Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kimberly Y.,1 	Case No. 25-cv-1074 (ECT/SGE)
Plaintiff,
REPORT AND
v. 	RECOMMENDATION
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Kimberly Y. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income under Title II and XVI of the Social Security Act. This
matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and
Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1.
Both Plaintiff and the Commissioner have fully briefed their positions, and this matter is
now ripe for review. (Pl.’s Br., Dkt. 12; Comm’r Br., Dkt. 21; Pl.’s Reply, Dkt. 23.) For
the reasons below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s request for relief (Dkt. 12) be
DENIED, and the Commissioner’s request for relief (Dkt. 21) be GRANTED.
1 This District has adopted the policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in Social Security opinions such as the present Report and
Recommendation. Thus, when the Court refers to Plaintiff by her name, only her first name
and last initial are provided.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2022, Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits and for supplemental security income under Title II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. (Tr. 17.)2 She alleged disability beginning on September 9, 2020. (Tr.
17.) Her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 17.) Plaintiff then requested
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 17.) After two telephonic
hearings on March 13, 2024, and March 21, 2024, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled.
(Tr. 17-38.)
In reaching her decision, the ALJ proceeded through the five-step sequential
evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.3 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period between her alleged onset
date, September 9, 2020, through her date of last insured. (Tr. 20.) At step two, the ALJ
found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of
multiple sites, fibromyalgia, chronic pain syndrome, obesity, depression, anxiety, panic
2 Throughout this Order, the Court refers to the Administrative Record, (Dkt. 7), by the
abbreviation “Tr” for transcript. Where the Court cites to the Administrative Record, it
refers to the page numbers found in the bottom-right corner of each page of the record.
3 Step one of this process involves determining whether a claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity. If not, the ALJ must next decide in step two whether the claimant’s
impairments are severe, and of a duration of least 12 continuous months. At step three, the
ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairments are severe enough to equal a listed
impairment under appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404. If so, the claimant is considered
disabled without further inquiry. If not, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, and
determine at step four whether the claimant can still do their past work given their
limitations. Finally, if the ALJ concludes a claimant cannot perform their prior work, step
five requires the ALJ to determine whether they can do other work considering their RFC,
age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).
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disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (Tr. 20-22.) At step three, the ALJ
determined that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, or any combination of impairments, met
or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment. (Tr. 22-26.) After step three but
before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform:
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with the
following limitations: She is able to frequently balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl, occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant must avoid all
exposure to vibration and hazards, including unprotected heights. The
claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions. She is able to interact frequently with supervisors and
occasionally with coworkers and the public. Finally, the claimant is
able to deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting.
(Tr. 26-36.) At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant
work as a housekeeping cleaner (DOT No. 323.687-014) as “the work does not require the
performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity.” (Tr. 36-38.) Additionally, at step five, the ALJ found there are also other jobs
that exist in significant number in the national economy that the Plaintiff can perform,
including the work of mail clerk (DOT No. 209.687-026), merchandising marker (DOT
No. 209.587-034), and small parts assembler (DOT No. 739.687-030). Based on these
findings, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff is not disabled. (Tr. 38.)
Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council, which found no basis for
changing the ALJ’s decision, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (Tr. 3-8.) On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the
Commissioner seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision to deny her Title II claim
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under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and denial of her Title XVI claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c).
(Dkt. 1.)
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Following a final decision from the Commissioner, the claimant may elect to seek
judicial review of the determination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Under this review, the District Court is limited to a determination of “whether the ALJ’s
decision ‘complies with the relevant legal standards and is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole.’” Lucas v. Saul, 960 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
“Substantial evidence ‘is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1024
(8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012)).
“If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the [ALJ’s] findings, the
court must affirm the [ALJ’s] decision.” Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir.
2012) (quoting Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001)). Essentially,
the ALJ’s decision should not be disturbed just because the Court might have reached a
different conclusion. Kraus, 988 F.3d at 1024. The decision of the ALJ to deny benefits
will not be reversed by the Court “so long as the ALJ’s decision falls within the ‘available
zone of choice.’” Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nicola
v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 886 (8th Cir. 2007)).
