Burdunice v. Mjanger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Lannon Lavar Burdunice,
Plaintiff,
v.
Siv Mjanger, Teresa Underwood,
Paul Schnell and William Bolin,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-4276 (JRT/DJF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Lannon Lavar Burdunice’s Complaint for alleged
violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). For the following reasons, the
Court recommends dismissing this action.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Burdunice is incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility–Rush City after being
convicted of second-degree intentional murder and unlawful firearm possession in Minnesota state
court. See generally State v. Burdunice, No. A18-1269, 2019 WL 3000714, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 8, 2019) (discussing conviction). Earlier this year, Mr. Burdunice was incarcerated at the
Minnesota Correctional Facility–Stillwater (“MCF–Stillwater”). (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) In April
2025, Mr. Burdunice filed a state habeas petition. (See id. ¶ 5; Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Relief Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 589.01, Under Minn. Const. Art. I § 7, Burdunice v. Bolin, No.
82-cv-25-2729 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2025).) Defendant Siv Mjanger was the judge assigned
to that matter. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 14.)
On May 14, 2025, Judge Mjanger issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding Defendant
William Bolin, MCF–Stillwater’s warden, to produce Mr. Burdunice on June 20, 2025 for a
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hearing on Mr. Burdunice’s petition. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7, 14; Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order
for Transportation, Burdunice v. Bolin, No. 82-cv-25-2729 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 14, 2025).)
Instead of producing Mr. Burdunice, Warden Bolin and Defendant Paul Schnell, Minnesota’s
Commissioner of Corrections, filed a motion to cancel the hearing. According to Mr. Burdunice,
the motion lacked any “viable legal or factual grounds.”1 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Finding otherwise,
Judge Mjanger granted the motion and canceled the hearing. (See id.) After briefing, Judge
Mjanger denied Mr. Burdunice’s habeas petition “without providing any substantive hearing or
opportunity for [Mr. Burdunice] to present arguments or evidence” concerning his habeas petition.
(See id. ¶¶ 15–16; Order Denying Pet. and Denying Req. for Evidentiary Hr’g, Burdunice v. Bolin,
No. 82-cv-25-2729 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2025).) Mr. Burdunice contends the judge’s failure
to hold the “required” hearing deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to challenge his
conviction. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 17.)
In addition to suing Warden Bolin and Commissioner Schnell for bringing their motion to
cancel the hearing, Mr. Burdunice sues Judge Mjanger and Teresa Underwood, a court
administrator, for failing to ensure that Judge Mjanger’s May 14, 2025 habeas writ (the one
originally issued to ensure Mr. Burdunice’s presence at the June hearing) was executed in a timely
and proper manner. (See id. ¶¶ 4–5.) He asserts two causes of action, alleging Defendants violated
his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
equal-protection guarantee. (See id. ¶¶ 19–29.) For relief, Mr. Burdunice seeks: (1.) a declaratory
1 But see Not. of Mot. and Mot. to Cancel the Hr’g Scheduled for June 20, 2020, Burdunice
v. Bolin, No. 82-cv-25-2729 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 3, 2025); Mem. In Supp. of Resp’ts’ Mot. to
Cancel the Hr’g Scheduled for June 20, 2020 at 1-2, Burdunice v. Bolin, No. 82-cv-25-2729 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. June 3, 2025).
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judgment that Defendants’ actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2.) an injunction
compelling Defendants to provide a full evidentiary hearing on Mr. Burdunice’s challenge to his
conviction; (3.) “punitive damages” of $1,000 against Judge Mjanger under Minn. Stat. § 589.07;
(4.) $70,000 in compensatory damages “from the State”; and (5.) fees and costs.2
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review any civil complaint in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer, and must dismiss the complaint (or any
portion) that is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,”
or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
When deciding whether a complaint states a viable claim, a court accepts its factual
allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Varga v.
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 764 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Loftness Specialized Farm Equip.,
Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2014)). A complaint need not be detailed, but its
allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It must also “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility test is
2 Mr. Burdunice states that he is suing each Defendant in his or her official capacity; he
does not expressly plead individual-capacity claims. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4–7.) The Eighth Circuit
applies a “course of proceedings” test to determine the capacity in which a Section 1983 defendant
is sued. See, e.g., S.A.A. v. Geisler, 127 F.4th 1133, 1135 (8th Cir. 2025) (en banc). Under that
test, the key question is whether the allegations and relief sought would put a defendant on notice
that the plaintiff is pursuing individual liability claims. See id. at 1139–40. Because Mr. Burdunice
seeks monetary relief (including punitive damages) and attributes the challenged conduct to each
Defendant, the Court construes the Complaint, for present purposes, as asserting individual-
capacity claims against each Defendant.
