Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Laye K.,
Petitioner,
v.
Markwayne Mullin,1 Secretary of
Department of Homeland Security, in his
official capacity; Kika Scott, Senior Official
Performing the Duties of the Director for
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, in her official capacity; and Steven
Rice, Field Office Director, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services St. Paul-
Minneapolis Field Office, in his official
capacity,
Respondents.
File No. 25-cv-1076 (ECT/EMB)
OPINION AND ORDER
Cameron Lane Youngs Giebink, David L. Wilson, Gabriela Sophia Anderson, and
Katherine Lourdes Santamaria El Bayoumi, Wilson Law Group, Minneapolis, MN, for
Petitioner Laye K.
Craig R. Baune, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents
Markwayne Mullin, Kika Scott, and Steven Rice.
Laye K. is a Liberian citizen. He applied for lawful permanent residency under the
Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act. USCIS denied his application. The problem,
as USCIS saw things, was that Laye’s initial entry into the United States was based on a
lie: When Laye was sixteen years old, he paid a smuggler to get him into the United States.
1 	Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted in place of Kristi Noem under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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The smuggler presented U.S. customs agents with a passport that falsely indicated Laye
was a U.S. citizen. 	Based on the fake passport—and the false representation of U.S.
citizenship that came with it—Laye was allowed to enter the country. 	Under the law,
noncitizens who falsely represent themselves to be U.S. citizens to gain admission into the
country are generally ineligible to become lawful permanent residents. USCIS applied this
general rule to deny Laye’s lawful-permanent-residency application.
Laye brought this case to challenge legal conclusions USCIS reached to deny his
application. 	Laye argues that, under the law, he cannot be held responsible for the
smuggler’s lie, and that even if he could, he is eligible for a statutory waiver that might
excuse his actions.
Respondents seek the case’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and the motion will be granted. The legal arguments Laye makes to absolve him
of responsibility for the smuggler’s false representation of Laye’s U.S. citizenship are not
persuasive, and the waiver he identifies is not available.
I
Before 	turning 	to 	the 	background 	facts, 	the 	interplay 	between 	the 	usual
Rule 12(b)(6) standards and the limited judicial review available under the governing
immigration statute deserves a brief explanation. 	Under the familiar Rule 12(b)(6)
standards, a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792
(8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 	Although the factual allegations need not be detailed,
they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 	Bell Atl.
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
In one respect, the governing statute is at odds with these standards. The statute—
the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (“LRIF”), National Defense Authorization
Act 	for 	Fiscal 	Year 	2020, Pub. 	L. 	No. 	116–92, 	§ 	7611, 	133 	Stat. 	1198, 	2309—
circumscribes judicial review of a USCIS decision denying an application for lawful
permanent residency submitted under the statute. 	Id. § 7611(g). 	Specifically, the LRIF
precludes judicial review, id. § 7611(g)(1), except for “the review of a constitutional
question or a question of law under section 704 of title 5, United States Code, with respect
to a denial of adjustment of status under this section,” id. § 7611(g)(2). The LRIF does not
except—and thus strips a federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction to review—USCIS’s
factual findings. See id. § 7611(g). If a federal court cannot review the agency’s factual
findings, then it is difficult to understand how a court could, in line with the ordinary Rule
12(b)(6) standards, accept the truth of an LRIF-governed petition’s factual allegations to
the extent those allegations contradict or are different from the agency’s factual findings.
Put another way, a petitioner cannot end-run the LRIF’s jurisdictional bar by alleging facts
at odds with the agency’s findings expecting a court will accept their truth at the
motion-to-dismiss stage.
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Regardless, as best I can tell, the interplay between the usual Rule 12(b)(6) standards
and the LRIF’s jurisdiction-stripping provision is largely academic here. USCIS’s factual
findings appear in a decision dated October 16, 2024. 	ECF No. 19-1. The parties agree
that this document appropriately may be considered. 	Respondents filed the October 16
decision with their motion. See id. Laye did not object to the decision’s consideration; he
discussed it in his brief. 	See ECF No. 33 at 4.2 	And the agency’s factual findings as
described in this decision are not materially different from the factual allegations in Laye’s
Petition. 	That probably explains why Respondents agreed to assume the truth of the
Petition’s allegations as part of their motion. ECF No. 18 at 2 n.1. Regardless, if there are
differences, the agency’s factual findings are controlling. With these matters clarified, turn
next to the facts found by the agency and the relevant procedural history.
