Judish v. Peterson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Grant Anthony Judish,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Eden Prairie, Brett Lindeman, Dan
Peterson, Mark Gustad, Rob Johnston,
Christopher Wood and Matthew Sackett,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-1302 (LMP/DJF)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Grant Anthony Judish brought this lawsuit asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Minnesota criminal law related to the alleged mishandling of his personal property in
connection with his arrest in April 2021. Mr. Judish initially brought claims against the City of
Eden Prairie and various Eden Prairie Police Department officials (“Eden Prairie Defendants”),
Hennepin County and its officials, and the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and
Training. Pursuant to previous orders of dismissal (ECF Nos. 23, 42), only the claims against the
Eden Prairie Defendants remain.
This matter is now before the Court on the Eden Prairie Defendants’ motion for partial
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Motion”) (ECF No. 31). Mr. Judish asserts claims against the
Eden Prairie Defendants under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and various Minnesota criminal statutes, including Minn. Stat. §§ 609.43,
609.746 and 617.261. Mr. Judish does not specify whether he intends to bring these claims against
the officials in their individual or official capacities. In light of Mr. Judish’s pro se status and the
course of the proceedings, the Court interprets these claims as claims against the officials in both
their individual and official capacities. See S.S.A. v. Geisler, 127 F.4th 1133, 1136-39 (8th Cir.
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2025) (overturning “clear statement rule” and holding Section 1983 plaintiff need not expressly
allege capacity in which he sues defendants); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating
pro se documents should be held to less stringent pleading standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers); Papantony v. Hedrick, 215 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding pro se complaints
should be construed broadly).
The Eden Prairie Defendants move to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant Dan Peterson and the Minnesota statutory claims against all Eden Prairie Defendants.
They also seek dismissal of all claims against the City and Defendants Brett Lindeman, Rob
Johnston, Christopher Wood and Matthew Sackett. Dismissal of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Defendants Peterson and Gaustad is not requested at this time. (See
ECF No. 33 at 2 n.1.) Based on the parties’ written submissions, and on the entire file, the Court
recommends that the Motion be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Judish’s Complaint presents a broad Section 1983 civil rights action stemming from
his April 8, 2021 arrest on an alleged harassment restraining order violation. (See ECF No. 1 at
4.) Scott County Sheriff’s Department officers arrested Mr. Judish and later transferred him to the
custody of Officer Brett Lindeman. (Id.) At the time of transfer, they also handed over to Officer
Lindeman various items of property taken from Mr. Judish, including an e-cigarette, BB gun,
phone, micro-SD card, sim card, keys, and a wallet containing a driver’s license and several
financial cards. (Id.) Officer Lindeman transported Mr. Judish to the Hennepin County Jail
(“HCJ”) for booking. (Id.) According to Mr. Judish, Officer Lindeman took custody of his e-
cigarette, BB gun, phone, micro-SD card, sim card, and keys without logging them, mentioning
them in the arrest report, or informing other officers. (Id.)
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Mr. Judish contends the initial lack of documentation became a problem when HCJ staff
asked him to sign a property inventory form that did not list all the items taken from him, including
the cell phone. (Id.) He states that he refused to sign the inventory form because it did not list the
“$500 cell phone” taken from him, and that an HCJ officer told him he had to sign it anyway. (Id.)
According to Mr. Judish, when he continued to refuse, several officers stripped him naked, locked
him in an empty holding cell for hours with no furniture, windows or restroom facilities, and put
him on suicide watch to force him to provide a signature. (Id. at 4–5.) He states that a deputy later
admitted, “[W]e checked the cameras and the officer that brought you in took the phone.…He said
the detective told him he wanted the phone so he came back in and grabbed it.” (Id. at 5.)
Mr. Judish eventually signed the inventory form “under duress”, was returned to the
holding cell, and was later moved to the general population. (Id. at 5.) Mr. Judish states that
Officer Lindeman eventually documented that he entered Mr. Judish’s phone, BB gun, e-cigarette,
and keys into evidence when he amended the arrest report four days after the arrest, on April 12,
2021. (Id.)
