Rachuy v. Rardin

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Gale A. Rachuy, 	Case No. 25-cv-00343 (LMP/ECW)
Petitioner,
v. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jared Rardin, Warden,
Respondent.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Gale A. Rachuy’s (“Petitioner” or
“Rachuy”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”).
(Dkt. 1.) The case has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For
the following reasons, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On December 13, 2023, Rachuy was sentenced to twenty-one months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release for wire fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Dkt. 22 ¶ 4; Dkt. 22-1 at 2; see also Dkt. 1 at 1.)1 The sentencing
judge also ordered Rachuy to pay a $100.00 felony assessment and $2,500 in restitution.
(Dkt. 22-1 at 2.)
1 	Unless stated otherwise, references to page numbers in this Report and
Recommendation refer to the CM/ECF page numbers of the docket entries.
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On January 25, 2025, Rachuy filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
asserting four grounds, and then filed a supporting memorandum of law and declaration
which was received on March 10, 2025. (Dkt. 1 at 6-7; Dkts. 8, 8-1, 8-2.) Rachuy
named Jared Rardin, the Warden of the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota
(“FMC-Rochester”), as Respondent. (Dkt. 1 at 1.)
Rachuy’s first ground sought 241 days of “jail credit for time spent in jails, the
halfway house, and home detention, on official detention” because the halfway house was
very similar to the St. Louis County Jail, arguing that the Jail was using the halfway
house as an “overflow” facility. (Id. at 6; see also Dkt. 8 at 4-7.) For his second ground,
Rachuy argued that “[t]he BOP [Bureau of Prisons] has exceeded their authority to
mandate restitution” because the sentencing judgement stated that restitution would be
determined by probation while on supervised release and because Rachuy had challenged
whether restitution had been paid at sentencing. (Dkt. 1 at 6; see also Dkt. 8 at 7-8.) For
his third ground, Rachuy argued the BOP usurped the jurisdiction of the sentencing judge
by refusing to grant him time credits under the First Step Act (“FSA”) because he could
not make his payments under the Federal Inmate Financial Responsibility Program,
which he also argued superseded the payment plan ordered by the sentencing judge.
(Dkt. 1 at 6; see also Dkt. 8 at 8-9.) As to his fourth ground, Rachuy argued that the BOP
had failed to timely provide him with medical care promised to him by the sentencing
judge. (Dkt. 1 at 7.) However, Rachuy subsequently withdrew his fourth ground in this
habeas proceeding. (Dkt. 8 at 9 (stating as to ground four that: “This issue is presently
with the Eighth Circuit on review and is withdrawn in this proceeding.”).) Consequently,
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the Court does not address ground four in this Report and Recommendation other than to
note that “a federal prisoner’s challenge to his medical treatment cannot be asserted in a
§ 2241 habeas petition because he does not attack the fact or duration of his
confinement.” Shinault v. Roal, No. 10-3575 (MJD/FLN), 2010 WL 3926874, at *2 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2010), R. & R. adopted, 2010 WL 3926874 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2010).
Rachuy filed a supplemental memorandum of law with exhibits, which were
received on March 13, 2025. (Dkts. 11-13.) On March 17, 2025, the Court ordered
Respondent to respond to the Petition. (Dkt. 15.) Respondent sought an extension of
time until April 23, 2025, because Rachuy was set to be released on April 18, 2025,
which Respondent argued would moot this matter. (Dkt. 16.) The Court granted the
extension (Dkt. 19) and Rachuy was released from BOP custody on April 18, 2025 (Dkt.
22 ¶ 5; see also Dkt. 20 (Rachuy’s notice of change of address dated April 15, 2025)).
Respondent filed his response to the Petition on April 23, 2025. (Dkt. 21.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that Rachuy’s Petition should be dismissed as moot due to
Rachuy’s release from BOP custody on April 18, 2025 insofar as it asserts claims to his
jail credit, the restitution being collected by the BOP, or any claimed entitlement to FSA
credits. (Dkt. 21 at 1.) To date, Rachuy has not filed any reply to this Response or
otherwise communicated with the Court.
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to actual, ongoing cases and controversies.” Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 723
(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also
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U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “When, during the course of litigation, the issues presented
in a case ‘lose their life because of the passage of time or a change in circumstances . . .
and a federal court can no longer grant effective relief,’ the case is considered moot.” Ali,
419 F. 3d at 723 (quoting Haden, 212 F.3d at 469). When a case becomes moot, a federal
court cannot “address the merits [of the case] because any opinion [the court] would issue
would be merely advisory.” In re Search Warrants Issued in Connection with
Investigation of S. Cent. Career Ctr., W. Plains, Mo. (“In re Search Warrants”), 487 F.3d
1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Haden, 212 F.3d at 469).
As to Rachuy’s “jail credit” and FSA credit grounds, this case became moot when
he was released from BOP custody because the Court “can no longer grant effective
relief” due to his release. See Ali, 419 F.3d at 723. Accordingly, the Court should not
address the merits of these grounds, because any such opinion would be merely advisory.
See In re Search Warrants, 487 F.3d at 1192.
That said, if any of the following four exceptions apply, a court should not dismiss
a habeas petition as moot:
(1) secondary or ‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary
injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading
review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but
is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action
suit.
Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-02124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL 3267738, at *2 (D. Minn. July
11, 2017) (quoting Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002)), R. & R.
adopted, 2017 WL 3268176 (D. Minn. July 31, 2017).
None of these mootness exceptions apply here. First, Rachuy does not allege any
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collateral injury that resulted from Rachuy not being released as early as he believed he
should have been. See Scheper v. Rios, No. 19-cv-402 (MJD/ECW), 2020 WL 4060729,
at *3 (D. Minn. June 5, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 4059875 (D. Minn. July 20,
2020).
