Doxsey v. Mullin et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Susan Tincher, John Biestman, Janet Lee,
Lucia Webb, Abdikadir Noor, and Alan
Crenshaw, on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of U.S.
Department Of Homeland Security;1 Todd
Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Marcos
Charles, Acting Executive Associate
Director, Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO), ICE; David
Easterwood, Acting Field Office Director,
ERO, ICE Saint Paul Field Office; John A.
Condon, Acting Executive Associate
Director, Homeland Security
Investigations; the Department of
Homeland Security; Unidentified Federal
Agencies; and Unidentified Federal
Agents; in their official capacities,
Defendants.
No. 0:25-cv-4669 (KMM/DTS)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary
Injunction. (Dkt. 276.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted. The Court’s
January 16, 2026 Preliminary Injunction is dissolved because it is now moot.
1 	Markwayne 	Mullin 	is 	now 	the 	Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	and 	is
automatically substituted for Kristi Noem as a party pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs initiated this action on December 17, 2025, alleging that Defendants and
their agents violated Plaintiffs’ First and Fourth Amendment rights while carrying out
immigration enforcement activities in Minnesota. (See generally Dkt. 1.) Specifically,
Plaintiffs 	challenged 	the constitutionality 	of Defendants’ 	actions 	in the context 	of
enforcement activities during “Operation Metro Surge,” which involved the assignment of
thousands of law enforcement agents to the Twin Cities for the purpose of arresting
undocumented immigrants. (Id.) Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order,
which the Court converted to a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Dkts. 16, 24.)
On January 16, 2026, the Court granted that motion and issued a preliminary
injunction (“Injunction”) enjoining Defendants and their agents from engaging in certain
conduct. (Dkt. 85.) The Injunction was narrower than that requested by Plaintiffs, in part
because of Defendants’ concern that a broader injunction could hamper routine federal law
enforcement activities unrelated to the immigration enforcement operation then underway.
As the Court explained:
[T]he Court has limited the language used in the injunction to
the Defendants and their officers and agents engaging in
immigration enforcement activities as part of the current
Operation Metro Surge. While the Court declines to specify a
geographic limitation at this time because the operation is
expanding beyond Minneapolis and St. Paul, it makes clear that
the regularly conducted business of Border Patrol agents on the
northern border, Coast Guard officers on the Great Lakes,
customs officials at the airports, and other federal officers
doing their work unrelated to Operation Metro Surge are not
covered by the injunction.
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(Id. at 79.) The Injunction’s protections covered “all persons who do or will in the future
record, observe, and/or protest Operation Metro Surge and related operations that have
been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025.” (Id. at 81 ¶ 1.)2 The Injunction’s
limitations constrained “Defendants and their officers and agents operating in the District
of Minnesota to conduct immigration enforcement activities as part of Operation Metro
Surge” as well as “to Defendants and their officers and agents responding to protests that
arise in response to Operation Metro Surge.” (Id. at 81 ¶ 2.) These two categories of officers
and agents were identified as “Covered Federal Agents.” (Id.) The Court then specified
that the Injunction did not “apply to Defendants and their officers and agents otherwise
conducting routine operations within the District of Minnesota.” (Id. at 81–82 ¶ 2.) Finally,
the Injunction established it would “remain in effect until Operation Metro Surge concludes
or the conditions change such that it is no longer necessary.” (Id. at 82 ¶ 5.)
On January 19, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the Injunction to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and, a day later, filed a motion to
stay the Injunction pending appeal. On January 21, the Eighth Circuit entered an
administrative stay of the Injunction, and soon thereafter granted Defendants’ motion to
stay the Injunction pending appeal. Tincher v. Noem, 164 F.4th 1097, 1098 (8th Cir. 2026).