Mr. Judish further alleges that, around April 9, 2021, Detective Dan Peterson searched his
phone and SD card without a warrant and copied and converted private files, including
pornographic images of Mr. Judish’s girlfriend. (Id. at 5–6.) Mr. Judish also asserts that—despite
a judge’s order—Detective Mark Gustad refused to return the devices until Mr. Judish provided
his passcodes, and that when the Eden Prairie Police Department finally returned them, the SD
card was damaged. (Id. at 5–7.) Mr. Judish alleges Detective Gustad did not petition the court for
a warrant to legally access the phone and the SD card until after Mr. Judish had been in custody
for over 30 days and indicated he was willing to enter into a plea agreement. (Id. at 6.)
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Mr. Judish additionally states that he complained to Eden Prairie Police Department
officials about the alleged property damage, illegal searches, and officer misconduct, and that his
complaints were ignored and never investigated. (Id. at 6–8.) Mr. Judish specifically states that
he complained to Lt. Rob Johnston, who assured Mr. Judish he would investigate. (Id. at 7–8.)
Lt. Johnston contacted Mr. Judish approximately two weeks later and reported he found no
evidence of wrongdoing and would close the investigation. (Id. at 8.) Mr. Judish then reported
his complaints to Police Captain Christopher Wood and Police Chief Matthew Sackett. (Id. at 8–
9.) Both responded to Mr. Judish that they found no evidence of misconduct and refused to
comment further. (Id.) Finally, Mr. Judish claims that after a judge ordered his release during a
hearing on April 12, 2021, Detective Gustad filed a new, misleading probable cause statement
asserting that Mr. Judish was “in custody on other matters” and requested a rush warrant for his
arrest in order to keep him in custody. (Id. at 5.)
The Eden Prairie Defendants argue the Complaint fails to plausibly assert constitutional
claims against Defendants Lindeman, Johnston, Wood or Sackett in their individual capacities and
that these claims are barred by qualified immunity. They also move to dismiss Mr. Judish’s official
capacity claims and claims against the City on the ground that his Complaint fails to support
municipal liability under Section 1983 because he does not plead facts showing his alleged injuries
were caused by any particular Eden Prairie Police Department policy, custom, or practice. They
further contend Mr. Judish’s Eighth Amendment claims fail entirely because he asserts no injury
arising from post-conviction confinement. Finally, they argue the claims under Minnesota
criminal statutes must be dismissed because the asserted statutes do not give rise to any private
right of action.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes all facts in the
complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most
favorable to the complainant. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so,
however, a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview
Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the
facts alleged, Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must
contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at
555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” will not pass muster under Twombly. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This standard “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Although pro se complaints must be construed liberally, Rule 12(b)(6) applies to pro se litigants,
and their complaints must contain sufficient facts to state a claim as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).
At this stage in the litigation, before the parties have had a fair opportunity to fully develop
the record through discovery, the Court focuses on the allegations in the Complaint and largely
excludes consideration of extraneous materials. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d
1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court may consider only the complaint, matters of public record, orders, materials embraced by the
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complaint, and exhibits attached to the complaint). Here, the Eden Prairie Defendants attach an
Evidence Custody Receipt and various emails to their opposition brief (ECF No. 34-1) and invite
the Court to draw inferences from those materials that do not support—and even directly
contradict—the allegations in the Complaint. The Court disregards these materials.
The Eden Prairie Defendants describe the Evidence Custody Receipt (ECF No. 34-1 at 1-
2) as a document that Mr. Judish “refers to in his Complaint” (ECF No. 33 at 4), but this statement
is misleading.1 Though the Complaint refers to a property intake inventory form (ECF No. 1 at 4-
5), the inventory form, which Mr. Judish alleges he signed, is plainly a different document than
the Evidence Custody Receipt (ECF No. 34-1 at 1-2), which includes no signature or any signature
line. Similarly, though the Complaint vaguely refers to various email communications between
Mr. Judish and the Eden Prairie Police Department (ECF No. 1 at 8-9), the Court cannot conclude
that the alleged communications are the same as those submitted in opposition to the Motion.
Because the proffered materials are not necessarily embraced by the Complaint and do not meet
any other ground for consideration on a Rule 12(b)(g) motion, the Court will not consider them at
this point in the proceedings.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Individual Capacity Claims
1. Claims Against Officer Lindeman
The Complaint alleges that Officer Lindeman violated Mr. Judish’s Fourth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by “seizing” Mr. Judish’s property without a warrant and failing to
observe proper documentation protocols in taking custody of Mr. Judish’s property. (ECF No. 1
1 The Eden Prairie Defendants’ opposition brief fails to identify where in the Complaint
Mr. Judish purportedly refers to the Evidence Custody Receipt, although the brief is otherwise
replete with citations to the Complaint by specific page and paragraph number. (See, e.g., ECF
No. 33 at 3.)
