Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Carmen M.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; and David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul Field
Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-582 (ECT/ECW)
OPINION AND ORDER
Samuel Verner, Zimmer Law Group, Saint Paul, MN, for Petitioner Carmen M.
Friedrich A.P. Siekert, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents
Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood.
Petitioner Carmen M. is an Ecuadorian citizen who has lived in the United States
since 2021. 	Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 12. 	Carmen “has a pending application for Asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.” 	Id. ¶ 13.
Carmen “does not have a final order of removal.” 	Id. On July 9, 2025, Carmen’s “Form
I-589, Application for Asylum, was denied by an immigration judge,” and “that appeal
remains pending in front of the [Board of Immigration Appeals].” 	Id. 1 	On January 23,
1 	Neither party provided the Court with Carmen’s Notice to Appear or the other
paperwork we’ve usually received in these cases. In this case, it doesn’t matter. In their
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2026, Carmen was “on her way to work” when ICE arrested her as part of “Operation
Metro Surge.” Id. ¶¶ 15–16. Carmen was “brought to the Bishop Henry Whipple” building
for processing. Id. ¶ 19.
Carmen challenges her detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 2. She claims she
has been wrongly classified as a § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory)
rather than an 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is
entitled to a bond hearing). Pet. ¶¶ 22–28; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957,
961–62 (D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). 	According to Carmen, that
misclassification and denial of a bond hearing violate her right to due process under the
Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure
Act. 	See Pet. ¶¶ 29–45. 	Carmen seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus requiring
Respondents to release her unless they provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
an order enjoining Respondents from transferring her out of the District of Minnesota
during the pendency of her Petition; and “any other and further relief that this Court may
deem just and proper.” Pet. at 14–15.
Acknowledging that Carmen’s petition “presents similar legal and factual issues to
prior habeas petitions,” Respondents argue that Carmen is subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to § 1225. 	See ECF No. 5 at 7–9, 14–19. 	This raises an issue of statutory
brief response to Carmen’s habeas petition, Respondents did not contest any of the facts
alleged in the Petition. See ECF No. 5 at 1–2.
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interpretation2 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it
will be rejected here as well.
Carmen has shown she has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than
§ 1226. 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
only one federal court of appeals has ruled on the question, and it reached the same
conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, (7th Cir.
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Carmen’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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2025). 	Carmen has lived in the United States for over four years. 	See Pet. ¶ 12. 	Her
detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v.
Scott, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sep. 21,
2025), appeal filed (Nov. 7, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may
not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” 	Id. (emphasis in original); accord
Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me.
Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued” and that
“[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving
the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not
triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). 	Here,
Respondents were ordered to include in their Answer “[w]hether the absence of a warrant
preceding [Carmen’s] arrest necessitates [Carmen’s] immediate release.” See ECF No. 3
at 2. Respondents have not produced a warrant, nor advanced any specific argument that
Carmen’s release is an unwarranted remedy given the apparent absence of a warrant.3 See
3 	Respondents do not argue that Carmen is subject to mandatory detention pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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ECF No. 5. 	Rather, Respondents argue that the failure to produce a warrant can be
addressed by the immigration court. 	See ECF No. 5 at 18 (“If the lack of a warrant is
important, than [sic] Petitioner can bring that issue up with the Immigration Court or the
BIA.”). This argument is not persuasive. As discussed above, the “issuance of a warrant
is a necessary condition to justify discretionary detention under section 1226(a),” see
Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11, and here, that condition was
not met.
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at
*11 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
[petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same);
Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.
The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).4
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Carmen’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Carmen M.’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but
not later than 48 hours after entry of this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 28, 2026, at 4:25 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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