Pyron v. Gandhi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Allen Pyron,
Plaintiff,
v.
Shireen Gandhi, in her official capacity,
Jodi Harpstead, in her individual capacity,
Nancy Johnston, Ann Linkert-Kohornen,
Charles Fai, Phil Olson,
Terrance Kneisel, Cory Vargason,
Matthew Sarberg, Jordan Goodman,
Douglas Latuseck, Lesli Norsted,
Hugh Aylward, Allen Garber,
and Paul Mayfield,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-1059 (KMM/DJF)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) (“Motion”).
Plaintiff Allen Pyron is a civil detainee of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”). (ECF
No. 1 at 2, 5.) Defendants are officials associated with MSOP, whom he is suing in their official and
individual capacities.1 	(Id. at 1-2.) 	Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the United States
Constitution and Minnesota law when MSOP confiscated his DVD collection and imposed a one-
year media ban prohibiting him from possessing electronic media. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendants’ Motion
seeks to dismiss all claims. (ECF No. 12 at 1.) For the reasons given below, the Court recommends
granting the Motion and dismissing this action in its entirety.
1 There are two exceptions. 	Defendant Harpstead is no longer the Commissioner of the
Minnesota Department of Human Services, and therefore, she is now sued only in her individual
capacity. (ECF No. 12 at 2.) Defendant Gandhi is Defendant Harpstead’s official successor (id.).
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substituted her for
Defendant Harpstead in her official capacity only.
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BACKGROUND
For purposes of Defendants’ Motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in Mr. Pyron’s
Complaint as true. See Bauer v. AGA Serv. Co., 25 F.4th 587, 589 (8th Cir. 2022). According to the
Complaint, Mr. Pyron has been a civil detainee of MSOP since February 13, 2008. (ECF No. 1 at
5.) He resides at the MSOP facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota (“MSOP Moose Lake”) in Unit 1C.
(Id. at 2, 5.) Mr. Pyron owns an extensive DVD collection that he kept in his room, which he shares
with a roommate. (Id. at 6, 8-9.)
On the afternoon of October 23, 2024, an MSOP security counselor directed Mr. Pyron to sit
in the common area of his living unit, where he was joined by his roommate. (Id. at 6.) MSOP staff
then subjected Mr. Pyron to a pat search and a passed a metal detector over him. 	(Id.)
Approximately 45-60 minutes later, staff subjected Mr. Pyron to a strip search. (Id.) Meanwhile,
other MSOP staff searched Mr. Pyron’s room for contraband and found a prohibited pornographic
DVD on the roommate’s side of the room. (Id. at 6-7; ECF Nos. 20, 34-1.2) Mr. Pyron’s roommate
confessed to possessing the contraband and said Mr. Pyron did not know about it. (Id. at 7; ECF No.
20.) Mr. Pyron also pleaded ignorance. (ECF No. 20.) Staff nevertheless confiscated all the DVDs
in the room, including Mr. Pyron’s collection, so they could examine the DVDs. (ECF No. 1 at 7-8;
ECF No. 34-1.)
MSOP continued to withhold Mr. Pyron’s DVDs for several months. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) In
January 2024, Mr. Pyron received a memorandum that was backdated to October 23, 2024, which
said he was subject to a one-year media ban because he possessed contraband and concealed it by
2 The Court may consider these exhibits in evaluating Defendants’ Motion to dismiss because
they are referenced in the Complaint (ECF No. 1 at 7, citing incident reports “2024029680” and
“2024029754”, which has one number mistyped). See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d
1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
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having “an excessive volume of media discs.” (Id. at 8-9; ECF No. 15.3) Staff also deemed his
entire DVD collection to be contraband. (ECF No. 15.) Mr. Pyron appealed the disposition of his
collection and the ban to the Hospital Review Board, but they rejected his appeal, and this lawsuit
followed. (ECF No. 1 at 9.)
