Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Argenis M.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-1058 (PAM/DTS)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Argenis M.’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. (“Pet.” (Docket No. 1).) For the following reasons, the Court denies the
petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico, who claims to have lived in the United States since
approximately 2021. 	(Id. ¶¶ 7, 12.) 	The record does not support that Petitioner has any
legal status in the United States. On February 4, 2026, Respondents detained him, and he
remains in their custody. (Id. ¶ 15.)
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DISCUSSION
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking
the Court to order his immediate release or grant him an individualized bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents contend that his detention is mandatory pending removal
proceedings under § 1225(b)(2). The Court must therefore decide whether § 1225(b)(2) or
§ 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
“When interpreting a statute, [courts] begin with the statute’s plain language, giving
words the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them. 	If the intent of
Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute’s language, the judicial inquiry must
end.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Lester, 	92 	F.4th 	740, 	742 	(8th 	Cir. 	2024) (cleaned 	up).
Section 1225(a)(1) dictates that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of
arrival . . .) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” There
is no dispute that Petitioner is an alien present in the United States. And the facts do not
support that he lawfully entered the United States, i.e., an immigration officer did not
inspect him and authorize his entry. 	8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’
and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”). “Admission” means
lawful entry into the United States, not merely any presence here. See id.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) instructs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
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proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” The plain reading of the text is that detention
is mandatory. 	Other courts disagree with this reading, making distinctions based on the
length of an alien’s presence in the United States, an alien’s efforts to secure lawful status
here, or where an alien was apprehended. 	Such limitations are not found in the statute.
“What governs this case is the text of the statute, not what other district courts have
concluded.” Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025). 	The text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is clear that an alien who is an
“applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission.”
Petitioner argues that because he was not apprehended at the border, he is not
properly classified as “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Indeed, many courts
agree with Petitioner’s statutory interpretation. 	However, the Court determines that the
growing minority of courts rejecting Petitioner’s argument are correct. 	See, e.g.,
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330, at *5–6 (5th
Cir. Feb. 6, 2026); Chen v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:25-CV-8350-MKV, 2025
WL 3484855, *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1140
(S.D. Cal. 2025); Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 6:25-CV-01884, 2026 WL 19095, at *4–6 (W.D.
La. Jan. 2, 2026); Alberto Rodriguez v. Jeffreys, No. 8:25CV714, 2025 WL 3754411, at
*11–14 (D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2025); Melgar v. Bondi, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL 3496721,
*10–14 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2025); Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, *3–4. Merely because
an alien has “illegally remained in this country for years does not mean that he is suddenly
not an ‘applicant for admission’ under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 802
F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1142 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025).
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The statute’s plain meaning prevails. 	Respondents may lawfully detain Petitioner
under § 1225(b)(2), which requires detention.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	The Petition (Docket No. 1) is DENIED; and
2. 	This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 19, 2026 	s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge
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