Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Fredy S.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; David Easterwood, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; and Ryan Shea,
Sheriff of Freeborn County,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-961 (ECT/DTS)
OPINION AND ORDER
John Hayden, Quantum Lex PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Fredy S.
Ana H. Voss and Friedrich A.P. Siekert, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis,
MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
David John Walker, Freeborn County Attorney’s Office, Albert Lea, MN, for Respondent
Ryan Shea.
Petitioner Fredy S. is a citizen of El Salvador who has lived in the United States
since 2020. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 13. Fredy “has a pending asylum application and does not
have a final order of removal.” Id. ¶ 14.1 On January 7, 2026, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agents operating pursuant to “Operation Metro Surge” arrested Fredy while
1 	The Petition later asserts that “[Fredy’s] asylum application is approved.” Pet. ¶ 30.
The Petition does not describe the legal implications of an “approved” versus a “pending”
asylum application.
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he was “walking home from work to catch the . . . bus.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 19. “[D]uring the
encounter, unidentified agents pointed a pistol at [Fredy] and hit him in the ribs and head.”
Id. ¶ 16. The Petition alleges, “[u]pon information and belief,” that “Respondents did not
have a warrant or probable cause of criminal conduct to justify the arrest.” Id. ¶ 17. Fredy
is currently detained in the Freeborn County detention facility, where he was “denied food
for the first three days of his confinement.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 21. Respondents2 do not dispute the
Petition’s facts. See ECF No. 5.
Fredy challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 2. He claims he has
been wrongly classified as a § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory) rather
than a § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a bond
hearing). Pet. ¶¶ 28–31; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn.
2025) (explaining legal framework). According to Fredy, that misclassification and denial
of a bond hearing violate his right to due process under the 	Fifth Amendment, the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. See Pet. ¶¶ 32–
48. Fredy seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus requiring Respondents to release him
unless they provide bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); an order enjoining his transfer
outside of this District during the pendency of his Petition, and if he has been transferred
outside of Minnesota, directing that he be transported back to Minnesota and released here;
issuance of an order of release including conditions to ensure Fredy’s safety, advance
2 	When used in this Order, “Respondents” refers to the federal officials named as
Respondents. Respondent Ryan Shea, the Freeborn County Sheriff, did not file a response
in these proceedings. See Dkt.
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notice to counsel, and a return of Fredy’s personal effects; issuance of an order of release
that 	enjoins 	Respondents 	from 	implementing 	any 	condition 	of 	release; 	reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs; issuance of an order directing the United States Marshals to
deliver this order to Freeborn County officials to “demand immediate release”; and “any
other and further relief that this Court may deem just and proper.” Pet. at 14–15.
Respondents argue that Fredy is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). See ECF No. 5 at 1–11. This raises an issue of statutory interpretation3 that
courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it will be rejected here
as well.
Fredy 	has 	shown 	he 	has 	been 	misclassified 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	rather 	than
§ 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Fredy’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
only one federal court of appeals has ruled on the question, and it reached the same
conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, (7th Cir.
2025). 	Fredy has lived in the United States for more than five years. 	Pet. ¶ 13. 	His
detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).4
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sep. 21, 2025),
appeal filed (Nov. 7, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be
arrested 	and 	detained 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Id. 	(emphasis 	in 	original); 	accord
Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me.
Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued” and that
“[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving
4 	Respondents do not argue that Fredy is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the Petition
would apply to Fredy’s detention. See ECF No. 5.
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the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not
triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). 	Here, the
Petition alleges that Fredy was arrested without a warrant. 	Pet. ¶ 17. Respondents were
ordered to include in their answer “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding [Fredy’s]
arrest necessitates [Fredy’s] immediate release.” See ECF No. 3 at 2. Respondents have
not produced a warrant, nor have they advanced any specific argument that Fredy’s release
is an unwarranted remedy. See ECF No. 5.
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at
*11 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
[petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same);
Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.
The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).5
5 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Fredy’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Fredy S.’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner remains detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of this
Order.
b. 	If Petitioner has been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioner to Minnesota and then release Petitioner from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 5, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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