The Complaint asserts five counts, including four that expressly or impliedly arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1.) violation of due
process (Count 1); (2.) violation of procedural due process (Count 2); (3.) violation of the right to
equal protection (Count 3); and deliberate indifference (Count 5). (Id. at 10-13.) The Complaint
also asserts a count based on violations of agency rules and procedures (Count 4) (id. at 13), as well
as ambiguous claims “under the Minnesota State Constitution” and “negligence.” (Id. at 2.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue Mr. Pyron’s claims must be dismissed because: (1.) his claims for damages
against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity (ECF No. 12 at 9); (2.) the Complaint fails to state any federal claim for which relief may
be granted (id. at 10); (3.) the Complaint fails to allege how any Defendant was personally involved
in the actions that gave rise to his claims (id. at 17); (4.) Defendants in their individual capacities are
entitled to qualified immunity (id. at 20-21); and (5.) any other claims should be dismissed for
failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 21).
I. 	Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
3 The Court considers this exhibit because it is referenced in the Complaint (ECF No. 1 at 8-
9, referencing January 2025 “memo for a DVD Restriction that was back-dated to October 23,
2024”). See Porous Media, 186 F.3d at 1079.
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construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const.
amend. XI. Although the text of the Amendment does not address suits against states brought by
their own citizens, the Supreme Court has long held that a nonconsenting state is generally immune
to such suits. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311,
313 (1920); Emps. of Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare, Mo. et al. v. Dep’t of Pub. Health &
Welfare, Mo., et al., 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495
U.S. 299, 304 (1990). A state’s sovereign immunity extends to claims against state officials sued in
their official capacities for monetary damages and other retroactive relief. 	See Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 U.S. 89, 104-05 (1984); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914
(8th Cir. 1998).
Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity through federal legislation if it: (1)
unequivocally expresses an intent to do so; and (2) does so within the scope of its constitutional
powers. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). This exception to sovereign immunity
does not apply to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however, since the United States Supreme
Court has conclusively held that Congress did not intend for Section 1983 to abrogate the states’
sovereign immunity. 	See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (“We
cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from
being sued without its consent.”).
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Mr. Pyron’s Complaint expressly states that he is suing Defendants in “both their individual
(personal) and official capacities.” 4 (ECF No. 1 at 5.) With respect to any official capacity claims,
Mr. Pyron argues Defendants are liable if MSOP adopted a “policy or custom” that resulted in a
deprivation of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 2, quoting Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 699 (7th
Cir. 2002) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).) But the standards Mr.
Pyron seeks to invoke apply to cities and other municipal governments, which do not enjoy the
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applicable to state agencies such as MSOP.5 To the
extent Mr. Pyron wishes to sue Defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, the
Eleventh Amendment deprives the Court of jurisdiction, and Section 1983 does not abrogate the
State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will, 491 U.S. at 67. Mr. Pyron’s claims for monetary
relief against the Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed on these grounds.
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is appropriate when a
plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In deciding a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume all facts in the complaint to be true and construe all
reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the complainant. Morton v.
Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). In doing so, however, a court need not accept as true
conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir.
1999), or legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts alleged, Westcott v. City of Omaha,
4 Confusingly, Mr. Pyron’s opposition brief appears to state that he sues Defendants “only in
their individual capacities” in addressing why his official capacity claims should be allowed to
proceed. (ECF No. 33 at 1-2.)
5 The Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), under which a plaintiff may sue state officials in their
official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. This exception does not extend to claims for
monetary relief, however. See, e.g., Smith v. Reynolds, 139 F.4th 631, 635 (8th Cir. 2025).
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901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Courts exclude from consideration all “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements ….” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Because Mr. Pyron appears in this matter pro se, the Court construes his Complaint liberally
to account for his lack of legal expertise. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However,
the Court “is not required to divine [Mr. Pyron’s] intent and create claims that are not clearly raised,
and it need not conjure up unpled allegations to save [his] complaint.” Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc.,
565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). 	Although pro se complaints must be
construed liberally, such complaints still must allege sufficient facts to state a claim as a matter of
law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).