Several weeks later, Plaintiffs filed a motion before the Eighth Circuit seeking to
stay the appeal to allow Plaintiffs time to file a motion to dissolve the Injunction before
2 Citations are to the ECF pagination.
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this Court.3 Pls.-Appellees’ Mot. to Stay Proceedings, Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-1105 (8th
Cir. Feb. 13, 2026). Defendants opposed the motion. Opp’n to Mot. to Stay Proceedings,
Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-1105 (8th Cir. Feb. 17, 2026). On February 19, 2026, the Eighth
Circuit granted the stay in part, giving this Court time to issue an indicative ruling regarding
whether it would dissolve the Injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1.
(Dkt. 233.)
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for an Indictive Ruling on dissolving the
Injunction (Dkt. 237), which Defendants opposed (Dkt. 245). On March 5, 2026, the Court
granted the Motion for an Indicative Ruling and “indicate[d] that it would grant a motion
to dissolve the January 16, 2026 Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 85) as moot if the Court of
Appeals remands for that purpose.” (Dkt. 246 at 9 ¶ 2.) In response, the Eighth Circuit
remanded the Injunction back to this Court on March 17, 2026 for the purpose of ruling on
a motion to dissolve the Injunction, stating in full:
This case is hereby remanded to the district court for the
limited purpose of allowing the district court to rule on
Plaintiff’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The
parties are instructed to move for appropriate relief from our
court within fourteen days of the date of the district court’s
ruling on such motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b).
(Dkt. 263 at 1.) Plaintiffs then filed this Motion seeking to dissolve the Injunction.
(Dkt. 276.) Defendants continue to oppose its dissolution. (Dkt. 287.)
3 Plaintiffs also filed an Amended Complaint in this Court on February 13.
(Dkt. 136.)
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Under Article III, federal courts may only adjudicate “actual, ongoing cases or
controversies.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). “Through the
passage of time and the occurrence of irrevocable events, disputes may disappear so that
federal courts no longer can grant effective relief. When this happens, the issue is moot and
a federal court has no power to decide the issue.” Lebanon Chem. Corp. v. United Farmers
Plant Food, Inc., 179 F.3d 1095, 1099 (8th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). A preliminary
injunction can become moot “where the effective time period of the injunction has passed.”
Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 762 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation and
emphasis omitted); see Olin Water Servs. v. Midland Rsch. Lab’ys, Inc., 774 F.2d 303, 306
(8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a preliminary injunction is moot where it “expired by its
own terms” during appeal). If the passage of time or changing circumstances render an
injunction moot, it should be dissolved. See Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Commc’n
Network Found., 982 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Fauconniere Mfg. Corp. v.
Sec’y of Def., 794 F.2d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451
U.S. 390, 394 (1981) (“If the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the determination
whether the preliminary injunction was properly granted, . . . then we must vacate the
district court’s order and remand the case for consideration of the remaining issues.”)
(quoting Ammond v. McGahn, 532 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1976)).
Operation Metro Surge (“OMS”) has come to an end. On February 12, 2026, White
House Border Czar Tom Homan, one of the leaders of OMS, stated that OMS had
concluded and that the number of federal agents was being reduced. (E.g., Dkt. 241-2 at 5
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(“I 	have 	proposed, 	and 	President 	Trump 	has 	concurred, 	that 	this 	surge 	operation
conclude.”); Dkt 241-2 at 3 (“But as far as the immigration surge, it’s over. . . . And we
should be back to regular footprint within a week.”).) Defendants do not dispute that OMS
itself has officially concluded and acknowledge that “the government announced the end
of Operation Metro Surge” on February 12, 2026. (Dkt. 287 at 3.)
Because OMS has ended, the Court concludes that the Injunction is now moot. The
scope of the Injunction expressly encompassed only conduct stemming from OMS and
excluded non-OMS conduct. Indeed, the Injunction specified that the covered class of
plaintiffs were those “record[ing], observ[ing], and/or protest[ing] Operation Metro Surge
and related operations that have been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025”;
that the covered Defendants and officers were those “operating in the District of Minnesota
to conduct immigration enforcement activities as part of Operation Metro Surge” or
otherwise “responding to protests that arise in response to Operation Metro Surge[]”; and
that it excluded “Defendants and their officers and agents otherwise conducting routine
operations within the District of Minnesota.” (Dkt. 85 at 81–82 ¶¶ 1–2.) Moreover, the
Injunction clearly stated that it “shall remain in effect until Operation Metro Surge
concludes[.]” (Id. at 82–83 ¶ 5.) The Injunction was expressly tied to the ongoing nature
of OMS; now that OMS has concluded, the Injunction can no longer be effective.
