Hezel v. Eischen et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
James Hezel,
Petitioner,
v.
B. Eischen, FPC Duluth, Warden,
Respondent.
Case No. 25-cv-1294 (JWB/DJF)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner James Hezel’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2441 (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1).1 When Mr. Hezel filed his Petition
he was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota (“FPC Duluth”) (id. at 2).
He sought reinstatement of First Step Act time credits (“FTCs”) to be used for an earlier transfer
to prerelease custody in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”), arguing that the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) failed to adequately calculate those FTCs. 	Mr. Hezel also asked the Court to
review his eligibility under the Second Chance Act of 2007 (“SCA”) for placement in an RRC and
to mandate access to the BOP’s Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) during his
imprisonment at FPC Duluth. Because Mr. Hezel is no longer imprisoned at FPC Duluth and has
been transferred to an RRC, the Court recommends denying the Petition as moot.2
1 The undersigned United States Magistrate Judge considers this matter pursuant to a
general referral in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1.
2 As set forth below, there are no material facts in dispute. 	Accordingly, an evidentiary
hearing is unnecessary. Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 1996).
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I. 	Background
Mr. Hezel is serving an aggregated 204-month term of imprisonment followed by 5-year
term of supervised release for Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (ECF No. 11-1 at 2). Mr. Hezel filed his habeas Petition
on April 7, 2025 (see ECF No. 1). In his Petition, Mr. Hezel asked the Court to direct the BOP to
award him credit for 51 “disallowed days” of FTCs for time Mr. Hezel spent when he was
“transferred between different prison institutions” to be applied towards earlier RRC placement.
(ECF No. 1 at 5.) At that time, his projected home detention eligibility date was February 26, 2028
and his projected release date via FTCs was August 25, 2028 (ECF No. 11-1 at 2).
Mr. Hezel’s circumstances have changed significantly, however. The BOP inmate locator
website indicates Mr. Hezel’s custody is now managed by the Detroit Residential Reentry
Management (“RRM”) field office. See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed April 24,
2026). 	Upon noting this new information on the inmate locator website, the Court ordered
Respondent to file a response: (1.) identifying the location and nature of Mr. Hezel’s present
confinement; and (2.) addressing Respondent’s position as to whether this matter is moot. (ECF
No. 14.) Respondent filed a response to the Court’s order on April 7, 2026, confirming that the
BOP transferred Mr. Hezel to an RRC, Volunteers of America INC in Indianapolis, Indiana, on
March 5, 2026. 	(ECF Nos. 16 at 1, 17 at 2, 17-3 at 1.) 	Respondent states that this matter is
therefore moot, since Mr. Hezel can no longer benefit from the additional time credits he sought
in his Petition. 	(ECF No. 16 at 1.) 	The Court gave Mr. Hezel an opportunity to file a reply to
Respondent’s response, but he did not file a reply within the court-ordered deadline. 	(See ECF
No. 14.)
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II. 	Analysis
A. 	Mootness
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
actual, ongoing cases and controversies.” 	Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000)) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.
1). “When, during the course of litigation, the issues presented in a case ‘lose their life because of
the passage of time or a change in circumstances ... and a federal court can no longer grant effective
relief,’ the case is considered moot.” Id. (quoting Haden, 212 F.3d at 469). When a case becomes
moot, a federal court cannot “address the merits because any opinion [the court] would issue would
be merely advisory.” In re Search Warrants Issued in Connection with Investigation of S. Cent.
Career Ctr., W. Plains, Mo. (“In re Search Warrants”), 487 F.3d 1190, 1192 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing
Haden, 212 F.3d at 469).
Mr. Hezel’s Petition requests an earlier transfer to prerelease custody via reimposition of
FTCs, immediate consideration of his eligibility for prerelease custody, and access to the BOP’s
RDAP during his imprisonment at FPC Duluth. (See ECF No. 1 at 5.) Mr. Hezel has now been
transferred to prerelease custody, and he is no longer imprisoned at FPC Duluth. Therefore, unless
an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, this case became moot when the BOP transferred
Mr. Hezel from FPC Duluth to RRC placement in Indiana. The Court can no longer grant effective
relief, see Ali, 419 F.3d at 723, and any opinion would be merely advisory, see In re Search
Warrants, 487 F.3d at 1192.