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at 9.) Defendants contend that Officer Lindeman had the authority to seize Mr. Judish’s property
without a warrant, and that Mr. Judish did not have a constitutional right for his seized property to
be stored at the Hennepin County Jail, as opposed to the Eden Prairie Police Department.
As a threshold matter, it is blackletter law that a warrantless search of a suspect’s person
incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 338-39 (2009). The seizure of items from a suspect during the booking process is also
permissible. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643–46 (1983) (holding authorities are entitled
to search an arrestee’s person at police station during booking). The Complaint alleges that police
seized Mr. Judish’s property incident to his arrest and during booking for an alleged violation of a
harassment restraining order. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Mr. Judish does not challenge probable cause for
his arrest and the Complaint states that he entered a guilty plea in the criminal case charged in
connection with that arrest. (Id. at 6.) The facts alleged in the Complaint thus do not support a
reasonable inference that the seizure of Mr. Judish’s personal items violated his Fourth
Amendment Rights.
Furthermore, there is no basis to believe that Officer Lindeman was involved in seizing the
items at issue from Mr. Judish. Mr. Judish challenges Officer Lindeman’s purported seizure of his
electronic cigarette, BB pistol, cell phone and keys. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) But the Complaint alleges
that officers from the Scott County Sheriff’s Department initially arrested Mr. Judish and then
“handed over” the electronic cigarette, BB pistol and cell phone upon transferring custody of Mr.
Judish to Officer Lindeman. (Id.) The allegations thus indicate that Scott County Sheriff’s
Department officers, and not Officer Lindeman, were responsible for the seizure. Similarly, the
Complaint suggests that Mr. Judish’s keys were seized from Mr. Judish by HCJ staff during
booking at the jail when Officer Lindeman was no longer present. (Id.) And regardless of when
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or how the items were seized, the Complaint fails to allege that Officer Lindeman seized property
from Mr. Judish’s person at any point in time. Rather, Mr. Judish’s unlawful seizure claim appears
to be premised solely on the contention that Officer Lindeman took possession of the items in
question from the HCJ booking area after they were already in law enforcement custody. (Id.)
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are not implicated by the transfer of evidence from a
jail booking area to another law enforcement agency, because a defendant has no expectation of
privacy in the booking area of a jail. See United States v. Russell, 847 F.3d 616, 618 (8th Cir.
2017) (“An individual asserting Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate that he personally
has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable.”)
(cleaned up).
To the extent Mr. Judish seeks to hold Officer Lindeman accountable for the seizures
effected by the Scott County Sheriff’s Department’s and HCJ staff, his claims are misplaced. See
Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541, 547 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Liability for damages for a
federal constitutional tort is personal, so each defendant’s conduct must be independently assessed.
Section 1983 does not sanction tort by association.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, Officer Lindeman’s mere transportation of the items following their initial seizure by
other law enforcement agencies is too attenuated to carry liability for the seizures. See Foote v.
Doe 1, 679 F. Supp. 3d 775, 800 (S.D. Iowa 2023) (finding officers who merely transported and
booked suspect following potentially unconstitutional arrest by other officers not liable under
Section 1983).
Mr. Judish’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officer Lindeman is similarly without
merit. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of “life, liberty or
property without due process of law”. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The Complaint does not specify
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how this applies to Mr. Judish’s claims against Officer Lindeman, but Mr. Judish appears to
contend that by removing his property from the HCJ booking area without properly documenting
that he took the property into evidence, Officer Lindeman deprived Mr. Judish of the property
without due process. But a law enforcement officer’s retention of lawfully seized evidence for
investigatory purposes does not give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Rodgers v.