Second, as to “a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review,” that “exception
applies if the matter is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends or expires
and there is a reasonable expectation that [Petitioner] will be subjected to the same action
again.” Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *2; In re Search Warrants, 487 F.3d at 1193.
Here, there is nothing remaining to litigate in this case, and nothing on the current record
indicates that Rachuy would be subjected to the allegations in the Petition again. See
Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *3.
Third, regarding the exception for when the “voluntary cessation of illegal conduct
can be resumed,” further detention is unlikely because Rachuy is no longer in BOP
custody, and there is no indication that Rachuy is or will be subjected to the BOP’s
custody again. Nevertheless, even assuming Rachuy was brought back into BOP custody,
it would be under a new set of circumstances and facts and, consequently, “impossible for
the government to repeat the same unlawful conduct that [Petitioner] challenged.” See
Kargbo v. Brott, No. 15-cv-2713 (PSJ/LIB), 2016 WL 3676162, at *2 (D. Minn. July 6,
2016). Further, Rachuy would have the ability to bring a new habeas petition under a
new set of facts and circumstances should he be returned to BOP custody.
Fourth, the Petition was brought on behalf of the individual Petitioner, not on
behalf of a class of individuals. See Ahmed, 2017 WL 3267738, at *3. Accordingly, for
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all of these reasons, the Court recommends denial of the Petition as moot as it relates to
claims regarding his purported jail credit or any claimed entitlement to FSA credits.
As to Rachuy’s restitution-based challenge, Respondent argues that because
Rachuy was released from custody on April 18, 2025, Rachuy “is no longer subject to
collection by the BOP.” (Dkt. 21 at 4.) In the alternative, Respondent argues that a
challenge to restitution is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding under § 2241. (Id. at 4
n.1.)
As to mootness, the sentencing judgment states that the special assessment of
$100.00 was “due immediately” and the restitution amount of $2,500.00 must be paid as
follows:
Payments of not less than $50 per month are to be made over a period of 3
years commencing 30 days after release from confinement. . . .
Over the period of incarceration, [Rachuy] shall make payments of either
quarterly installments of a minimum of $25 if working non-UNICOR or a
minimum of 50 percent of monthly earnings if working UNICOR.
[Rachuy’s] obligation to pay the full amount of restitution continues even
after the term of supervision has ended, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3613.
See U.S. v. Rachuy, No. 0:22-cr-00348 (JNE/LIB) (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2023), Dkt. 72 at
*7.2
Here, Rachuy was sentenced to a 21-month term of imprisonment; his obligation
to pay restitution continues “over a period of 3 years,” after his release; and his obligation
2 	This Court may take judicial notice of public court records. See, e.g., Stutzka v.
McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy, 200
F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)); Smith v. Gordon, No. 24-CV-2714 (JMB/SGE), 2024
WL 4444731, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2024) (citing cases).
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to pay restitution continues even after his term of supervision ends. See id. at 2, 7.
However, to Respondent’s point, the BOP’s ability to collect restitution has terminated
with Rachuy’s release from prison. Because the Warden of FMC-Rochester is the named
Respondent and Rachuy is no longer in the custody of FMC-Rochester (or the BOP), the
restitution-based ground is moot. See Pendergrass v. Andrews, No. 5:17-HC-2127-FL,
2018 WL 1542380, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2018) (“Here, petitioner’s sole claim is that
the BOP has been improperly attempting to collect restitution payments from him
through the IFRP and imposing punitive sanctions based on his refusal to participate in
the program. Petitioner’s release from federal custody moots this claim: BOP is no
longer attempting to ‘force’ petitioner to participate in the IFRP or imposing any
sanctions on him due to his refusal to participate.”) (collecting cases). Nothing in this
Report and Recommendation, however, alters Rachuy’s obligation to pay restitution
while on supervised release or after his term of supervision.
Further, regardless of mootness, a petitioner’s restitution challenge cannot be
asserted in a § 2241 habeas petition because it “in no way challenges his custody or
confinement.”3 Sample v. Roal, No. 09-cv-1943 (PAM/JJK), 2010 WL 2131002, at *3
3 	Rachuy did not make any argument that he could challenge the BOP’s collection
of restitution (or the restitution order itself) using the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. But any such argument would fail, because neither challenge raises a dispute
over Rachuy’s custody or confinement. See Taylor v. Fikes, No. 20-CV-1364
(PJS/ECW), 2022 WL 18584395, at *17 (D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2022) (“The Eighth Circuit
reiterated in Dyab v. United States that a motion under § 2255 is not the ‘correct vehicle’
to challenge the restitution portion of a sentencing court’s judgment because ‘a dispute
about restitution does not involve a claim of a right to be released from custody, a
prisoner cannot challenge the restitution portion of his sentence under § 2255.’”) (quoting
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(D. Minn. Mar. 1, 2010), R. & R. adopted, 2010 WL 2131003 (D. Minn. May 24, 2010).
This is another reason why Rachuy’s restitution-based claims should be dismissed.
III. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioner Gale A. Rachuy’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) be DENIED.
Dated: November 20, 2025 	s/ Elizabeth Cowan Wright
ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is
therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific
written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within
14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may
respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. D.
Minn. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line
limits set forth in D. Minn. LR 72.2(c).
Dyab v. United States, 855 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 2017)), R. & R. adopted, 2023 WL
1477839 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2023)); Sample, 2010 WL 2131002 at *2-3 (“[A] federal
prisoner cannot challenge the restitution portion of his sentence using 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
because this statute affords relief only to prisoners claiming a right to be released from
custody.” (quoting United States v. Bernard, 351 F.3d 360, 361 (8th Cir. 2003)), R. & R.
adopted, 2010 WL 2131003 (D. Minn. May 24, 2010).
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