II
Laye is a Liberian citizen. ECF No. 19-1 at 1; Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 10. He was born
in Liberia on February 10, 1998. ECF No. 19-1 at 3; Pet. ¶ 15. In 2014, when Laye was
sixteen years old, he paid an individual named Ali Donzo $1,300 to assist Laye in gaining
2 	Rule 12(b)(6) allows the document’s consideration. Though considering “matters
outside the pleadings” generally transforms a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary
judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), this is not so when the relevant materials are “necessarily
embraced” by the pleadings. Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir.
2017). 	“In general, materials embraced by the complaint include documents whose
contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which
are not physically attached to the pleadings.” Id. (citation modified). Courts “additionally
consider ‘matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to
judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case,
and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned.’” Id. (quoting
Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012)). 	The
agency’s decision is integral to Laye’s claims—they target the decision’s legal premises.
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admission into the United States. ECF No. 19-1 at 4; Pet. ¶ 19. Before boarding a plane
bound for America, Ali provided Laye with a fake U.S. passport. ECF No. 19-1 at 4. Laye
examined the document. Id. It purportedly belonged to an American citizen named “Alh
Donzo.” Id.; Pet. ¶ 20. Ali accompanied Laye on the flight to the United States. See ECF
No. 19-1 at 4; Pet. ¶ 21. 	The flight landed in the United States—the Petition alleges at
John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York—on August 27, 2014. ECF No. 19-1
at 3; Pet. ¶ 21. 	Laye “presented [himself] for admission” to the United States, ECF No.
19-1 at 4, perhaps at customs and security checkpoints overseas before arriving in New
York, Pet. ¶ 21. Ali “made the representations to [customs agents]” necessary to present
Laye for admission, including presenting the fake passport and making false statements on
Laye’s behalf to the effect that he was a United States citizen. ECF No. 19-1 at 4. Laye
said nothing about his citizenship status; Ali did all the talking. See id.; Pet. ¶¶ 21–22.
In September 2020, Laye applied for lawful permanent residency in the United
States under the LRIF. ECF No. 19-1 at 1; Pet. ¶ 23. USCIS denied the application. See
ECF No. 19-1 at 1. 	USCIS determined that Laye was inadmissible under a provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (or “INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). ECF No.
19-1 at 4. This provision says that any noncitizen “who falsely represents, or has falsely
represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose of benefit
under [the INA] . . . or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). 	In reaching this determination, USCIS rejected Laye’s argument
that he remained admissible because it was Ali—and not Laye—who falsely claimed Laye
was a citizen. See ECF No. 19-1 at 4. The agency explained:
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USCIS does not find your argument that you cannot be held
accountable for the actions of the individual you paid to
procure your entry into the United States to be persuasive. You
are responsible for the representations made by the person you
paid to assist you in entering the United States. 	See USCIS
Policy Manual, Volume 8, Part K, Chapter 2 (“If an applicant’s
attorney or agent makes the false representation, the applicant
is held responsible. 	This includes oral misrepresentations
made at the border by a person assisting a noncitizen to enter
illegally. Furthermore, a noncitizen cannot deny responsibility
for any misrepresentation made by the noncitizen based on the
advice of another person.”).
Id. 	USCIS also rejected Laye’s argument that his status as a minor exempted him from
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s coverage. 	ECF No. 19-1 at 4. 	And USCIS determined that no
waiver of inadmissibility was available. 	Id. 	Laye asked the agency to reopen and
reconsider its decision. ECF No. 37 at 1. USCIS dismissed Laye’s request and affirmed
its initial decision. See id. at 3.
