Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Adriano L.V.,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; Todd Lyons, in his official capacity
as Acting Director of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
David Easterwood, in his official capacity as
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-269 (MJD/DJF)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Adriano L.V.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1). Adriano is a citizen of Ecuador and
entered the United States without inspection on October 1, 2021. (Id. at 2, 13.) Since January 13,
2026, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has detained him at Fort
Snelling, Minnesota. (Id. at 1.) Respondents are various federal officials responsible for enforcing
the nation’s immigration laws and who control Adriano’s detention at Fort Snelling. (Id. at 4-5.)
The Petition asks the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Adriano
or, in the alternative, provide him with a bond hearing. (Id. at 16-17.) For the reasons given below,
the Court recommends that the Petition be granted and that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering Respondents to release Adriano immediately.
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in orders in immigration matters.
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The Petition raises a debate that is now quite familiar in this District: Whether a noncitizen
who entered the United States without inspection or permission to enter, who is arrested and
detained in the interior of the country after living here for years, is subject to expedited removal
without bond under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225, or is instead subject to the more forgiving
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 	The Petition argues Section 1226 applies and that Adriano’s
detention violates Section 1226(a) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 14-
16.) Section 1226(a) “allows for arrest of an alien on a warrant issued by the Secretary of [the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)2] ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States.’” 	Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) (emphasis added). “It further
provides that unless the person falls into the mandatory-detention category of § 1226(c) [applicable
to certain criminal offenders], DHS may detain or release the alien on bond or conditional parole.”
Id. 	There is nothing in the record to suggest that Adriano has a criminal history. 	Therefore, if
Section 1226 applies to Adriano, his detention would be permissible only upon issuance of a DHS
warrant, he would be entitled to a bond hearing, and his continued detention at such a hearing would
be discretionary, not mandatory.
Respondents argue that Section 1226(a) does not apply to Adriano’s detention, and that his
detention is statutorily mandated by Section 1225(b)(2). 	(ECF No. 4 at 2.) 	According to
Respondents, Adriano is subject to detention under Section 1225 as an “applicant for admission” to
the United States pursuant to Section 1225(a) because he entered without inspection, though he has
2 Section 1226(a) states that arrested is permitted “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney
General.” Because this language predates the Department of Homeland Security and ICE, however,
courts now construe the statute’s reference to the Attorney General as referring to the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security. See Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938, 940 n.2 (8th Cir.
2017).
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now lived here for over four years.
In asserting this argument, Respondents presses upon the Court a relatively recent
reinterpretation of the statutory regime that seeks to overturn decades of precedent and the agency’s
own construction of the applicable laws, under which noncitizens who have been present in the
United States for a significant period of time are entitled to a bond hearing, while new arrivals are
not. Compare 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (stating, in connection with enactment of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), that “despite
being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled
(formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
redetermination” and that “[t]he effect of this change is that inadmissible aliens, except for arriving
aliens, have available to them bond redetermination hearings before an immigration judge, while
arriving aliens do not.”); with Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 225 n.6 (BIA 2025)
(acknowledging longstanding practice of providing bond hearings under Section 1226(a) “for aliens
who entered the United State without inspection” but concluding instead that such persons are
generally subject to Section 1225). Respondents acknowledged in Hutardo that their position is at
odds with the way they have handled these cases for years (see id.), but rather than lobby Congress
for a statutory amendment, they advance a new statutory construction and argue they should not now
be held to their own previous interpretation of the statute. See, e.g. Federal Respondents’ Response
to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Oscar V. v. Bondi, Case No. 26-cv-0087 (MJD/JFD) (D.
Minn. Jan. 12, 2026) (ECF No. 5 at 5, “Although the Government has previously operated under a
different (and erroneous) understanding of the law, this Court must apply the language of Section
1225(b)(2)(A) as written.”). 	The Court need not revisit Respondents’ statutory construction
argument, which the presiding judge in this case previously rejected in an analogous case. 	See
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Beltran v. Bondi, 25-cv-4604 (MJD/DTS), 2025 WL 3719856 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2025). The Court
agrees the Beltran decision and sees no basis to enter a contrary recommendation here.
Respondents urge the Court to reach a different conclusion on grounds that some courts have
now agreed with their interpretation in factually similar cases. 	(ECF No. 4 at 3-5.) 	However,
Respondents concede that the facts and arguments presented in this case are similar to many other
petitions that have flooded the District of Minnesota recently (id.), and almost every judge to have
considered these petitions has held that Section 1226(a) regulates the terms of the petitioners’
detention, not Section 1225(b)(2). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL
25627, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (“Every judge in this District to have addressed this question …
has decided that § 1226(a)’s discretionary regime applies in cases like this, where the Petitioner has
been in the country for some time and where his detention did not occur in connection with an
attempt or request to enter the United States.”). But see Abdirahmaan G. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-34
(PAM/SGE) (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2026), ECF No. 7 (holding that Section 1225(b)(2) applies under
similar circumstances as here). 	The Court finds this District’s majority view persuasive and
concludes that Adriano’s detention is subject to Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2).