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III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s rejection of the state agency psychological
consultants’ opinion that Plaintiff “is limited to ‘superficial contact’ with others.” (Dkt. 12
at 8.) Plaintiff argues that “superficial contact” is “a significant functional limitation that
directly addresses the quality and depth of interpersonal interactions she can maintain in a
work setting,” and the ALJ’s rejection of this crucial limitation in the determination of
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFP) on the basis that the term is “vague” was
improper. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s rejection of the “superficial contact”
limitation deprives the RFC of substantial evidentiary support. (Id.)
Commissioner offers that the ALJ did more than dismiss the “superficial contact”
limitation as vague, “[t]he ALJ explained that the psychological consultants’ proposed
limitations were inconsistent with their findings of no more than mild limitations in the
paragraph B criteria . . . [and determined] a greater limitation than incorporated by the RFC
[]was neither supported by nor consistent with the overall record evidence.” (Dkt. 21 at 1-
2.) Commissioner argues because the ALJ complied with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and
416.920c and articulated his findings, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of error.
(Id. at 2)
An ALJ is “free to accept some, but not all, of a medical opinion” and “is not
required to explicitly reconcile every conflicting shred of medical evidence.” Austin v.
Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 729 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Nor is an ALJ “required to
adopt the exact limitations set forth in the opinions” he found partially or even fully
persuasive. Wyatt v. Kijakazi, No. 23-1559, 2023 WL 6629761, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 12,
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2023) (per curium); McKinney v. O'Malley, No. 23-3220, 2024 WL 1327965, at *1 (8th
Cir. Mar. 28, 2024) (per curium).
Although an ALJ need not adopt a limitation set forth in a state agency’s medical
opinion, a court must be able to “trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning” in declining to do
so, such that a court could assess whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
Jacobs v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-431 (JMR/JJK), 2009 WL 943859, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 6,
2009) (quoting Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985)). An ALJ must
“construct a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.” Id. (quoting
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). The requirement to build a logical
bridge in not an arduous standard; it “is a minimal articulation standard, meaning that the
ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence in writing, but must explain his
rejection of uncontradicted evidence that would support the claim for benefits, in order to
overcome the inference that the ALJ did not reject the evidence but simply forgot it or
thought it irrelevant.” Id. “We review the record to ensure that an ALJ does not disregard
evidence or ignore potential limitations, but we do not require an ALJ to mechanically list
and reject every possible limitation.” McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 615 (8th Cir. 2011).
A. 	Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints
When determining an individual’s RFC, an ALJ is required to consider the
individual’s own subjective descriptions of her pain and limitations. See Masterson v.
Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2004). An ALJ’s evaluation of the individual’s
subjective statements should be based on the record as a whole. See Michael R. v. Berryhill,
18-cv-241 (NEB/KMM), 2019 WL 5149978, at *9 (D. Minn. June 11, 2019), report and
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recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4233852 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2019). The ALJ may
discount an individual’s subjective statements regarding the consistency, persistence, and
functionally limiting effects caused by the individual’s impairments if the subjective
statements are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole. Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082,
1086 (8th Cir. 2016); Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ may not, however, reject or discredit an individual’s subjective statements
regarding the individual’s symptoms based solely on a lack of supporting objective medical
evidence because, as Courts have long recognized, symptoms are sometimes more severe
than the objective medical evidence would indicate. See, e.g., Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979,
982 (8th Cir. 2008). The ALJ must consider all relevant evidence, including the claimant’s
daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain and other symptoms;
precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medications taken by the individual to alleviate pain and other symptoms; non-medicinal
treatment and measures utilized by the individual for relief of pain or other symptoms; and
other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain
and other symptoms. See, e.g., Michael R., 2019 WL 5149978, at *9 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3)); Grindley v. Kijakazi, 9 F.4th 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2021)
(citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984)).