Laye asserts four claims in this case. (1) He claims the agency’s legal interpretation
of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) is incorrect. 	In Laye’s view, the statute’s inadmissibility bar
“cannot be triggered by the acts of a minor, let alone the acts of a third party imputed to
that minor.” 	Pet. ¶ 63. 	Laye seeks judicial review of this interpretation under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. See Pet. ¶¶ 59–69 (Count
I). (2) Laye claims the inadmissibility-waiver provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) applies to
lawful-permanent-residency claims under the LRIF, and he claims the agency erred in not
reaching this legal conclusion. 	Pet. ¶¶ 73–74. 	He seeks judicial review of this
interpretation under the APA. See Pet. ¶¶ 70–80 (Count II). (3) Pursuant to the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Laye seeks a declaration in his favor on the legal question
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raised in Count I—i.e., that “USCIS cannot invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)([I]) based
on the conduct of a minor or the conduct of an adult third party imputed to a minor.” Pet.
¶ 83; see id. ¶¶ 81–83 (Count III). 	(4) Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Laye
seeks a declaration in his favor on the legal question raised in Count II—i.e., “that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159(c) forms the proper waiver standard for applications for adjustment of status under
LRIF for applicants who USCIS declares need[] a waiver of inadmissibility.” 	Pet. ¶ 86;
see 	id. 	¶¶ 	84–86 	(Count 	IV). 	For 	relief, 	Laye 	seeks 	a 	remand 	of 	his
lawful-permanent-residency application to USCIS for further adjudication consistent with
his interpretation of the law and attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this
action. See Pet. at 12 ¶¶ 1–7 (following “WHEREFORE” clause).
III
A
The INA defines “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” to mean “the status
of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States.” 	Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)). Noncitizens present in the United States can apply to adjust their
status to that of a permanent resident through multiple legal pathways. These include, for
example, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (“Adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person
admitted for permanent residence”), 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (“Adjustment of status of refugees”),
and country-of-origin-specific provisions. An individual seeking adjustment of status must
“make[] an application for such adjustment” and demonstrate that he is eligible under the
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relevant adjustment provision. 	8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); accord 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b); 8 C.F.R.
§ 209.1.
The LRIF is a country-of-origin-specific adjustment provision. 	It “allows for the
adjustment of status of certain Liberian nationals [who] are otherwise admissible.” Bryant
v. Rice, No. 24-cv-3687 (JRT/ECW), 2025 WL 2210889, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2025).
The LRIF directs that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security “shall adjust
the status of an alien” who meets certain criteria, including that the person be “admissible
to the United States for permanent residence.” LRIF § 7611(b)(1); see Prince K. v. Noem,
No. 24-cv-3134 (PJS/ECW), 2025 WL 2697501, at *3 (D. Minn. Sep. 22, 2025). The INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), identifies “a number of things that make an alien inadmissible to the
United States for permanent residence,” Prince K., 2025 WL 2697501, at *3. One of the
things that makes an alien inadmissible is a false claim to United States citizenship.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).
Laye 	claims 	that, 	for 	three 	reasons, 	the 	agency’s 	determination 	that 	he 	is
inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) was legally incorrect. First, Laye argues that he
alone must have falsely represented that he was a United States citizen—that is, a third
party’s representation doesn’t count under the statute. Second, Laye argues that, if a third
party’s representation counts, the statute required Laye to know the representation was
being made on his behalf. Third, Laye argues that, if a third party’s representation counts,
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the statute does not apply to a juvenile on whose behalf of the representation is made.
Consider each of these arguments in that order. 3
1
The first issue is one of statutory interpretation. Framed in this case’s context, the
question is whether § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s inadmissibility bar may be applied to an alien
whose hired smuggler makes a false U.S. citizenship claim on the alien’s behalf. 	For
several reasons, the better answer is it may.
(a) The statute’s text is broad enough to encompass this circumstance. The statute
does not say that the alien “alone” or “personally” must falsely represent his citizenship.
And it is generally improper to interpret a federal statute in a way that would “require[]
adding a word to the statute’s text.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. United States, 431 F.3d
374, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004)); see Dekovic
v. Rubio, No. 24-1431, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 668425, at *10 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026)
(rejecting interpretation that “would require us to read words into the statute that are not
included in its plain text”); see also Exby-Stolley v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 979 F.3d 784,
810 (10th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (noting that when interpreting a statute, it “is generally
impermissible” to “effectively add[] words to the statute”).