Knight, 781 F.3d 932, 941 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Where retention of evidence is justified by pending
charges or an arrest warrant, no further process is required.”) (quoting Walters v. Wolf, 660 F.3d
307, 314 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen seizing property for criminal investigatory purposes,
compliance with the Fourth Amendment satisfies pre-deprivation procedural due process as well.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). That Officer Lindeman retained Mr. Judish’s property while
Mr. Judish remained under investigation thus does not establish a viable Fourteenth Amendment
claim.2
Insofar as Mr. Judish challenges Officer Lindeman’s alleged failure to properly document
his removal of the property, Mr. Judish does not identify any specific statute, rule, regulation or
policy that required Officer Lindeman to do so. And regardless, “[a] violation of state law, without
more, is not the equivalent of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bagley v. Rogerson, 5
F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, to the extent that Officer Lindeman initially failed to
properly document his removal of the property from the HCJ in violation of police chain of custody
protocols, any such failure could not have contributed to an unconstitutional property deprivation
2 Mr. Judish asserts that some of the items Officer Lindeman took had “no evidentiary
value whatsoever” (ECF No. 1 at 9). But Mr. Judish has no first-hand knowledge of what was
potentially relevant to the law enforcement investigation and the Court does not accept this
conclusory argument as true for purposes of deciding this Motion. See Hanten, 183 F.3d at 805;
Westcott, 901 F.2d at 1488.
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since he amended his report and documented the items he took into evidence just four days later,
while Mr. Judish was still under investigation. (See ECF No. 1 at 4.)
The Complaint further asserts that Officer Lindeman violated Mr. Judish’s Eighth
Amendment rights. Though the factual predicate for this claim is not entirely clear, Mr. Judish
appears to allege his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because Officer Lindeman’s “failure
to observe protocol … was a direct cause of further violations of Plaintiff Judish’s rights,” namely,
his alleged mistreatment by deputies at the jail. (ECF No. 1 at 9.)
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment arising from
their conditions of confinement. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Ambrose v. Young,
474 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment applies to conditions of confinement). Defendants correctly note that the protections
afforded under the Eighth Amendment do not apply to pretrial detainees such as Mr. Judish. (See
ECF no. 33 at 12, citing Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2000)). Pretrial detainees
are nonetheless entitled to the same protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least
as much protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as under the Eighth Amendment.”) (citing
Ervin v. Busby, 992 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding pretrial detainees’ claims are evaluated
under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment). Mr. Judish’s claim thus arises
under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth. However, for purposes of the Court’s analysis
this is a distinction without a difference, because courts must construe pro se complaints liberally,
no matter how “inartfully pleaded,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The Court therefore will not dismiss
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Mr. Judish’s Eighth Amendment claim based on this technical pleading error and instead construes
it as a conditions of confinement claim arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, Mr. Judish’s claim against Officer Lindeman fails under even this liberal
construction. Officer Lindeman cannot be said to have been “involved in the allegedly
unconstitutional acts” of the HCJ deputies for merely having removed Mr. Judish’s property from
the jail without documenting it. See Grider v. Bowling, 785 F.3d 1248, 1252 (8th Cir. 2015)
(holding police officer was not liable for excessive force used by second police officer when he
had no forewarning that second police officer would use excessive force). Though Officer
Lindeman’s alleged documentation error may have contributed to a misunderstanding between Mr.
Judish and HJC staff regarding the whereabouts of the cellphone, Officer Lindeman played no role
in how the HCJ deputies—or Mr. Judish himself—responded to that misunderstanding. Officer
Lindeman left the jail prior to any of acts constituting Mr. Judish’s alleged mistreatment by HCJ
deputies, and the Complaint is devoid of any facts plausibly suggesting he directed, approved or
participated in it in any way. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Mr. Judish’s claim that Officer Lindeman subjected
him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement fails for these reasons, and the Court
recommends that all Mr. Judish’s constitutional claims against Officer Lindeman be dismissed.
2. Claims Against Lieutenant Johnston, Captain Wood and Chief Sackett
Mr. Judish alleges that Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights in their “misuse of authority to avoid detriment, to protect others
from detriment, and to harm another.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) More specifically, Mr. Judish bases
this claim on Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett’s alleged failure to properly
investigate his alleged mistreatment and the handling of his property following his arrest. (ECF
No. 1 at 8–9.) Defendants argue Mr. Judish has failed to allege any plausible claims for
supervisory liability under Section 1983 because Mr. Judish’s complaints to Lt. Johnston, Captain
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Wood, and Chief Sackett did not arise until after the alleged violations occurred, such that Mr.
Judish merely disagrees with an after-the-fact determination.3 (ECF No. 33 at 11.)