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“context-specific” and depends on a court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679;
see also Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Although courts are to
read pro se complaints liberally, such pleadings must still include enough facts to support each
claim. See, e.g., Sandknop v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 932 F.3d 739, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).
II. Official-Capacity Claims
Mr. Burdunice sues all Defendants in their official capacities. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4–7.) An
official-capacity suit against a state official is, in effect, a suit against the state itself. See, e.g., Bio
Gen LLC v. Sanders, 142 F.4th 591, 604 (8th Cir. 2025) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Absent waiver or abrogation, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for
damages against states in federal court. See, e.g., EEE Mins., LLC v. North Dakota, 81 F.4th 809,
815 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011)).
Minnesota has not waived its immunity for Section 1983 claims, and Section 1983 did not abrogate
state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Roe v. Nebraska, 861 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 66–67). Sovereign immunity therefore bars Mr. Burdunice’s official-capacity
claims for monetary damages, and the Court recommends dismissing those claims without
prejudice.
Official-capacity suits can seek prospective injunctive or declaratory (non-monetary) relief
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a plaintiff can sue
a state official in his or her official capacity for an injunction to stop an ongoing violation of federal
law, and such a claim is treated as having been brought against the official personally. 209 U.S.
123, 159–60 (1908); see also Stewart, 563 U.S. at 254–55 (discussing doctrine). Here, Mr.
Burdunice requests two forms of non-monetary relief, including: (1.) an injunction “compelling
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Defendants to provide [him] a full and fair evidentiary … hearing” on his habeas petition, “without
unnecessary delay”; and (2.) a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ past actions violated his
rights. (See ECF No. 1 § VIII.) Only the first of these demands is prospective and therefore falls
within the exception carved out in Ex Parte Young, but this claim faces other legal barriers.
First, any request for injunctive relief against Judge Mjanger is statutorily barred. In 1996,
Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” The
Complaint does not allege that any declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was
unavailable, so Section 1983 precludes injunctive relief against Judge Mjanger.
The injunctive relief Mr. Burdunice seeks against the remaining Defendants (an injunction
compelling a new hearing) effectively asks this Court to overturn a final state-court judgment.
That request triggers the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, a jurisdictional rule that bars federal district
courts from hearing cases that, as a practical matter, ask the federal court to review or overturn a
final state-court judgment. See, e.g., Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 754
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Friends of Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Beebe, 578 F.3d 753, 758 (8th
Cir. 2009)). Because Mr. Burdunice’s demands are precluded under this doctrine, the Court
recommends dismissing all the Complaint’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief against
Defendants in their official capacities.
III. Individual-Capacity Claims
A. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity
The Court construes the Complaint to also bring claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities. To the extent Mr. Burdunice seeks to bring such claims against Judge
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Mjanger and Teresa Underwood, his claims are barred by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages in Section 1983 actions for their judicial
acts, so long as they did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hamilton v. City
of Hayti, 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991)).
Here, the allegations against Judge Mjanger—that she canceled a habeas hearing and ruled on Mr.
Burdunice’s habeas petition—involve paradigmatic judicial functions within her jurisdiction as a
Minnesota district judge. Mr. Burdunice’s individual-capacity claims against Judge Mjanger fail
for this reason.
Mr. Burdunice’s claims against Ms. Underwood fail for a similar reason. Mr. Burdunice
alleges she “fail[ed] to ensure” that the originally scheduled June 2025 hearing occurred. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 5.) But her actions were intertwined with Judge Mjanger’s decisions: If the hearing was
canceled, it was because Judge Mjanger ordered it canceled. Ms. Underwood is therefore protected
by quasi-judicial immunity, which gives absolute immunity to court staff who carry out judicial
orders or functions integral to the judicial process. See, e.g., Hunt v. Acosta, 109 F.4th 1003, 1007
(8th Cir. 2024) (citing cases, including Hamilton, 948 F.3d at 928). The Court thus recommends
dismissing any individual-capacity claims against both Judge Mjanger and Ms. Underwood.