(b) A rule of construction supports this understanding. When “a federal statute . . .
is silent as to the applicability of agency law, the Supreme Court has stated that the
3 	If he is responsible for Ali’s false claim of U.S. citizenship, Laye does not dispute
that the representation was made “for any purpose or benefit under [the INA],” namely
admission into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).
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‘apparent authority theory has long been the settled rule in the federal system.’” Arriaga
v. Fl. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Am. Soc’y of
Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567 (1982)). “[A]pparent authority
is ‘created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the
principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal
consents to have that act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.’” Id.
at 1245 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 27 (A.L.I. 1958)). Applying this rule
here, an agent’s representation of false U.S. citizenship on the noncitizen’s behalf could
trigger § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s inadmissibility bar.
(c) No authority construes § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s inadmissibility bar as being
limited to aliens who “alone” or “personally” misrepresent their U.S. citizenship status,
and one sign points the other way. 	USCIS has understood § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to
incorporate the apparent-authority rule. Recall the agency applied the following provision
from its then-effective Policy Manual in denying Laye’s lawful-permanent-residency
application:
If 	an 	applicant’s 	attorney 	or 	agent 	makes 	the 	false
representation, the applicant is held responsible. This includes
oral 	misrepresentations 	made 	at 	the 	border 	by 	a 	person
assisting an alien to enter illegally. 	Furthermore, an alien
cannot deny responsibility for any misrepresentation made by
the alien based on the advice of another person.
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Policy Manual, vol. 8, pt. K, ch. 2 § D.6, https://
web.archive.org/web/20250716135754/https:/www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8
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-part-k-chapter-2 (last visited Mar. 29, 2026);4 see ECF No. 19-1 at 4 (loosely quoting the
Policy Manual provision). Though the agency’s interpretation is not entitled to deference,
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–413 (2024), Laye has identified no
authority questioning the agency’s historical understanding, and the Court’s independent
research hasn’t identified any, either.
(d) Construing the statute as limiting its inadmissibility consequence to aliens who
“alone” or “personally” misrepresent their U.S. citizenship status would risk absurd
incentives and results. 	See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004)
(recognizing that a court should “not construe a statute in a manner that leads to absurd or
futile results” (citing United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940))).
That construction would give a noncitizen strong incentive to retain a third party to falsely
represent his U.S. citizenship. 	This work-around’s obviousness would, in turn, risk
substantially constricting the statute’s utility.
Laye makes essentially three arguments to support his preferred construction of
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), but none is persuasive. First, Laye argues that the statute’s use of
“himself or herself” limits its reach to aliens who personally misrepresent their citizenship.
ECF No. 33 at 8–9. This misconstrues the statute’s text. The words “himself or herself”
4 	The first sentence of this provision has since been revised. 	It now reads: “If
someone else, such as an alien’s attorney, agent, or legal representative makes the false
claim to U.S. citizenship on the alien’s behalf, the alien is held responsible if the officer
finds the alien was aware.” U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Policy Manual, vol. 8, pt.
K, ch. 2 § D.6, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-k-chapter-2 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2026). The remaining two sentences have not substantively changed. See
id. (using “false claim” in place of “misrepresentation”).
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modify the misrepresentation (the alien’s citizenship), not the identity of the individual
making the misrepresentation. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Second, Laye argues that
“Congress expressly imputed the conduct of third parties, conspirators, and agents to
noncitizens . . . elsewhere in the [INA],” suggesting it did not intend to do so in
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). 	ECF No. 33 at 10; see Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (citation modified)).