Supervisory liability may attach under Section 1983 if a supervisor “directly participates”
in a constitutional violation. Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996). A
supervising officer also may be accountable for the actions of his subordinates if he: (1) had notice
of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct in which they engaged; (2) was deliberately indifferent to
or tacitly authorized that conduct; (3) failed to take sufficient remedial action; and (4) that failure
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. Sturgeon v. Faughn, 36 F.4th 804, 809 (8th Cir. 2022)
(cleaned up) (citing Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 355 (8th Cir. 2012); Andrews, 98 F.3d at
1078). To be held liable, “[t]he supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he or she] might see.” Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d
805, 809 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Judish can show neither “direct participation” nor “deliberate indifference” with
respect to Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett, because they were not even aware of
the misconduct of which he complains until after it was over. (ECF No. 1 at 8–9.) Mr. Judish
alleges he first contacted Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett after he was discharged
from Hennepin County Jail, had entered a plea of guilty, and his possessions were returned to him.
(Id. at 7.) His claims against Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett are based on the
3 Defendants contend that Mr. Judish did not make his complaints until “two years after
the City returned his property.” (ECF No. 33 at 6, 11.) In asserting this argument, they rely on an
inference drawn from emails attached to their opposition brief, which for the above-stated reasons
are inappropriate for the Court’s consideration on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Porous Media, 186
F.3d at 1079. The Court accordingly disregards this claim and looks to the allegations in Mr.
Judish’s Complaint. The Complaint alleges Mr. Judish contacted Defendants Johnston, Wood and
Sackett to complain only after he pleaded guilty and his property was returned to him. (ECF No.
1 at 7-9.)
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assertion that they failed to investigate his complaints to his satisfaction; not that they participated
in the alleged misconduct in any way or had any prior knowledge of it. Moreover, based on the
timeline set forth in the Complaint, it is not possible that their inaction was the proximate cause of
Mr. Judish’s alleged injuries. For this reason, the Court recommends that the Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett be dismissed.
3. Eighth Amendment Claim Against Detective Peterson
Mr. Judish asserts claims against Detective Dan Peterson under the Fourth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Judish bases this claim on the allegation that Detective Peterson
accessed his cell phone without a warrant and transferred the contents of that phone—including
pornographic images and videos of his ex-girlfriend—to a work computer. (Id. at 9–10.) The
Eden Prairie Defendants argue the Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because the
Eighth Amendment applies only to prisoners who challenge their conditions of confinement post-
conviction. (ECF No. 33 at 12.) The Court agrees. As previously stated, the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to the claims asserted in Mr. Judish’s Complaint because he challenges only his
conditions of confinement as a pretrial detainee. (See Wilson, 209 F.3d at 715–16.) Moreover,
the Court cannot construe this claim as a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Complaint does not assert that Detective Peterson in any way contributed
to Mr. Judish’s conditions of confinement at the HJC, or indeed, had any contact with Mr. Judish
or the HJC at all. Insofar as Mr. Judish challenges Detective Peterson’s alleged use, mishandling
or misappropriation of his personal property without a warrant, these claims arise under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments and not the Eighth. The Eighth Amendment claim should thus be
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dismissed while the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Detective Peterson, which
Defendants do not presently challenge, should be allowed to proceed.4
B. Municipal Claims
Mr. Judish also brings claims against the City of Eden Prairie and its employees in their
official capacities. When suing municipalities and government officials in their official capacities
under Section 1983, a mere showing that a constitutional violation occurred is not enough. The
plaintiff must show that “the violation resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an
unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Jackson v. Stair,
944 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
Mr. Judish asserts Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the City and
all the individual Eden Prairie Defendant employees in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 1,
9–11.) He argues he has met his burden to plead municipal liability under Monell by alleging facts
showing the City has an informal practice of “tolerating and disregarding misconduct by its police
officers, as evidenced by repeated notification of misconduct complaints provided to all members
of command staff.” (ECF No. 44 at 2.) The Eden Prairie Defendants contend these claims fail
because Mr. Judish has not shown that an official policy of the government is “the moving force
of the constitutional violation,” as required by Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
4 Having found that all the individual-capacity claims at issue in the Motion should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court does not reach Defendants’ argument that these claims
are precluded by qualified immunity.
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The Court agrees with Defendants. Mr. Judish neither contends the City of Eden Prairie
harmed him as the result of an unconstitutional official municipal policy nor pleads any injury
arising from a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Instead, Mr. Judish argues his
Complaint asserts an “unofficial custom” of ignoring misconduct, as evidenced by the City’s
alleged disregard for Mr. Judish’s complaints regarding his treatment. (ECF No. 44 at 2.) Mr.