Respondents further contend that the Court should adopt their position because the IIRIRA
sought to correct an unfairness whereby “inadmissible noncitizens who successfully evaded
apprehension and gained entry enjoyed greater rights than those who were found inadmissible after
appearing for inspection.” (ECF No. 4 at 7.) But this argument is disingenuous. First, Respondents
argument is contradicted by the above-quoted statements in the Federal Register, which constitute
far more credible evidence of what the IIRIRA was intended to do because the government made
them immediately after the IIRIRA was enacted. 	Second, Respondents have argued—and the
undersigned Magistrate Judge has previously held—that inadmissible noncitizens who successfully
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evade apprehension but are arrested at or near the border soon after crossing are generally subject to
mandatory detention and expedited removal under Section 1225. See Bashir A. v. Klang, Case No.
25-cv-4559 (KMM/DJF) (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 2025) (Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 16 at 4-
5). Thus, the distinction is not between those who have “successfully evaded apprehension” and
those who appear for inspection. Rather, the statutory regime draws a distinction between those who
are recent arrivals—who have not purchased homes, married, had children, and established careers—
and those who arrived long ago and built their lives here. This construction of the statutory regime
recognizes that to suddenly remove someone who has established his life in the United States
without affording him any process, as Respondents now seek to do, is significantly crueler. The
Court therefore rejects Respondents suggestion that the interpretation they urge is somehow more
equitable.
Having concluded Section 1226(a) applies, the Court must now recommend a remedy. The
Petition asks the Court to immediately release Adriano. (ECF No. 1 at 17.) Respondents argue that,
to the extent it applies, Section 1226(a) only entitles him to a bond hearing (ECF No. 4 at 8-9). But
“[i]ssuance of a warrant is a necessary condition” precedent for detention under Section 1226(a).
Ahmed M., 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (citation modified); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents therefore
must produce a warrant to show that they lawfully detained Adriano in the first place. Yet, they
have not done so or even suggested that such a warrant exists despite being: (1.) on notice that the
Petition sought immediate release; and (2.) directed to produce “such affidavits and exhibits as are
needed to establish the lawfulness and correct duration of Petition’s detention in light of the issues
raised in the habeas petition.” (ECF No. 3.) The warrant requirement should not come as a surprise
to Respondents, since it is plainly in the text of Section 1226(a), and it has been the basis for several
orders for the immediate release of other, similarly situated, petitioners in this District, see Ahmed
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M., 2026 WL 25627, at *3; Juan S.R. v. Bondi, 26-cv-5 (PJS/LIB) (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2026) (ECF
No. 8); Byron V.G. v. Bondi, 26-cv-99 (KMM/DJF) (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2026) (ECF No. 8). As there
is not even a hint that a warrant was obtained prior to Adriano’s detention, the Court recommends
that he be released immediately.3
Further, the Court notes that although District Judge Davis entered an Order on January 14,
2026 enjoining Respondents from removing Adriano from this District until a final decision on his
habeas petition is made, Respondents filed a statement on January 17, 2026, representing that they
transferred Adriano to an ICE facility in Texas “for bed-space reasons” on January 14 before the
injunction was filed. The Court thus recommends that Respondents be ordered to return Adriano to
this District upon his release.
Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the Court is altering the standard timelines
for Respondents to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See L.R. 72.2(b)(1) (“A
party may file a serve specific written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition,
unless the court sets a different deadline.”) (emphasis added). Respondents must file any objection
to this Report and Recommendation on or before January 20, 2026. Petitioner may file a response
to any objections on or before January 21, 2026.
3 It is unsurprising that Respondents have not produced a warrant since they continue to
detain individuals under the guise of Section 1225, which has no warrant requirement. See Byron
V.G., 26-cv-99 (KMM/DJF) (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2026) (ECF No. 8 at 4 n.3).
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Adriano L.V.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED;
2. 	Respondents be ordered to release Petitioner Adriano L.V. from custody as soon as
practicable; and
3. 	Respondents be ordered to return Petitioner Adriano L.V. to the District of
Minnesota upon his release.
Dated: January 18, 2026 	s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. For
the 	reasons 	previously 	stated, 	Respondents 	must 	file 	any 	objection 	to 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation on or before January 20, 2026. Petitioner may file a response to any objections
on or before January 21, 2026.
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