But the provisions Laye cites to support this contention, see ECF No. 33 at 16–17, address
a different circumstance. 	They prescribe consequences for those who aid noncitizens in
perpetrating an unlawful act. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (“Any alien who at any
time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter
or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.”). 	None of the
provisions Laye cites addresses whether a noncitizen may face some adverse consequence
based on the actions of the noncitizen’s agent. 	They are not helpful for purposes of
applying the statutory-construction principle articulated in Russello. 	Third, Laye argues
that a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (or “BIA”), Matter of M-R-, 6 I. &
N. Dec. 259 (B.I.A. 1954), shows that the BIA has “properly confined culpability to the
actor himself for decades.” 	ECF No. 33 at 36. 	The decision does not support that
contention. 	The decision addressed whether a statute that rendered inadmissible any
noncitizen who procured false documents to enable himself to enter the United States
applied to a noncitizen (M.R.) who procured false documents to enable others (his children)
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to enter the country. See Matter of M-R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 259–261. The BIA concluded
that the statute applied “only to the alien whose machinations were on his own behalf.” Id.
at 260. The decision did not address whether a noncitizen might be held responsible for
the representations of an agent or another third party made on the noncitizen’s behalf.5
2
The answer to Laye’s next contention—that, if the smuggler’s false representation
of Laye’s U.S. citizenship counts, the statute required Laye to know the misrepresentation
was being made on his behalf—is more straightforward. I don’t understand Respondents
to 	disagree. 	They 	do 	not 	argue 	that 	Laye 	would 	have 	been 	inadmissible 	under
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) had he been unaware of Ali’s misrepresentation. 	This argument’s
absence makes sense considering the agency’s published understanding of the statute. As
applied to noncitizens who benefit from false U.S. citizenship representations made on
their behalf by third parties, the agency understands § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to require that
the noncitizen be “aware” of the false representation. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
Policy Manual, vol. 8, pt. K, ch. 2 § D.6 (explaining that “the alien is held responsible” for
5 	The agency continues to understand § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) as the Board construed
the statute in Matter of M-R-. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Policy Manual, vol.
8, pt. K, ch. 2 § D.5, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-k-chapter-2 (last
visited Mar. 28, 2026) (“An alien is only inadmissible if he or she makes a false claim to
U.S. citizenship for his or her own purpose or benefit. 	If an alien falsely claims U.S.
citizenship on behalf of another person, the alien that made the misrepresentation is not
inadmissible for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship.”).
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the third party’s misrepresentation “if the officer finds the alien was aware”), https://
www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-k-chapter-2 (last visited Mar. 29, 2026).6
The agency’s October 16, 2024 decision reflects this understanding. USCIS found
several facts establishing Laye’s awareness of Ali’s false representation that Laye was a
United States citizen. 	Based on Laye’s own statements, the agency determined (1) that
Laye paid Ali $1,300 to assist in procuring Laye’s admission to the U.S.; (2) that, as part
of the plan, Ali gave Laye a U.S. passport that Laye testified “would get [him] into the
U.S.”; (3) that Laye told USCIS he “looked at the passport and saw that it belonged to a
U.S. citizen”; (4) that Laye knew Ali “intended to present a false passport from a U.S.
citizen on [Laye’s] behalf in order to procure [Laye’s] admission to the United States”; and
(5) that Laye stood by when Ali followed through on the plan by presenting the fake
passport to customs officials and falsely representing that Laye was a U.S. citizen. 	ECF
No. 19-1 at 4. Considering these facts, it is not surprising that Laye testified during USCIS
interviews in March 2019 and March 2021 that he used a false U.S. passport to enter the
United States. 	See id. at 3 (“During your interview with USCIS on March 11, 2019, for
your first Form I-485, you testified you used a U.S. passport to enter the United States, and
the name and photo in the passport were not your own.”); see also id. (“On March 11, 2021,
during your interview for your second Form I-485, you again testified you entered the
6 	Beyond his awareness or knowledge of Ali’s misrepresentation, Laye does not argue
that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) includes a particular intent requirement. See ECF No. 33 at 10–
15.
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United States using a U.S. passport under the identity of Alh Donzo.”). These findings are
unreviewable here. LRIF § 7611(g).7
Though the agency did not say explicitly that Laye “was aware” of Ali’s false
representation that Laye was a U.S. citizen, I don’t see how the findings might be construed
another way (i.e., as either a finding that Laye was unaware or as no finding on the
question). Laye knew the passport was going to be passed off as if it were his. Laye knew
the passport “belonged to a U.S. citizen.” 	And Laye knew the passport’s character as
belonging to a U.S. citizen was essential to procuring his admission into the United States.