Defendants’ arguments that the Injunction is not moot are unpersuasive. First,
Defendants argue that, even if OMS is over, the Injunction remains relevant because it
encompasses not just OMS but also other “related operations.” They highlight that the
Injunction covers plaintiffs who “record, observe, and/or protest Operation Metro Surge
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and related operations that have been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025.”
(Id. at 81 ¶ 1 (emphasis added).) But Defendants’ focus on “and related operations” strips
this clause of its context. The plain language of the Injunction—both in its discussion of
the Court’s limitations as to breadth and in the decretal language—clearly ties it to OMS,
which is now over. Moreover, Defendants’ reading would vitiate any temporal limit
whatsoever on the Injunction, which is far from the limited order the Court intended.
Defendants also argue that the Injunction is not moot because protests against
immigration enforcement continue. Defendants highlight that 500 federal immigration
agents remain in the Twin Cities, contending that their responses to ongoing protests would
be covered by the Injunction, if it were in effect. But the current conditions are enormously
different from those on the ground when the Injunction was issued. OMS was characterized
by the presence of thousands of armed immigration agents patrolling the streets of the Twin
Cities and making at-large arrests of persons suspected of being noncitizens. Plaintiffs and
others responded to OMS’s unique operations with equally unique protests at the locations
of immigration agents’ activities, as well as observing and recording OMS personnel while
they carried out their official duties. The Injunction addressed that particular dynamic. The
fact that some Minnesotans continue to protest federal immigration enforcement and policy
generally only highlights that “the current conditions differ vastly from those prevailing
when” this Court issued the Injunction. Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds, 33 F.4th 1042, 1044 (8th
Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (vacating a preliminary injunction as moot where the “current
conditions differ[ed] vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed” the
issues underlying the injunction).
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Defendants 	lastly 	argue 	that, 	should 	the 	Court 	dissolve 	the 	Injunction, 	that
dissolution should be done with prejudice to prevent Plaintiffs from moving for a new
preliminary injunction. In the alternative, Defendants ask that such dissolution preclude
Plaintiffs from relying on any pre-February 12, 2026 conduct in a second request for an
injunction. Defendants suggest that, despite moving to vacate the current Injunction,
Plaintiffs will immediately seek a new one, and they are taking these steps in order to evade
appellate review. For this reason, Defendants ask the Court to proactively restrict both the
future remedies available to Plaintiffs and their use of evidence already in the record.
However, Defendants cite no authority to support the imposition of such restrictions in this
case, and the Court declines the invitation to do so here. A determination to the contrary
would be to prejudge issues not before the Court on this limited Motion.
This conclusion does not mean that the discussion of these issues necessarily comes
to an end. Should Plaintiffs seek additional interim injunctive relief, Defendants are free to
raise their concerns about the propriety of such an injunction and the relevance of events
from December through early February to any such requests. Plaintiffs will of course
continue to bear the burden of satisfying the strictures of Article III standing for their claims
for injunctive relief, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and they will
have to demonstrate a need for any future motion for preliminary injunctive relief, see
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, a Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is currently pending before this Court in which
Defendants have argued that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek any prospective relief and that
the case is now moot. (Dkts. 253, 258.) The Court will address Defendants’ broader
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concerns about the ongoing viability of the Plaintiffs’ claims in the context of the Motion
to Dismiss. But those concerns do not weigh against dissolving an injunction that is now
clearly moot.
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion and dissolves the January 16
Injunction.
ORDER
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	to 	Dissolve 	the 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	(Dkt. 	276) 	is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court’s January 16, 2026 Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 85) is DISSOLVED
as moot.
Date: April 8, 2026 	s/Katherine Menendez
Katherine Menendez
United States District Judge
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