Here, in reaching the RFC determination at step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
“medically determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms,” but concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity,
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persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 27.)
Specifically, the ALJ found, “the claimant’s course of treatment related to her
mental impairments are also consistent with the above residual functional capacity and
inconsistent with the degree and limitation alleged by the claimant.” (Tr. 29.) In support of
this finding, the ALJ noted Dr. Bok Chung’s reports from October 14, 2020 and October
19, 2020, and Dr. Chung’s “similar findings on most subsequent examinations” wherein
Plaintiff’s “mental status examination was … largely unremarkable … she was alert, fully
oriented, and cooperative with normal speech, coherent thought process, intact recent
memory, intact remote memory, normal attention and concentration, intact language,
normal fund of knowledge, fair insight, and fair judgment.” (Tr. 30, citing Exhibit 4F at 7,
12, 18, 22-23, 29, 35, 40, 45, 55, 62-63 and 9F at 6, 18, 23, 29, and 10F at 13.) The ALJ
also noted Plaintiff’s “normal affect/mood, normal speech, normal judgement/insight,
intact memory, and cooperative behavior, noted by her primary care provider Ms. Rydlund
on November 3, 2020, December 3, 2020, and May 9, 2022. (Tr. 30-31.) Ultimately, the
ALJ found, “[e]ven when endorsing significant anxiety and/or depression, the claimant
typically exhibited normal speech, coherent thought processes, intact recent memory, intact
remote memory, normal attention and concentration, normal fund of knowledge, fair
insight, fair judgment, and cooperative behavior . . . [t]he mental restrictions in the above
residual functional capacity account for the anxiety, distractibility, and reduced/diminished
attention that were noted on a couple of examinations even though these findings were
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somewhat transient in nature and not reported on a persistent basis.” (Tr. 33 (citations
omitted).)
B. The State Agency Psychological Consultants
In his findings, the ALJ determined that the prior administrative findings of the state
agency psychological consultants were only partially persuasive. (Tr. 34 (emphasis
added).) Specifically, the psychological consultants found that “Claimant’s ability to work
with co-workers and the public would be reduced, but adequate to handle brief, infrequent,
and superficial contact.” Id.
The ALJ disagreed with this limitation and explained,
The state agency psychological consultants’ findings are not fully
persuasive because their narrative residual functional capacity
limitations appear inconsistent with their findings of no more than
mild limitations in the “paragraph B” criteria, and this apparent
inconsistency was not well-supported by explanation. The
consultants’ findings also contain some terms that are not policy
compliant or vocationally relevant. For example, the terms “brief,
infrequent, and superficial” contact and “ordinary” levels of
supervision are somewhat vague and not well-defined. They generally
imply that the claimant has a limited ability to interact with others,
and the undersigned has accounted for that general implication in the
residual functional capacity by including a limitation to frequent
interaction with supervisors and occasional interaction with
coworkers. . . . To the extent the consultants meant to suggest any
greater degree of limitation, this was not well-supported by
explanation and would not be consistent with the overall record,
including the largely intact mental status examination findings,
conservative course of mental health treatment, and activities of daily
living outlined earlier in this decision.
(Tr. 34.) The ALJ concluded,
[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work [] with the following limitations: . . . She is able to interact
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frequently with supervisors and occasionally with coworkers and the
public.
(Tr. 26.)
The Plaintiff strongly disagrees with this finding and alleges the ALJ erred by not
including the “superficial contact” limitation determined by the State agency psychological
consultants who reviewed Plaintiff’s “extensive medical record and psychological
evidence.” (Dkt. 12 at 7.) The Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ’s finding that the term “superficial
contact” is “vague,” without pinpointing supporting evidence or other specific reasons to
reject this opinion. (Dkt. 12 at 8-10.) Plaintiff argues remand is necessary because the ALJ
did not include this limitation in the RFC. (Id.)