ECF No. 19-1 at 4. The agency interpreted and applied the statute as Laye argues it should
have.
3
Laye argues that, under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), an agent’s false representation of
U.S. 	citizenship 	cannot 	count 	against 	the 	noncitizen 	on 	whose 	behalf 	the 	false
representation was made when the noncitizen was a minor. 	Laye identifies several
authorities to support this contention, but none justifies the legal conclusion he seeks.
These authorities are addressed here in the order they appear in Laye’s opposition brief.
7 	In his brief, Laye seems to challenge the factual findings underlying USCIS’s
determination that he was aware of Ali’s misrepresentation. Laye claims, for example, that
he “did not hire [Ali] to say he was a citizen,” that “he was not told he would be pretending
to be a U.S. Citizen,” and that his background “[a]s an orphan from a war-torn nation” who
was “raised in refugee camps” left him “unaware that presenting a U.S. passport was an
implicit claim to U.S. citizenship.” 	ECF No. 33 at 11. 	These allegations cannot be
accepted as true without reviewing and rejecting USCIS’s findings, but that would be
improper. See LRIF § 7611(g).
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(a) Laye cites immigration authorities refusing to impute noncitizen parents’
unlawful actions or those actions’ consequences to the parents’ noncitizen children, but
these 	authorities 	do 	not 	support 	a 	comparable 	legal 	conclusion 	regarding 	Laye’s
responsibility for Ali’s false representation of Laye’s U.S. citizenship. Laye cites a case,
Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2006), in which the Sixth Circuit held that the
BIA lacked a reasonable basis to impute the fraudulent conduct of noncitizen parents to
their five-year-old daughter, id. at 402–09. 	ECF No. 33 at 17–18. 	It is difficult to
understand how this rule might apply or hold significance here. This case does not involve
a parent-child relationship. As the parties have characterized things, this case involves a
principal-agent relationship. 	And though it may be possible for a parent to act “in a
capacity difficult to distinguish from that of an agent,” Cruz v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. Rptr.
3d 368, 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), the court in Singh did not find that the parent-child
relationship at issue in that case possessed principal-agent attributes. It did not address the
question at all. Nor does Laye explain how the Singh court’s analysis might apply to the
ordinary (non-parent-child) principal-agent relationship. 	Similarly, Laye argues that Ali
very likely committed a federal crime when he facilitated Laye’s entry into the United
States, ECF No. 33 at 20 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(2)(B)(ii)), and he points
out that courts do not impute a noncitizen parents’ actions to their noncitizen children
“where the imputation involves unlawful conduct,” ECF No. 33 at 20 (quoting Shyiak v.
Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 579 F. Supp. 2d 900, 908 (W.D. Mich. 2008)).
Laye cites no authority applying this non-imputation rule outside the parent-child context.
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(b) Laye cites authorities that treat minors differently from adults in the immigration
context 	to 	show 	that 	minors 	are 	categorically 	“exempted 	from 	the 	inadmissibility
provisions at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I),” ECF No. 33 at 21, but considered against
statutory text, the cited authorities don’t carry that weight. Begin with the statute’s text. It
applies to “[a]ny alien” who falsely represents that he or she is a U.S. citizen. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). 	As the Supreme Court “has repeatedly explained, the word ‘any’
has an expansive meaning.” 	Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 338 (2022) (citation
modified). 	It means the statute applies to aliens “of whatever kind.” 	Id. 	If Congress
intended the statute not to apply to minors, “any” would be an anomalous word choice.