A. 	Procedural Due Process
Count 2 of the Complaint asserts a procedural due process violation arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 11-12.) Though less clear, the Court also construes Count 1
as raising a procedural due process claim arising under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 35, 37.)
Insofar as Mr. Pyron invokes the Fifth Amendment, his claim fails “for the simple reason that
the Fifth Amendment applies only to actions taken by the federal government.” Pyron v. Johnston,
No. 24-cv-4051 (JMB/ECW), 2025 WL 2097460, at *6 (D. Minn. July 25, 2025) (citing Barnes v.
City of Omaha, 574 F.3d 1003, 1005 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009)). MSOP is not a federal agency and Mr.
Pyron’s Complaint does not allege any action by a federal government actor. (See generally ECF
No. 1.) Therefore, his Fifth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
Mr. Pyron’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims also lack merit. “To
establish a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must show that he has been deprived of a
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constitutionally protected life, liberty or property interest.” Davenport v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs.,
553 F.3d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2009); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Only
if we find a protected interest do we examine whether the deprivation of the protected interest was
done in accordance with due process.”). 	Mr. Pyron argues the one-year media ban and related
confiscation of his DVDs constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest. (ECF No.
1 at 10-12, 14.) The Court disagrees. Mr. Pyron cites no authority on point, and other courts in this
District have expressly held that “[n]o federal, state or local statute creates a property right for [an
MSOP detainee] to possess computers and electronics … or unlimited amounts of personal property
and clothing.” Semler v. Ludeman, No. 09-cv-732 (ADM/SRN), 2010 WL 145275, at *24 (D. Minn.
Jan. 8, 2010); see also Pyron, 2025 WL 2097460, at *6 (“There is no federal or state law that creates
a property right for MSOP clients to possess certain electronics or personal property that can be
purchased and placed on an MP3 player.”). The Court embraces these precedents and finds the right
to possess DVDs does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected interest. The Court thus
recommends that Mr. Pyron’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim be dismissed.
B. 	Substantive Due Process
Count 1 also appears to assert a substantive due process claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11.) Specifically, Mr. Pyron alleges Defendants imposed the media
ban arbitrarily and without adequate justification. 	(Id. at 10, “Defendants subjected Plaintiff to
arbitrary and severe restraints and restrictions on his daily living….”.) 	His Fifth Amendment
challenge should be dismissed because, as previously stated, he asserts no federal action.
His Fourteenth Amendment claim also lacks merit. 	“In evaluating a substantive right
protected by the Due Process Clause, courts balance the liberty interest of the individual against
relevant state interests.” Semler, 2010 WL 145275, at *26. For a government action to be “arbitrary
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in the constitutional sense,” it must be highly “egregious” and “shock[] the conscience.” County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 	“To meet this high standard, … the alleged
substantive due process violations must involve conduct so severe … so disproportionate to the need
presented, and … so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of
zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience.” 	Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 408 (8th Cir. 2017). 	Such scenarios are “rare.”
Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 2012). A one-year media ban and confiscation of
DVDs plainly does not rise to this level of depravity. 	See Pyron, 2025 WL 2097460, at *6
(concluding MSOP’s denial of detainees’ access to certain media did not shock the conscience). Mr.
Pyron’s belief that it is unfair to punish him for misconduct his roommate allegedly committed is
understandable, but Defendants’ need to ensure the room is free from potential contraband
constitutes an adequate justification. It is not so egregious or conscience-shocking as to give rise to
a constitutional deprivation. The Court therefore recommends that Mr. Pyron’s substantive due
process claim be dismissed.
C. 	Equal Protection
Mr. Pyron also asserts that the media ban violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must
allege he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals. See American Family Ins. v.
City of Minneapolis, 836 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2016). Nowhere does Mr. Pyron’s Complaint
allege that any similarly situated individual was treated differently than Mr. Pyron. (See generally
ECF No. 1.) The Complaint simply makes a conclusory allegation of discriminatory treatment.6
6 Mr. Pyron vaguely alleges racial discrimination for the first time in his opposition
memorandum. (See ECF No. 33 at 16.) The Court cannot consider this new claim because Mr.