B. Procedural Due Process
Mr. Burdunice also appears to bring individual-capacity claims against Defendants Schnell
and Bolin for violating his right to procedural due process. Mr. Burdunice alleges Commissioner
Schnell and Warden Bolin “interfered” with a court-ordered habeas hearing by filing their motion
to cancel the hearing, which he says lacked any “viable legal or factual grounds.” (ECF No. 1 ¶
15.) Although the Court ordinarily cabins its review at this stage in litigation to the allegations in
the complaint, it may take judicial notice of public court records, including Defendants Schnell
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and Bolin’s motion to cancel the hearing and supporting memorandum filed in the state habeas
case. See, e.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005). Those filings show
that Commissioner Schnell and Warden Bolin advanced specific legal and factual arguments under
Minnesota statutes and caselaw that supported cancellation of the June 2025 hearing. (See note 1
above.) The Court thus disagrees with Mr. Burdunice’s characterization that the motion lacked
any legitimate basis.
This finding undermines Mr. Burdunice’s due process claim against Defendants Schnell
and Bolin. Mr. Burdunice maintains that canceling the hearing was impermissible and deprived
him of a “meaningful opportunity” to challenge his confinement. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 17.) But the public
record shows that the hearing was canceled through proper exercise of the judicial process:
Defendants Schnell and Bolin filed a written motion supported by legal authority, and the presiding
judge granted relief. Judge Mjanger canceled the hearing and ruled on the petition by appropriately
exercising her judicial authority. Nothing in the Complaint alleges Defendants Schnell or Bolin
misled the court, fabricated evidence, or used coercion outside the judicial process; Mr. Burdunice
alleges only that they filed a motion and prevailed. The Complaint therefore fails to state plausible
procedural due process claims against Defendants Schnell and Bolin in their individual capacities
and those claims should be dismissed.
C. Equal Protection
Mr. Burdunice’s equal protection claim similarly lacks merit. Mr. Burdunice claims
Defendants Schnell and Bolin treated him “differently than similarly situated individuals who are
afforded a meaningful opportunity to contest the legality of their detention.” (Id. ¶ 18; see also id.
¶¶ 26–29.) The Equal Protection Clause “‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
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situated should be treated alike.’” Sanimax USA, LLC v. City of S. St. Paul, 95 F.4th 551, 563 (8th
Cir. 2024) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
Mr. Burdunice does not allege discrimination based on membership in any protected class
(e.g., race, religion, or national origin). The Complaint thus must be read as trying to plead a “class
of one” claim—i.e., that Mr. Burdunice was singled out for different treatment without any rational
basis. See, e.g., Sanimax USA, 95 F.4th at 564 (quoting Mensie v. City of Little Rock, 917 F.3d
685, 692 (8th Cir. 2019)). In the Eighth Circuit, pleading a class-of-one claim requires “‘a specific
and detailed account of the nature of the preferred treatment of the favored class,’” particularly
when officials exercise discretion. Id. (quoting Mensie, 917 F.3d at 692).
Here, Mr. Burdunice’s equal protection claim against Defendants Schnell and Bolin fails
for two independent reasons. First, he does not identify any similarly situated comparators. He
alleges only that other detainees get “hearings in similar circumstances,” while he did not. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 28; see also id. ¶ 18.) But he fails to identify any other habeas petitioners or specify facts
supporting his assertion that their circumstances are similar. Second, Mr. Burdunice does not
plead facts supporting an inference of intentional discrimination or the absence of any rational
basis for Defendants’ conduct. Mr. Burdunice’s equal protection theory is that Defendants Schnell
and Bolin sought cancellation of the June 2025 hearing “without viable legal or factual grounds.”
(Id. ¶ 15.) But as discussed above, the record shows Defendants Schnell and Bolin advanced legal
and procedural reasons to cancel the hearing, which the court found persuasive. Mr. Burdunice
thus has not plausibly alleged equal protection claims against Defendants Schnell and Bolin and
those claims should be dismissed. For all the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends dismissing
the Complaint in its entirety.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Lannon Lavar Burdunice’s Complaint (ECF No. 1)
be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Dated: December 19, 2025 s/ Dulce J. Foster
DULCE J. FOSTER
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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