Wright v. Swift County, Minnesota et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
________________________________________________________________________
Treasure Wright,
Plaintiff,
v.
Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley,
in her official capacity as Swift County
Treasurer/Auditor,
Defendants.
File No. 25-cv-3376 (ECT/DTS)
OPINION AND ORDER
________________________________________________________________________
Treasure Wright, pro se.
Carlos B. Soto-Quezada and Jason J. Kuboushek, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, MN, for
Defendants Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley.
________________________________________________________________________
Pro se Plaintiff Treasure Wright contacted Swift County several times in May, June,
and July 2025, to purchase tax-forfeited real property. 	According to Ms. Wright, the
County and its then-auditor and treasurer, Katie Foley, did not respond to some of Ms.
Wright’s inquiries, took too long to respond to others, gave Ms. Wright inaccurate
information, 	and 	ultimately 	prevented 	Ms. 	Wright 	from 	bidding 	on 	or 	purchasing
tax-forfeited property. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 1–3.
In this case, Ms. Wright claims these actions (1) violated her right to procedural due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violated her right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violated her right to be free from retaliation because of her
exercise of First Amendment freedoms; and (4) amounted to government misconduct more
generally. Id. at 4. Ms. Wright brings each of these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl.
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at 4. 	Ms. Wright brings these claims against Swift County and Ms. Foley only “in her
official capacity as Swift County Treasurer/Auditor.” Id. at 1.
Ms. Wright alleges that Defendants’ actions caused her emotional distress, damaged
her “dignity and trust in fair access to public resources,” caused her financial harms “from
being denied a life-changing property opportunity,” and caused her to incur medical costs.
Id. at 5. For relief, Ms. Wright seeks compensatory damages of $3 million; a declaration
that Defendants violated her constitutional rights; injunctions that would require Swift
County to “restore [its] tax-forfeited land webpage,” offer her “a fair and documented
opportunity to purchase tax-forfeited land,” and give her “construction of legal easement
access to any parcel” she purchases; and “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if legal
counsel is retained.” Id.
Defendants seek summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and
the motion will be granted. 	No reasonable jury could find that Ms. Wright’s injuries
resulted from a governmental policy or custom. 	Ms. Wright cannot state a cognizable
claim for relief against Swift County without satisfying Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	Monell’s basic rule is “that civil rights
plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that their injury was
caused by a municipal policy or custom.” Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29,
30–31 (2010). In other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 because
it employed a tortfeasor, but it may be “sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief . . . [only if] the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
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adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” 	Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 	The same
rule applies to Ms. Wright’s claims against Ms. Foley because she sued Ms. Foley in only
her official capacity. “A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is
‘another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Baker
v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55).
“Official-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurs only when a constitutional injury
is caused by ‘a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.’” Gladden v. Richbourg,
759 F.3d 960, 968 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 810–11 (8th
Cir. 2006)).
Ms. Wright has not met the burden Monell imposes. Her Complaint pleads no facts
regarding the existence of a policy or policies that might have caused the constitutional
violations she alleges. As part of their motion, Defendants explain that their responses (or
non-responses) to Ms. Wright’s inquiries resulted—not from any official policy—but from
administrative challenges prompted by the combination of the County’s auditor and
treasurer offices. See ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 4–8. These, in turn, “caused administrative delays in
all processes, including responding to emails,” the inability to access information regarding
tax-forfeited properties through the County’s website, and the listing of some tax-forfeited
properties as available “when they had already been sold.” Id. ¶¶ 6–7. In her response to
Defendants’ motion, Ms. Wright neither addresses these explanations nor identifies any
facts that might suggest that Defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions were policy-driven in
the sense Monell requires.
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Monell 	aside, 	Ms. 	Wright 	does 	not 	explain 	or 	cite 	evidence 	showing 	how
Defendants’ treatment of her might conceivably rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. 	She does not identify what process she did not receive that she believes the
Fourteenth Amendment required. See Jenner v. Nikolas, 828 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that, to show a due-process deprivation, a plaintiff 	must show (1) that
Defendants deprived her of a liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (2) that she was deprived of that interest without procedures that were
constitutionally sufficient) (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per
curiam)). She does not identify the basis for her equal-protection claim. Is it sex, race, or
something else? She identifies no comparator whom Defendants treated more favorably.
See Adam & Eve Jonesboro, LLC v. Perrin, 933 F.3d 951, 959 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining
that the “first step” when evaluating an equal-protection claim is to decide “whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated that she was treated differently than others who were similarly
situated to her”) (quoting In re Kemp, 894 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2018)). She does not
identify what First Amendment-protected activity forms the basis for her retaliation claim.
Nor does she connect protected activity to an adverse action. 	See Bennie v. Munn, 822
F.3d 392, 397 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that, to state a First Amendment–retaliation
claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) [she] engaged in a protected activity,
(2) the government official[s] took adverse action against [her] that would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated
at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity”). Finally, Ms. Wright identifies no
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legal authority that might support the assertion of a generic “government misconduct”
claim under § 1983.
Citing Rule 56(d), Ms. Wright argues that consideration of Defendants’ summary-
judgment motion would be premature because “discovery has not yet occurred.” ECF No.
22 at 2. 	This is not persuasive. 	“Under Rule 56(d), a court may defer considering a
summary judgment motion or allow time for discovery ‘[i]f a nonmovant shows by
affidavit or declaration that, for specific reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify
its opposition.’” 	Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822, 836 (8th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)). “However, Rule 56 ‘does not require trial courts
to allow parties to conduct discovery before entering summary judgment.’” 	Id. (quoting
United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam)). To comply with Rule 56(d), “it is not enough for a party to set forth some facts
she hopes to elicit from further discovery.” Id. at 836–37 (citation modified). “[T]he mere
assertion that evidence supporting a party’s allegation is in the opposing party’s hands is
insufficient to justify a denial of a summary judgment motion on [Rule 56(d)] grounds.”
Id. at 837 (quoting Jones v. City and County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir.
1988)). “Instead, the party must show that the facts sought exist.” Id. (citation modified).
Here, Ms. Wright does not do what Rule 56(d) requires. She filed a declaration, but
she described the evidence she seeks in the broadest possible terms. 	She asserted, for
example, that she required discovery of documents “including but not limited to internal
emails, memoranda, policies, directives, and records concerning over-the-counter sales of
tax-forfeited 	property, 	auction 	scheduling, 	and 	determinations 	regarding 	parcel
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availability.” ECF No. 23 ¶ 4. Ms. Wright described other evidence she seeks at an equally
high level of generality. See id. ¶¶ 5–9. Ms. Wright’s explanation for why she needs these
documents is similarly high-level. 	She asserted only that, “[w]ithout discovery of the
foregoing materials, Plaintiff cannot fully present facts essential to justify her opposition
to summary judgment, including evidence bearing on Defendants’ knowledge, intent,
internal decision-making, and the accuracy and completeness of representations made to
Plaintiff.” 	Id. ¶ 10. 	These generalized assertions do not identify what discovery is
necessary with any reasonable precision. 	They do not connect requested discovery to
claims. They do not justify deferring consideration of Defendants’ motion.
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendants Swift County, Minnesota and Katie Foley’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 16] is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff 	Treasure 	Wright’s 	Complaint 	[ECF 	No. 	1] 	is 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 17, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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