Horswell v. REM River Bluffs et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
PHILLIP HORSWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
REM RIVER BLUFFS,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-CV-4507 (JWB/JFD)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Phillip Horswell’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1)
and Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No. 2 (“IFP Application”)). For the
reasons below, the Court recommends dismissing the Complaint and denying the IFP Ap-
plication as moot.
The Complaint names one defendant, REM River Bluffs. (See Compl. 1.) Mr. Hor-
swell does not further identify this entity, but it appears to be a social-services organization
that, among other things, provides housing for individuals. In his factual allegations,
Mr. Horswell states that a “house manager” at the facility “made [Mr. Horswell] practice”
a diet consistent with certain Islamic dietary restrictions (specifically, “eating no pork”) for
several weeks. (Id. at 4.) He alleges that this practice interfered with what he describes as
his “Roman Catholic religion of eating whatever I want except for during Lent.” (Id.) For
relief, Mr. Horswell seeks $22,729 in damages.
Under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a federal district
court “determines at any time” that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over an action, the
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court must dismiss the matter. The Complaint does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.1
Federal subject-matter jurisdiction in civil actions generally rests on one of two bases:
(1) federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (claims arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States), or (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (suits between citizens of different states or countries where the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $75,000). The Complaint therefore uses a template form that includes spe-
cific questions aimed at establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Compl. 3–4.)
In response to these questions, Mr. Horswell claims that federal-question jurisdic-
tion exists; asked to state the case’s federal-law basis, he writes, “C.M.R. 03, 201 Ch. 10,
subsec. 201-10-24.3.” (Id. at 3.) What this refers to is unclear. As best as the Court can tell,
it appears to refer to a policy on religious services within a policy-and-procedures manual
issued by the Maine Department of Corrections. See Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, State of
Maine, Dep’t of Corrs. Rules, at https://www.maine.gov/sos/rulemaking/agency-rules/de-
partment-corrections-rules (last visited Dec. 11, 2025). On its face, then, the Complaint
does not identify a federal-law cause of action. Mr. Horswell therefore has not shown that
federal-question jurisdiction exists here.2
1 As the party invoking subject-matter jurisdiction, Mr. Horswell bears the burden of es-
tablishing the Court’s jurisdiction. See Jones v. United States, 727 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir.
2013) (citing Great Rivers Habitat Alliance v. FEMA, 615 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2010)).
2 To be sure, Mr. Horswell might argue that his case presents a First Amendment issue
concerning his religious practices, and that this issue supports federal-question jurisdiction.
Even if so, the Complaint would fail to state a claim for several reasons. For example, it is
unclear from the Complaint whether REM River Bluffs can be held liable under the First
Amendment because it does not allege that REM River Bluffs is a government agency, a
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The Court therefore recommends dismissing this action in its entirety and denying
the IFP Application as moot.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons above, and based on all the files, records, and proceedings in this
case, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff Phillip Horswell’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. 	Mr. Horswell’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No.
2) be DENIED as moot.
Dated: December 11, 2025
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objec-
tions within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
state-controlled entity, or acted on behalf of a government official. The upshot is that
Mr. Horswell nowhere alleges that REM River Bluffs’s action was state action, an essential
element of any § 1983 claim that he might seek to bring based on First Amendment issues.
See, e.g., Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194–95 (2024) (citing cases).
s/ John F. Docherty
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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