Judish is correct that a pattern or practice of failing to investigate complaints can demonstrate a
Section 1983 violation, but such failures must occur in connection with prior incidents. Mettler v.
Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Evidence that a police department has failed to
investigate previous incidents similar to the incident in question may support a finding that a
municipal custom exists, and that such a custom encourages or allows officers to use excessive
force without concern for punishment.” (emphasis added)). Otherwise, no ongoing pattern is
established, and causation is lacking. A failure to adequately investigate complaints of the alleged
misconduct itself cannot prove municipal liability, unless those complaints came during the alleged
misconduct. Id.
Mr. Judish made his first complaints to City officials about Detective Gustad’s alleged
failure to return the cell phone after Mr. Judish was released from custody on May 12, 2021. (ECF
No. 1 at 6–7.) At that time, the criminal case against Mr. Judish was still pending. See State v.
Judish, 27-CR-21-7281 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (Sentencing Order, July 9, 2021), available at
https://publicaccess.courts.state.mn.us/CaseSearch.5 As previously discussed, a law enforcement
officer’s retention of lawfully seized evidence for investigatory purposes while a criminal case is
still pending is not an unconstitutional practice. See Rodgers, 781 F.3d at 941. Furthermore,
5 The Court takes judicial notice of the public court record in Mr. Judish’s criminal case.
See Porous Media, 186 F.3d at 1079; Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005)
(court can take judicial notice of orders filed in related case).
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following Mr. Judish’s complaints, the City returned his phone to him just a few days later. (Id.
at 7.) If anything, the City’s response shows that it did not turn a blind eye to his complaints about
Detective Gustad’s retention of the phone.
Mr. Judish’s other complaints occurred well after the alleged misconduct, including his
complaints to Lt. Johnston, Captain Wood, and Chief Sackett concerning the condition of the SIM
card and his complaints regarding Officer Lindeman and Detective Peterson. Because the City
officials’ responses to these complaints could not have contributed to Mr. Judish’s alleged injuries,
they do not establish municipal liability. Mr. Judish has not alleged facts showing the City had an
unofficial custom or practice plausibly leading to unconstitutional conduct that could have caused
his alleged injuries. The Court thus recommends Mr. Judish’s constitutional claims against the
City of Eden Prairie and the individual City of Eden Prairie Defendants in their official capacities
be dismissed.
C. State Law Claims
Mr. Judish brings state law claims against several of the Eden Prairie Defendants under
Minnesota criminal statutes 609.43 (misconduct of public officer or employee), 609.746
(interference with privacy) and 617.261 (nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images).
None of these claims has merit. Mr. Judish purports to bring all his claims, including the state law
claims, under Section 1983. (ECF No. 1 at 1–2.) However, Section 1983 does not provide a cause
of action for violating state laws. Preston v. City of Pleasant Hill, 642 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir.
2011) (“A plaintiff may not bring a state claim under the aegis of § 1983”). Therefore, Mr. Judish’s
state law claims must be directly actionable, if at all.
Under Minnesota law, a criminal statute does not establish a civil cause of action unless
the statute “expressly or by clear implication so provides.” Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47
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n.4 (Minn. 1990); see also Graphic Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark
Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Minn. 2014); Becker v. Mayo Foundation, 737 N.W.2d 200, 207
(Minn. 2007). None of the statutes Mr. Judish asserts includes any provision expressly establishing
a civil private right of action. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.43, 609.746, 617.261.
