Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Yessenia S.T,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; David
Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and Eric Tollefson,
Sheriff of Kandiyohi County,
Respondents.
No. 26-cv-30 (SRN/SGE)
ORDER
Wilmer David Lumbi, 913 Thomas Ave. N., Minneapolis, MN 55411, Next Friend for
Pro Se Petitioner Yessenia S.T.
Ana Voss and Liles Harvey Repp, U.S. Attorney’s Office, 300 S. 4th St., Minneapolis,
MN 55415, for Respondents
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) [Doc. No.
1] filed by Wilmer David Lumbi, Next Friend of Pro Se Petitioner Yessenia S.T. Petitioner
seeks immediate release from detention or, in the alternative, an opportunity for a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondents oppose the Petition. (Resp’ts’ Opp’n
[Doc. No. 4].)
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The Court has taken the Petition under advisement on the papers. For the reasons set
forth below, the Petition is granted as to a bond hearing.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Immigration Proceedings
Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador. 	(Pet. ¶ 13.) 	She has lived in the United States
since July 2021. 	(Id. ¶ 18.) 	In February 2025, she filed a petition for asylum, which is
currently pending.1 (Id. ¶ 19; Robinson Decl. [Doc. No. 5] ¶ 7 & Ex. D (Form I-213) at
2.) 	In November 2025, DHS approved employment authorization for Petitioner. 	(Pet. ¶
20.) 	She has three minor children residing in the United States, two of whom are U.S.
citizens. (Id.; Form I-213 at 3.) Petitioner is actively involved in her children’s school and
her local church. (Pet. ¶¶ 22–23.)
On December 13, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers
encountered Petitioner during a vehicle stop of a vehicle registered to their intended target.
(Robinson Decl. ¶ 8.) Officers found that Petitioner had illegally entered the United States
and she lacked immigration documents demonstrating that she was otherwise allowed to
remain in the United States. (Id.) In addition, ICE contends that Petitioner had failed to
report to an ICE/Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) office and she had not
updated DHS with her permanent address. (Id.) Officers arrested Petitioner and took her
1 A hearing on her asylum petition was scheduled for January 8, 2026 at the Bishop Henry
Whipple Federal Building in Minneapolis, but Immigration Court was closed that day due
to protests following the fatal shooting of Renee Good on January 7, 2026. (See Robinson
Decl. ¶11.) Respondents contend that Petitioner’s asylum hearing will be rescheduled, but
did not provide a date in their submissions to the Court. (Id.)
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into custody. 	(Id.) 	She is currently detained at the Kandiyohi County Jail in Willmar,
Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 11.)
B. ICE Policy and BIA Ruling
Pursuant to a new policy announced on July 8, 2025, entitled “Interim Guidance
Regarding 	Detention 	Authority 	for 	Applicants 	for 	Admission,” 	the 	Department 	of
Homeland Security (“DHS”)/ICE now considers all persons who enter the United States
without inspection “applicants for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), and therefore
argues that they are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
In September 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted DHS/ICE’s
broad interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA
2025). 	In Hurtado, the BIA found that § 1225(b)(2) applied to aliens classified as
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being aliens “present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, or [for arriving] in the United States at any time
or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” Id. at 217, 225.
C. Proceedings in this Court
On January 5, 2026, Petitioner’s Next Friend filed the instant Petition on her behalf,
asserting that Petitioner is entitled to immediate release or a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), at which an immigration judge can assess whether she poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community. (Pet. ¶¶ 1, 37–56.)
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Respondents disagree. 	They argue that as a matter of statutory interpretation,
Petitioner falls under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225, not § 1226, and therefore, is not
entitled to a bond hearing under the INA.2 (Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 19–43.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
The parties dispute whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the INA applies
to a noncitizen who is already residing in the United States. The critical distinction between
these provisions is that “noncitizens detained under Section 1225(b)(2) must remain in
custody for the duration of their removal proceedings, while those detained under Section
1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing before an [Immigration Judge] at any time before
entry of a final removal order.” 	Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246–47
(W.D. Wash. 2025). 	Again, Respondents maintain that Petitioner falls within the
mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b), while Petitioner argues that she is subject to
2 Respondents do not challenge subject matter jurisdiction, administrative exhaustion, or
the standing of Petitioner’s “next friend” to file this action. Nevertheless, the Court briefly
addresses these issues. 	As to jurisdiction, the Court finds that none of the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 apply to the question of whether mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) or discretionary detention under § 1226(a) applies. 	See
Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Minn. 2025).
As to exhaustion, requiring administrative exhaustion would be futile in light of Hurtado.