There is more. 	When Congress wanted to exempt minor children from an immigration
statute’s coverage, it did so explicitly. 	See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I). 	That
Congress 	included 	an 	explicit 	minor-child 	exemption 	in 	a 	different 	immigration
provision—especially a subsection within the same statute—indicates it did not intend
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to share that exemption.8
8 	Laye cites several INA provisions that treat minors and adults differently. See ECF
No. 33 at 21–25. He points out, for example, that an unaccompanied minor cannot swear
an oath to become a U.S. citizen, id. at 21–22 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1445(f)), admit
removability, 	id. 	at 22 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c)), or sponsor noncitizens for
immigration purposes, id. at 23 (first citing 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f)(1); and then citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 213a.2(c)(A)). 	These provisions reflect policy choices to treat minors and adults
differently in specific contexts. If anything, they support the conclusion that Congress did
not make the same policy choice in § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). For essentially this same reason,
the “broader jurisprudence surrounding minors” Laye cites, see ECF No. 33 at 29–31
(citing, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)), does not inform the statute’s
interpretation.
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Laye argues that an Eighth Circuit case, Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982 (8th
Cir. 2011), supports the conclusion that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) does not apply to minors.
ECF No. 33 at 21. 	In that case, a noncitizen (Sandoval) applied for lawful permanent
residency. 	Sandoval, 641 F.3d at 984. 	USCIS denied Sandoval’s application because,
several years earlier when she was sixteen years old, Sandoval had misrepresented to
immigration authorities that she was a U.S. citizen. 	Id. 	During proceedings before an
immigration judge, Sandoval argued that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s inadmissibility bar
“should not apply to . . . minor children in the same way it applies to adults.” 	Sandoval,
641 F.3d at 984. The immigration judge accepted the argument, but the BIA did not. Id.
at 985. 	Before the Eighth Circuit, Sandoval argued that “even where a statute does not
provide for a different treatment of minors on its face, the agency has stepped in to do so.”
Id. at 986. 	“The problem,” as the Eighth Circuit saw it, was that the BIA had failed to
“dedicate the agency to a clear position subject to meaningful judicial review.” Id. at 987;
see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (instructing
courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute), overruled by, Loper
Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 412. The Eighth Circuit explained:
The Board’s statement concerning the lack of authority for the
IJ’s 	initial 	position 	is 	susceptible 	of 	at 	least 	three
interpretations: (a) that the statute applies indiscriminately to
any alien, no matter what the age; (b) that the statute has to be
interpreted on a case-to-case basis with an eye toward certain
factors; or (c) that the statute applies, perhaps presumptively,
to all individuals above [a] certain age designated by the
agency, but that age happens to be lower than eighteen.
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Sandoval, 641 F.3d at 987. The court remanded the case to the BIA “with instructions to
clarify the standard it uses in applying [§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)] to unaccompanied minors
and to articulate the reasons Sandoval deserves no relief under that standard.” Id. at 983.
Sandoval 	does 	not 	support 	implying 	a 	minor-child 	exemption 	in
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). 	The court did not decide the legal issue. 	It remanded the case to
the agency for a decision and explanation, but there is no subsequent history showing how
the agency resolved the question. The Eighth Circuit did not indicate that construing the
statute to apply to minor children would have been inappropriate; each of the three
interpretations it identified allowed for that possibility. 	Sandoval, 641 F.3d at 987. 	The
Eighth Circuit’s options did not include interpreting § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) categorically
not to apply to minor children.
If Sandoval were understood to support the idea that a minor’s status should be
considered in applying § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)’s inadmissibility bar, the agency did that here.
The agency concluded that the statute “does not contain an exemption based solely on the
fact that an individual is a minor.” ECF No. 19-1 at 4. The agency, in other words, did not
say that Laye’s minor status was irrelevant to its decision. And the agency accounted for
Laye’s age throughout its decision. 	It repeated Laye’s contention that he “should not be
found inadmissible . . . because [he was] a minor at the time of [his] entry and therefore
lacked the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of a false claim to U.S.
citizenship.” Id. at 2. The agency acknowledged that Laye was sixteen years old when Ali
made the false representation on Laye’s behalf. Id. at 3. And the agency found a series of
facts from which it determined that Laye (notwithstanding his age) was responsible for his
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actions in hiring Ali to smuggle him into the United States, including Ali’s presentation of
the fake passport and statements on Laye’s behalf. Id. at 3–4.