Pyron did not raise it in his Complaint. See Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d
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(ECF No. 1 at 12.) This unsupported conclusion is inadequate to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Mr. Pyron’s equal protection claim should be dismissed for this reason.
D. 	Deliberate Indifference
Count 5 of the Complaint asserts a deliberate indifference claim. (ECF No. 1 at 13.) To state
a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1.) he faced a “substantial risk of serious
harm”; and (2.) the defendants were “deliberately indifferent to that risk of harm.” Letterman v.
Does, 789 F.3d 856, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court does not believe a one-year media ban or the
confiscation of Mr. Pyron’s DVDs creates a substantial risk of “serious” harm, and the Complaint
does not provide any factual basis for concluding otherwise. 	For these reasons, the Court
recommends that Mr. Pyron’s deliberate indifference claim be dismissed.
E. 	Personal Involvement
Mr. Pyron’s federal claims should be dismissed in their entirety for failure to state a claim on
the foregoing grounds.7 In addition, Defendants argue Mr. Pyron has failed to adequately allege
they were personally involved in the actions giving rise to his claims. (ECF No. 12 at 17-20.) In the
interest of completeness, the Court addresses this additional argument.
“To hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show that the
supervisor personally participated in or had direct responsibility for the alleged violations.”
McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1993). For each Defendant, the Complaint states,
“Upon information and belief, [Defendant] has approved the actions against Plaintiff that are the
subject of this lawsuit.” (ECF. No. 1 at 2-5.) Mr. Pyron argues these unsupported allegations are
992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by briefs in
opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).
7 Because all Mr. Pyron’s constitutional claims should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity. See Watkins v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 102
F.4th 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024) (to overcome qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss a plaintiff
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enough to allege Defendants are subject to supervisory liability. (ECF No. 33 at 20-22.)
Mr. Pyron’s conclusory allegations alone are not enough to establish any Defendant’s
participation, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, but for some Defendants the Complaint provides additional
information to support the allegations of personal involvement. Mr. Pyron alleges Defendant Fai is
responsible for “delegating treatment clinicians to view media” (ECF. No. 1 at 3), and he is also the
person who notified Mr. Pyron of the media ban. 	(ECF No. 15.) 	This is enough to establish a
reasonable inference that Defendant Fai was directly involved in Mr. Pyron’s media ban. Mr. Pyron
also asserts that Defendants Norsted, Aylward, and Garber considered his appeal of the media ban as
members of the Hospital Review Board, had the authority to intervene, and failed to do so. (ECF
No. 1 at 4-5, 9.) 	These allegations are sufficient to suggest Defendants Norsted, Aylward, and
Garber were personally involved. See Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)) (“The supervisor must know about the
conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what he might see.”).
The Court thus rejects the lack of personal involvement defense as to Defendants Fai, Norsted,
Aylward and Garber, but the remaining Defendants may be dismissed on this additional ground.
III. 	State Law Claims
The remainder of Mr. Pyron’s lawsuit arises under state law. Count 4 asserts a claim based
on MSOP’s alleged failure to follow its own policies. (ECF No. 1 at 13, alleging the policies were
“provoked without provocation”.) Mr. Pyron also vaguely “alleges supplementary claims under the
Minnesota State Constitution … and common law claims for negligence.” (Id. at 2.) Whatever
merit these state law claims may or may not have, the Court does not recommend exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over them because none of Mr. Pyron’s federal claims should proceed.
must show, among other elements, “that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right”).
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See Sacks v. Univ. of Minn., 600 F. Supp.3d 915, 944 (D. Minn. 2022) (citing Hervey v. Cnty. of
Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 726-27 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has instructed district
courts not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when, as here, all federal
claims are dismissed well before trial.”). Mr. Pyron’s state law claims should be dismissed for this
reason.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) be GRANTED; and
2. 	This matter be DISMISSED.
Dated: December 30, 2025 	s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy”
of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after
being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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