See Ortiz v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-CV-960-LJV, 2025 WL 3085032, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4. 2025) (finding exhaustion of remedies would be futile, even if
petitioner had not exhausted his remedies). Immigration judges would be obliged to follow
Hurtado’s ruling on the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Finally, a “next friend” may pursue a habeas corpus action on behalf of a detained person,
who remains the real party in interest. 	Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990).
Such status is appropriate where, as here, the detainee is unable to prosecute the action on
their own. Id. at 163–64.
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§ 1226(a). There is no dispute, however, that Petitioner was arrested while already residing
in the United States.
This Court has previously found, along with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals—
the only circuit court to have addressed the issue—and the vast majority of district courts
throughout the country, that the applicable detention scheme for noncitizens already
residing in the country is under § 1226(a), absent any exceptions under § 1226(c).
Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Minn. 2025), E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Castañon-Nava v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir. 2025); see also Demirel v. Fed.
Detention Ctr., No. 25-5488, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025) (collecting
cases); Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *6–7 (E. D. Mich. Sept. 9,
2024) (collecting cases). 	By contrast, § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens at or near the
border. 	Ortiz v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-CV-960-LJV, 2025 WL 3085032, at
*10 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4. 2025). Respondents do not assert that any of the exceptions under
§ 1226(c) apply.
Respondents acknowledge the weight of legal authority against their interpretation
of § 1225(b)(2)(A), but they nevertheless urge the Court to “revisit its prior conclusion[.]”
(Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 41.) 	They argue that a “growing minority” of courts agree with their
position. 	(Id. at 15–16.) 	In particular, Respondents note that as of November 2025, the
court in Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243, at *4, identified 282 out of 288 district court decisions
rejecting the Government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A), but assert that “[j]ust over a
month later, the number of district court decisions agreeing with the Government’s
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approach stood at, at least, 30.” (Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 17.) The Court remains unpersuaded
by Respondents’ statutory interpretation of §§ 1225(b)(2)(A).
Respondents also note factual distinctions between the instant case and this Court’s
prior decisions in Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1139–41 (involving ICE’s invocation of
an automatic stay of the Immigration Court’s decision to grant bond under § 1226), and
E.M., 	2025 	WL 	3157839, 	at 	*1 	(involving 	deferred 	action 	status 	and 	the 	prior
administrative closure of removal proceedings due to a pending U Visa application).
(Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 41–42.) 	Indeed, in the Court’s Order to Show Cause, it directed
Respondents to address how the instant case is materially distinguishable from Maldonado
and E.M., either factually or legally. (Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 2] at 2.) However,
the factual differences that Respondents have identified do not alter the Court’s statutory
analysis, fully set forth in Maldonado and E.M., and its finding that § 1225(b) is
inapplicable to noncitizens already residing in the country, such as Petitioner, who is
subject to the provisions of § 1226. Petitioner is therefore entitled to a bond hearing. Other
judges in this District have reached the same conclusion, applying the same statutory
analysis. 	See, e.g., Yulexi T. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-68 (ECT/DTS), 2026 WL 77022, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2026); Kelvin N. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-32 (JMB/JFD), 2026 WL 63423,
at *2–3 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2026); Iishaar-Abdi v. Klang, No. 25-CV-4686 (JRT/DTS), 2025
WL 3764853, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2025); Awaale v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4551
(MJD/JFD), 2025 WL 3754012, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2025); Hugo v. Olson, No. 25-
cv-4593 (LMP/DTS), 2025 WL 3688074, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025); Lionel V.F.
v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4474 (PJS/LIB), 2025 WL 3485600, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2025).
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Accordingly, the Court orders Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing in
accordance with § 1226(a).
III. 	ORDER
Based on the submissions and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that
1. 	Petitioner Yessenia S.T.’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] is
GRANTED, as follows:
a. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),
and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the discretionary
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
b. 	Within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) at
which the parties will be allowed to present evidence and argument regarding
whether Petitioner is a danger to the community and presents a flight risk if
not detained.
c. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention.
d. 	Within ten (10) days of this Order, the parties shall provide the Court with a
status update concerning the results of any bond hearing conducted pursuant
to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the Court regarding
Petitioner’s release. Further, the parties shall advise the Court whether any
additional proceedings in this matter are required and submit any proposals
for the scope of further litigation.
2. 	Respondents 	are 	ENJOINED 	from 	removing, 	transferring, 	or 	otherwise
facilitating the removal of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota before the
ordered bond hearing. If the immigration judge determines that the Petitioner is
subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Respondents may request
permission from the Court to move Petitioner if unforeseen or emergency
circumstances arise that require Petitioner to be removed from the District. Any
such request must include an explanation for the request as well as a proposed
destination. 	The Court will then determine whether to grant the request and
permit transfer of Petitioner.
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Dated: January 14, 2026 	s/Susan Richard Nelson _________
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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