(c) Laye cites state cases and one pre-Erie9 federal case applying rules limiting a
minor’s ability to contract. 	See ECF No. 33 at 35–38. 	Laye argues that, even if he
contracted with Ali to smuggle him into the United States, these common-law rules forbid
USCIS from attributing Ali’s representations to him because the underlying contract
between Laye and Ali was unenforceable. 	Id. at 37. 	This contention is not convincing.
State or pre-Erie federal common law does not often guide or inform the application of a
federal statute, and Laye cites no case in which a court interpreted a federal immigration
statute like § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) by applying or referring to state authorities governing
minors’ capacity to contract. Even if one accepts that these authorities might inform the
inquiry and that Laye’s agreement with Ali was “voidable” at Laye’s election, see ECF No.
33 at 36–37, USCIS’s decision did not depend on enforcing the agreement. Finally, Laye
argues that he “disaffirmed any claim to citizenship well before he reached the age of
majority” when, in August 2015, he applied for temporary protected status. Id. at 37–38.
That application required Laye to disclose that he was not a U.S. citizen. 	See id. at 38
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)). If Laye means to argue that his temporary-protected-status
application amounted to a repudiation of his agreement with Ali, any repudiation seems
9 	Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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beside the point because (again) USCIS’s decision that Laye is inadmissible under
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) did not depend on enforcing the agreement.10
B
Laye contends that the inadmissibility waiver in 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) applies to
lawful-permanent-residency applications under the LRIF, and he claims the agency erred
in not reaching this legal conclusion. ECF No. 33 at 40–41. “Section 1159(c) is a
specialized 	waiver-of-inadmissibility 	provision 	that 	applies 	to 	only 	two 	groups 	of
non-citizens present in the United States: (1) those who were admitted under § 1157 as
refugees and (2) those who have been granted asylum under § 1158.” Prince K., 2025 WL
2697501, at *5; see 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) (applying to “[a]ny alien who has been admitted
to the United States under section 1157 of this title” and meets other conditions); id.
§ 1159(b) (applying to “any alien granted asylum”); see Cela v. Garland, 75 F.4th 355,
361 n.9 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining distinction between refugees and asylees).
Two judges in this District recently concluded that § 1159(c)’s inadmissibility
waiver does not apply to noncitizens who seek to adjust their status under the LRIF. See
Prince K., 2025 WL 2697501, at *5; Bryant, 2025 WL 2210889, at *4. In Prince K., Chief
Judge Schiltz concluded that § 1159(c)’s inadmissibility waiver provision did not apply to
a plaintiff seeking admission under the LRIF who was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for having misrepresented material information about his marital status.
10 	Laye does not argue that the timely-retraction doctrine applies. See Sandoval, 641
F.3d at 988–89; see also Barboza v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 18-CV-1027-
KEM, 2018 WL 11541023, at *2–4 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 3, 2018).
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2025 WL 2697501, at *2, *5. But Prince was neither admitted as a refugee under § 1157
nor “granted asylum” under § 1158. 	Prince K., 2025 WL 2697501, at *5. 	Chief Judge
Schiltz also determined that Congress did not incorporate the § 1159(c) waiver standard
into the LRIF and that the four inadmissibility grounds exempted from the LRIF did not
apply to Prince. Id. Judge Tunheim reached the same result in Bryant, finding no basis to
apply the § 1159(c) waiver to LRIF applicants deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 	for 	making 	fraudulent 	and 	willful 	misrepresentations 	in 	seeking
immigration benefits. 2025 WL 2210889, at *1, *3–4.
Laye has identified no good reason to reach a different conclusion here. He was not
admitted to the United States as a refugee under § 1157 or as an asylee under § 1158,
meaning § 1159(c)’s inadmissibility waiver does not apply to him. And I agree with Chief
Judge Schiltz and Judge Tunheim’s legal conclusions that the LRIF neither incorporates
§ 1159(c)’s inadmissibility waiver nor exempts § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) as a ground of
inadmissibility.
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ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 17] is GRANTED; and
2. 	The Petition for Relief Under 5 U.S.C. § 706 [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 30, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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