Furthermore, none of these statutes establishes a private right of action by clear
implication. In determining whether a statute creates an implied civil cause of action, the
Minnesota Supreme Court looks to legislative intent informed by basic principles of statutory
construction. See Graphic Commc’ns, 850 N.W.2d at 691-92 (no private cause of action created
by pharmacy statute providing that difference in generic and brand name drug costs “shall be
passed on to the purchaser”); Krueger v. Zeman Const. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858, 863-64 (Minn. 2010)
(Minnesota Human Rights Act provision prohibiting contract discrimination established cause of
action for contracting parties but not their employees); Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 207-09 (Child
Abuse Reporting Act establishes criminal liability but no private cause of action).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has previously stated that Minn. Stat. § 609.43 does not
establish an implied civil cause of action. Sellers v. City of St. Paul, No. C6-94-2362, 1995 WL
238765, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1995); see also Clayborne v. Minnesota Dept. of
Corrections, Case No. 23-cv-3612 (JMB/TNL), 2024 WL 3105956, at *5 (D. Minn. June 24, 2024)
(no private right of action under Minn. Stat. § 609.43 in federal court). Moreover, no clear
implication of legislative intent to establish a civil cause of action arises from any reasonable
construction of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.746 or 617.261. Both statutes expressly impose criminal
penalties. An enforcement mechanism for the protections afforded under each statute therefore
already exists, and the Court assumes the Legislature’s decision to impose criminal and not civil
liability was intentional. See Graphic Commc’ns, 850 N.W.2d at 691 (reasoning that express
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criminal and civil penalties demonstrate that the Legislature did not intend to provide an implied
private civil cause of action). Additionally, in this case reading a private cause of action into either
statute would be particularly problematic because the Defendants are law enforcement officers
sued for actions taken in the course of their duties. Both Minn. Stat. § 609.746 and Minn. Stat. §
617.261 contain provisions precluding enforcement of the statutes against law enforcement
officers engaged in the performance of their lawful duties. See Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(k);
Minn. Stat. § 617.261, subd. 5(1). For these reasons, the Court cannot infer that the Minnesota
Legislature intended to create the civil claims Mr. Judish seeks to advance under these statutes.
Mr. Judish’s state law claims are not actionable for these reasons, and the Court accordingly
recommends that they be dismissed.
D. Local Rule 7.1
Mr. Judish additionally argues denial of Defendants’ Motion is required because
Defendants failed to meet their Local Rule 7.1(a) obligation to meet and confer with Mr. Judish
prior to filing the Motion. (ECF No. 44 at 2.) The Court agrees that the meet-and-confer
requirement applies to motions to dismiss and that this requirement is important. However, the
Court has discretion to excuse a party’s failure to comply with the requirements of this local rule,
see First Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Lee, No. 14-CV-1843 (PJS/SER), 2016 WL 881003, at *7 n.10 (D.
Minn. Mar. 8, 2016), and finds an exercise of discretion in this instance is warranted.
Rule 7.1 requires a moving party to file a meet-and-confer statement along with the
underlying motion unless the opposing party is unavailable. L.R. 7.1(a). Here, there is no dispute
that the Eden Prairie Defendants failed to file a simultaneous meet-and-confer statement, and there
is no indication they were unable to meet with Plaintiff before they filed their Motion because he
was unavailable. Although the Eden Prairie Defendants did not file a meet-and-confer statement
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when they filed the Motion on August 25, 2025 as required, they conferred with Mr. Judish a few
days later and filed a statement on September 4, 2025. (ECF No. 40.) At that point, Mr. Judish
had not yet filed his response to the Motion. (See ECF No. 44.) If Mr. Judish had believed any
narrowing or dismissal of his claims was appropriate, he could have included a narrowing
concession or dismissal in his briefing. Instead, his response opposes all the Eden Prairie
Defendants’ arguments. (See id.) In this context he cannot now credibly complain that he was
“deprived of the opportunity to resolve or narrow the issues before motion practice.” (Id.) Because
the Eden Prairie Defendants quickly rectified their omission, there was neither any prejudice to
Mr. Judish arising from the delay nor any added burden on the Court. To deny the Motion in this
context would elevate form over function and undermine the Court’s consideration of the issues
on the merits. Mr. Judish’s argument that the Motion should be denied on this ground should be
rejected.
The Court’s conclusion should not be viewed as permission to sidestep the meet-and-confer
requirement, however. Unless excused or exempt under the Rule, any motion filed without a meet-
and-confer statement will likely be met with an order to subsequently meet and confer and file a
statement to avoid denial. Repeated failures to satisfy the meet-and-confer requirement may result
in a status conference or sanctions.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants City of Eden Prairie, Brett Lindeman, Dan
Peterson, Mark Gustad, Rob Johnston, Christopher Wood, and Matthew Sackett’s Motion for
Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 31) be GRANTED as follows:
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1. All claims against Defendants Brett Lindeman, Rob Johnston, Christopher Wood,
Matthew Sackett, and the City of Eden Prairie be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
2. All official-capacity claims against Defendants Mark Gustad and Dan Peterson be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
3. The Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Dan Peterson be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE; and
4. All claims arising under Minnesota state criminal law be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
The Eden Prairie Defendants did not seek dismissal of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment individual-capacity claims against Defendants Dan Peterson and Mark Gaustad, and
those claims should be allowed to proceed.
Dated: November 24, 2025 s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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