Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Alfredo R.I.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-619 (DWF/DLM)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Alfredo R.I.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents filed a response seeking
dismissal or transfer to the Western District of Texas. (Doc. No. 6.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Court denies the motion to dismiss or transfer and grants the Petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico and has resided in Plymouth, Minnesota since
December 2006. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Petitioner has a visa to work in the United States and
is in the process of obtaining a U Visa. (Id.) Petitioner does not have a final order or
removal. (Id.)
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On January 15, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents while at work. (Id. at 5.) ICE agents arrested Petitioner
without a warrant. (Id.) Petitioner was initially detained in Minnesota, then transferred
to Texas, and is now being transferred again to Minnesota, although his current
whereabouts are unknown. (Id. at 7; Doc. No. 8-1 at 1.) Petitioner’s counsel has been
unable to reach him to verify his location. (See Doc. No. 1 at 7.)
Petitioner filed the Petition on January 24, 2026. (Id.) He asserts that his
detention is unlawful under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Id. at 11-14.)
He requests that the Court order his return to Minnesota and subsequent release, or
alternatively, that the Court require Respondents to hold a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). (Id. at 16-17.) Respondents filed a response seeking dismissal or transfer of
the Petition to the Western District of Texas. (Doc. No. 6.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss or Transfer
As a threshold matter, Respondents challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over this
case, requesting dismissal or transfer. (Doc. No. 6.) Generally, jurisdiction over a habeas
petition lies only in the district of confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443
(2004). There are a couple of exceptions to this general rule. First, a district court is not
stripped of jurisdiction if the Government moves the petitioner after they properly filed
their petition in that district. Id. at 441. Second, the general rule is inapplicable when
“there is an indication that the Government’s purpose in removing a prisoner [was] to
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make it difficult for his lawyer to know where the habeas petition should be filed, or
where the Government was not forthcoming with respect to the identity of the custodian
and the place of detention.” Id. at 454 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 450 n.18
(majority opinion) (“When . . . a prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an
unknown custodian, it is impossible to apply the immediate custodian and district of
confinement rules.”); Aleksander B. v. Trump, No. 26-cv-170, 2026 WL 172435, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (collecting cases that recognized this exception).
Here, Petitioner’s current location is unknown. Although he was in Texas at the
time of filing, it appears he is being moved again. Consequently, the Court does not
know Petitioner’s immediate custodian and cannot apply the district of confinement rule
on jurisdiction. Respondents’ motion is denied.
II. 	Merits of the Petition
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896,
900-01 (D. Minn. 2020). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
Respondents do not assert a justification for Petitioner’s detention. (See Doc.
No. 6.) The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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Freedom from physical detention by the government is “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Civil detention violates the
Due Process Clause unless there is a “special justification” that “outweighs the
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690 (citation modified). Without special justification, Respondents’
continued detention of Petitioner violates the Due Process Clause.
Petitioner assumed that Respondents would assert authority under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). (See Doc. No. 1 at 10.) Even if they had, his detention would still be
unlawful. As this Court has explained on multiple occasions, the claim that § 1225
requires mandatory detention of people in Petitioner’s position contradicts the plain
language of the statute. See Jose L.M.S. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-474, 2026 WL 185066,
at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2026); Omar E.F.G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-451, 2026 WL 184571,
at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026); Victor S.M. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-400, 2026 WL 161445,
at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2026). Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission”—
noncitizens who are either “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted or
who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1226 applies where
§ 1225 is inapplicable and provides immigration judges with the discretion to grant
release on bond to noncitizens subject to removal proceedings. See id. § 1226(a).
Here, Petitioner is not an arriving noncitizen because he has been in the United
States for twenty years, is authorized to work in this country, and has a pending U Visa
application. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (noting that § 1226(a)
applies to “certain aliens already in the country”). Petitioner would therefore be subject
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to the discretionary bond provisions of § 1226(a), not the mandatory bond provisions of
§ 1225(b)(2). A detainee being held pursuant to § 1226(a) must have been served an
arrest warrant prior to detainment. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also Ahmed M. v. Bondi,
No. 25-cv-4711, 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases). There
is no evidence that Respondents had a warrant to arrest Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner’s
release would also be proper on this ground. See, e.g., Omar E.F.G., 2026 WL 184571,
at *3.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner’s current detention is unlawful
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody
immediately. If Petitioner is not currently detained in Minnesota, Respondents are
ORDERED to immediately return Petition to Minnesota and then immediately release
Petitioner from custody.
4. 	Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, the Government shall
provide the Court with a status update confirming Petitioner’s release.
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5. 	Respondents are directed to release Petitioner with all personal documents
and belongings, such as his driver’s license, passport, other immigration documents, and
cell phone, and without conditions such as ankle monitors or tracking devices.
6. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under this same
statutory theory, absent materially changed circumstances.
7. 	Respondents’ motion to dismiss or transfer (Doc. No. [6]) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 30, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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