. California Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d
1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When the State’s return fails to dispute the factual allegations
contained in the petition and traverse, it essentially admits those allegations.”), overruled
on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000).
3 The Court concludes that any transfer of Alex H. outside of Minnesota after the Court’s
February 9, 2026 Order would violate the Court’s order. (See Doc. No. 6.)
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granted in this case,” including providing any supporting documentation that may be
needed to establish the lawfulness of Alex H.’s arrest and addressing whether “the absence
of a warrant preceding Petitioner’s arrest necessitates Petitioner’s immediate release.”
(Doc. No. 6.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that this case belongs in Texas, rather than in Minnesota. (Doc.
No. 11.) 	Respondents also generally oppose the Petition, explaining that it “raises legal
and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has decided” and that
Respondents have appealed one such petition (see Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248 (8th
Cir.)). 	(Doc. No. 11.) 	Respondents then incorporate by reference all of the arguments
raised in the Avila appeal and request denial of the petition. (Id.) In this way, Respondents
reiterate their argument that the detention of petitioners similarly situated to Alex H. is
mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 	As this Court has previously concluded,
however, Respondents’ interpretation lacks merit.
Furthermore, Respondents do not present any argument concerning their failure to
comply with a statutory requirement that they obtain a warrant prior to arresting Alex H.
For these reasons, the Court grants the Petition in part and orders immediate release.
A. 	Constitutional Guarantee of Habeas Review
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
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every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
B. 	Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court finds that the Petition is properly considered in this District. 	The
“immediate custodian” rule outlined in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 427 (2004), is a
venue rule and not a jurisdictional one. The application of the “immediate custodian” rule
is not automatic, and the venue for habeas petitions allow for equitable concerns such as
convenience and appropriateness of the district. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973)). This Court considers such factors, especially since
this Court can reach the custodian by service of process. 	Braden, 410 U.S. at 495 (“So
long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within
its jurisdiction” requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his
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claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the petitioner himself
is confined outside the court’s jurisdiction.”)
Here, the equitable factors weigh in favor of this District as the appropriate venue
to adjudicate the Petition.4 	The decision to arrest and detain Alex H. was directed to
personnel within this District and therefore witnesses and information about the manner of
his arrest would also be found in this District. Alex H. was, for at least some time, actually
detained within this District. 	Alex H. has lived in Minnesota since 2022 (Pet. ¶ 12), and
Respondents have given no response as to the basis of his detention or what the length of
his detention would be. Transferring venue would prolong both Alex H.’s detention and
the adjudication of his claims. Further, venue should not be transferred simply because a
petitioner was unable to file their petition prior to transfer, particularly when that transfer
was not at a petitioner’s request, was without notice to counsel, is wholly outside of their
control, and can occur in a very short time after arrest. 	Transferring venue solely on the
basis that a petitioner was transferred, and thereby currently detained elsewhere, could also
have the effect of incentivizing forum shopping, as Respondents could quickly transfer
detained individuals to a district of their choosing. 	Therefore, this Court concludes that
this District is the appropriate forum for deciding Alex H.’s Petition.
C. 	Interpretation of Section 1225
4 Respondents were ordered to provide Petitioner’s counsel with information concerning
his transportation out of the District of Minnesota. (Doc. No. 5.) Neither the Declaration
of David Fuller (Doc. No. 10) nor the Response (Doc. No. 11) include information
regarding or establishing when Respondents transferred Alex H. out of the District of
Minnesota.
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Respondents rely on an incorrect interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226 to justify
detention without a bond hearing. 	Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’
interpretation that section 1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens
living in the country who are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without
inspection. 	See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL
3295903, at *4 & n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been
rejected in 350 cases “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts spread across the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose
Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D.
Minn. 	Nov. 	4, 	2025) 	(collecting 	cases); 	Belsai 	D.S. 	v. 	Bondi, 	No. 	25-CV-3682
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). This
Court also finds Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
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participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Alex H. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not
currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
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of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
The fact that Alex H. has requested asylum does not change the conclusion. 	The
definition of “admission” in this context means “the lawful entry of the noncitizen into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 	Barco
Mercado, 2025 WL 3295903 at *5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis altered)).
Even by applying for asylum, a “noncitizen who already has entered the United States
illegally and is living here cannot be said to be actively seeking lawful entry into the United
States,” because the “entry, whether lawful or unlawful, occurred years ago.” Id. (emphasis
in original). 	Other courts have reached this same conclusion under similar facts. 	E.g.,
Quishpe-Guaman v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-00211-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 3201072, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding it was “strong evidence” that the federal government
earlier released a noncitizen on her own recognizance under section 1226 and rejecting
Respondents’ argument that her asylum application shows that she “is plainly seeking
admission to the United States”); Mayamu K. v. Bondi, File No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025
WL 3641819, at *4, 8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) (concluding that despite a pending asylum
application, the petitioner’s previous Order of Release on Recognizance under section 1226
precludes detention under section 1225).
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Alex 	H.’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by
section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b).
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D. 	Remaining Independent Grounds for Relief
Moreover, the Court also grants the Petition and orders release for another
independent reason. Because section 1226(a) applies, a warrant was a prerequisite to Alex
H.’s detention. See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25‐CV‐4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at
*3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026); Juan S.R. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-5 (PJS/LIB), Doc. No. 8 at 3–
4 (D. Minn. Jan. 1, 2026). 	See also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the
Attorney General, [a noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” (emphasis added)). The
Petition alleges that Alex H.’s arrest was warrantless (Pet. ¶¶ 14, 51), and Respondents
have not presented evidence to the contrary. Consequently, on this independent basis, the
Court grants the Petition and orders Alex H.’s immediate release.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED, as follows:
1. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner Alex H. from custody
immediately in Minnesota without conditions, and in any event on or before
4:00 p.m. CT on February 12, 2026. 	Respondents are further ordered to
provide advanced notice to Petitioner’s Counsel of the time and location of
the release.
2. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on February 13, 2026, counsel for Respondents
shall file a letter affirming that Petitioner was released from custody in
Minnesota without conditions in accordance with this Order. Counsel shall
also file a declaration on or before 11:00 a.m. CT on February 13, 2026,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by an individual with personal knowledge that
states when and where the Petitioner was released, attaches any and all
documentation concerning the Petitioner’s release, and affirms that all
property of Petitioner was returned to Petitioner upon release (or, if property
is retained, state which property is retained, the legal basis for its retention,
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and affirm that Respondents duly provided Petitioner with certified copies of
any and all immigration-related documentation).
3. 	Counsel for Respondents shall also file a declaration on or before 11:00 a.m.
CT on February 16, 2026, confirming that Respondents have complied with
the Court’s February 9, 2026 Order (Doc. No. 5). 	In the event that these
disclosures have not been completed, counsel’s affidavit shall note what has
been disclosed and what remains outstanding.
4. 	Alex H. may move separately within 30 days of final judgment in this action
to recover attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
5. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks relief beyond an order requiring release or an
order requiring a bond hearing, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 11, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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