But the Court should not dismiss the Petition as moot if any of the following exceptions
applies: “(1) secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2)
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the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily
ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified
class action suit.” Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-2124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL 3267738, at *2 (D.
Minn. July 11, 2017) (internal citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL
3268176 (D. Minn. July 31, 2017); see also, e.g., Scheper v. Rios, No. 19-cv-402 (MJD/ECW),
2020 WL 4060729, at *3 (D. Minn. June 5, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL
4059875 (D. Minn. July 20, 2020).
None of these exceptions apply here. Mr. Hezel suffered no cognizable collateral
consequences related to whether the BOP properly granted his FTCs. “Collateral consequences”
include restrictions on the right to engage in certain types of businesses or professions, the right to
vote, the right to own a gun, and the right to serve on a jury. 	Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 9
(1998). 	Moreover, “a habeas petitioner cannot rely on the collateral consequences of his
conviction to save his case from mootness if he is not actually challenging the validity of his
conviction.” Tejado-Hurtado v. Fikes, No. 21-cv-2766 (JRT/LIB), 2022 WL 291006, at *2 (D.
Minn. May 26, 2022) (quoting Woodward v. Fondren, No. 8-cv-194 (ADM/JJK), 2008 WL
5214396, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2008), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2906199
(D. Minn. July 22, 2022)). 	Mr. Hezel does not challenge the validity of his conviction or the
imposition of his sentence. Rather, he challenges the calculation of his FTCs, the timing of his
release to an RRC, and the availability of the RDAP. This exception thus does not apply.
The exception for wrongs “capable of repetition yet evading review” applies “if the matter
is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends or expires and there is a reasonable
expectation that [the petitioner] will be subjected to the same action again.” In re Search Warrants,
487 F.3d 1193. 	This exception does not apply here because Mr. Hezel has been released from
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FPC Duluth and there is nothing in the record to support any “reasonable expectation” that he will
be subject to incarceration in a federal corrections facility again. See Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738,
at *3. If Mr. Hezel were to return to such a facility, his confinement would be based on an entirely
new set of facts and circumstances for which he would be free to bring a new habeas petition. See
id.
Next, there is nothing in the record to suggest the BOP transferred Mr. Hezel to prerelease
RRC custody simply to preclude the Court’s review. 	And finally, Mr. Hezel did not bring his
Petition on behalf of a class of individuals. (See ECF No. 1.)
Because the Court can no longer grant effective relief to Mr. Hezel and none of the
exceptions to mootness applies, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his Petition. The
Court recommends the Petition be denied as moot and this matter be dismissed without prejudice
for these reasons.
B. 	Exhaustion
Though the Court recommends dismissal on grounds of mootness, dismissal would be
warranted in any event because Mr. Hezel has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent states that though Mr. Hezel filed administrative grievances at the institutional and
regional levels, he failed to appeal the denials of those grievances through the final administrative
level of appeal. (ECF No. 9 at 7-12; ECF No. 10 at 4-5.) Mr. Hezel has proffered no evidence to
suggest otherwise, but he argues administrative exhaustion is unwarranted and futile. (ECF No. 1
at 2-3.) The Court disagrees.
The federal habeas corpus statute does not include an exhaustion requirement, see
generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but courts have long required prisoners to exhaust administrative
remedies through the BOP before seeking habeas relief, see Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d
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943, 946 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam). By failing to raise his concerns all the way through the applicable BOP grievance process,
Mr. Hezel deprived the BOP of a full and fair opportunity to explain or remedy its decisions, if
necessary. Mr. Hezel’s failure to exhaust his BOP administrative remedies on the issues raised in
Petition establishes an additional ground for dismissal. See Mathena, 577 F.3d at 946; Chappel,
208 F.3d at 1069.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT Petitioner James Hezel’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2441 (ECF No. 1) be DENIED as moot.
Dated: April 27, 2026 s/ Dulce J. Foster
DULCE J. FOSTER
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with
the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
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