This Court finds that Plaintiff’s narrow focus on the word “vague” ignores the rest
of the ALJ’s decision and reasoning. The ALJ specifically noted that the psychological
consultants’ findings on Plaintiff’s limited ability to have only superficial contact with
coworkers and the public were inconsistent with their findings that Plaintiff only had mild
limitations in the “paragraph B” criteria.4 Although the ALJ did not repeat the evidence
that supported his finding that Plaintiff was capable of more than “superficial contact” and
could interact with coworkers and the public “occasionally,” the ALJ referenced his prior
4 The state agency psychological consultants applied the “paragraph B” criteria and found no
limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, mild limitation in interacting
with others, no limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and mild limitation in
adapting or managing oneself. (Tr. 115, 130, 148, and 163.)
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findings in the decision regarding the Plaintiff’s intact mental status examination,
conservative course of mental health treatment, and activities of daily living.
C. 	The Logical Bridge
The ALJ built a clear, logical bridge between evidence in the record and his
conclusion that Plaintiff can have “occasional” contact with co-workers and the public. The
ALJ noted the psychological consultants’ conclusion that Plaintiff is limited to “brief,
infrequent, and superficial contact” with co-workers and the public but nonetheless
declined to adopt this opinion. (Tr. 34.) He explained that the consultants’ findings were
not fully persuasive because their findings were inconsistent with one another. Id. The ALJ
further explained the inconsistencies in their findings and rejected their “superficial
contact” limitation because the “apparent inconsistency was not well-supported by
explanation.” (Tr. 34.) The ALJ went on to explain the greater degree of limitation
suggested by the consultants was not consistent with the overall record. Id.
D. 	Superficial Contact with Co-Workers and the Public
Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing but explaining why requires additional context.
The psychological consultants opined that Plaintiff was limited to “brief, infrequent, and
superficial contact.” Brief and superficial mean different things. While “brief” refers to the
quantity of time involved in an interaction, “superficial” refers to the quality or nature of
the interaction. See Troy L. M. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-199 (TNL), 2022 WL 4540107, at
*14 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2022) (collecting cases). "Occasional" refers to how often such
interactions occur. See Nicole Z. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-1800, 2024 WL 4117470, at 3 n.3
(JMB/TNL) (D. Minn. Sept. 9, 2024).
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Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ included limitations related to the frequency
of interactions—i.e. occasional—but did not include limitations related to the quality of
those interactions, the ALJ necessarily failed to account for the “superficial” constraint of
the psychological consultants’ “brief, infrequent, and superficial” limitation. But as noted
above, an ALJ does not have to find all of the consultants’ report persuasive. And the ALJ
did not misstate, ignore, or conflate the terms “superficial” and “occasional” in his
decision. Rather, the ALJ specifically rejected the greater limitation of “superficial contact”
suggested by the consultants because it was contradicted by the consultants’ other findings,
and it was unaccompanied by an explanation or support in the record.
Thus, finding no error in the ALJ’s explanation, the Court must turn its inquiry to
whether substantial evidence supports an RFC without a limitation for superficial contact
with co-workers and the public. The Court finds it does. For example, Plaintiff’s ability to
engage appropriately with medical providers about her treatment over the course of many
months suggests she is capable of more than superficial, infrequent, or brief interaction.
So, too, do her reports that she socializes online, participates in Bible studies online, goes
to church, and homeschools her two children. (See, e.g., Tr. 369, 681, 690, 706.) These
portions of the record—combined with evidence that Plaintiff drives short distances alone
and shops in stores, going out a few times a week to get milk, bread, and essentials (see Tr.
399)—also support the finding that she is capable of more than superficial contact with the
public.
The Court finds ALJ’s decision not to include limitations related to “superficial
contact” in the RFC is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Eichelberger v.
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Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Viewing the record collectively, a reasonable
mind could conclude Plaintiff is not limited in the depth of her interactions and is capable
of occasional contact with others. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by finding
that she could perform work without the “superficial contact” limitation.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s request for relief (Dkt. 12) be DENIED.
2. The Commissioner’s request for relief (Dkt. 21) be GRANTED.
3. The denial of benefits be AFFIRMED.
Dated: January 30, 2026 	s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
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