USA v. Garcia-Lopez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Luis Antonio Garcia-Lopez,
Defendant.
Criminal No. 25-437 (DWF/LIB)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on the United States of America’s (the
“Government”) motion to dismiss without prejudice pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. No. 33.) Defendant Luis Antonio Garcia-Lopez
filed a response requesting dismissal with prejudice. (Doc. No. 36.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Court grants the Government’s motion and dismisses the case without
prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Garcia-Lopez is charged with reentry of a removed alien (Count 1), encouraging
and inducing illegal residence (Count 2), and harboring an illegal alien (Count 3). (Doc.
No. 14.) At his initial appearance, Magistrate Judge Jon T. Huseby ordered Garcia-
Lopez’s pretrial release. (Doc. Nos. 7, 9.) At the time, there was an active immigration
detainer on Garcia-Lopez, so he was immediately taken into custody by immigration
CASE 0:25-cr-00437-DWF-LIB Doc. 37 Filed 02/06/26 Page 1 of 4

2
authorities. (See Doc. No. 32.) On November 26, 2025, Garcia-Lopez was removed
from the United States pursuant to a removal order. (Doc. No. 28 ¶ 4; Doc. No. 33 at 2.)
Following his removal, Garcia-Lopez’s counsel moved to dismiss the indictment.
(Doc. No. 28.) The Government followed suit by filing its own motion to dismiss under
Rule 48(a). (Doc. No. 33.) The parties agree that this case should be dismissed. The
only question remaining for the Court is whether that dismissal should be with or without
prejudice.
DISCUSSION
Rule 48(a) provides that “[t]he government may, with leave of court, dismiss an
indictment, information, or complaint.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). Generally, dismissal
under Rule 48(a) is without prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 950 F.3d 556,
562 (8th Cir. 2020). However, when the Government seeks dismissal for an improper
purpose, such as harassment, dismissal should be with prejudice. See, e.g., United
States v. Rupp, No. 18-cr-15, 2019 WL 93272, at *6, *13 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 3, 2019), aff’d,
994 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2021); see also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15
(1977) (“The principal object of the ‘leave of court’ requirement is apparently to protect a
defendant against prosecutorial harassment . . . .”). The mere possibility that the
Government will re-charge the defendant in the future is insufficient to show
prosecutorial harassment. See United States v. Feldhacker, 849 F.2d 293, 295 (8th Cir.
1988) (“In general, absent prosecutorial abuse, a defendant does not obtain immunity
from prosecution simply because the prosecution has previously dismissed an indictment
which described the criminal acts at issue.”).
CASE 0:25-cr-00437-DWF-LIB Doc. 37 Filed 02/06/26 Page 2 of 4

3
In its motion, the Government stated three reasons for its request: (1) a desire to
avoid the waste of judicial resources; (2) the Executive Branch may simultaneously
pursue criminal prosecution and removal, so no bad faith can be attributed to the decision
to remove Garcia-Lopez during the pendency of this case; and (3) Garcia-Lopez would
not face any prejudice if charges were later refiled because all evidence is maintained in
his A-file. (Doc. No. 33 at 2-3.) Garcia-Lopez argues that the Government had other
options if it wished to pursue criminal prosecution and removal, such as deferred action
or an administrative stay. (Doc. No. 36 ¶ 2.) Additionally, Garcia-Lopez argues that he
will suffer prejudice if Counts 2 and 3 are dismissed without prejudice. (Id. ¶ 4.) He
alleges that these counts are based on faulty evidence, including documents that were
potentially falsified by a witness. (Id.) He also alleges that the Government has already
removed an exculpatory witness from the country. (Id.) He asserts that if these charges
were ever revived, he is likely to lose access to or be unable to locate material witnesses
due to the Government’s removal actions against the witnesses in this case. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Although any attempt to dismiss charges in order to obtain a tactical advantage
would clearly constitute bad faith, Garcia-Lopez has not shown that that is the
Government’s purpose here. He suggests a possible purpose, but there is no evidence to
support that suggestion. The Government may pursue both criminal prosecution and
removal simultaneously. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that the Government
moved for dismissal with the purpose of harassing Garcia-Lopez. Without more, the
CASE 0:25-cr-00437-DWF-LIB Doc. 37 Filed 02/06/26 Page 3 of 4

4
Court must presume that the Government asks for dismissal without an improper purpose
and therefore must dismiss the indictment without prejudice.1
While Garcia-Lopez’s allegations are insufficient for the Court to find an improper
purpose, the allegations, if true, certainly raise the legally significant question of whether
there could be a fair trial on these charges in the future. It may be that the Government’s
removal actions, while not improper, make reviving these charges impossible.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	The United States of America’s motion to dismiss without prejudice
pursuant to Rule 48(a) (Doc. No. [33]) is GRANTED.
2. 	The charges (Doc. No. [14]) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Dated: February 6, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
1 	Garcia-Lopez raised other issues in his own motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 28.)
First, he argued that removing him from the country violated his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel because he can only communicate with counsel via telephone now. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Second, he asserted that any continued legal proceedings without his presence would
violate his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. (Id. ¶ 8.) Dismissal of this matter on the
Government’s motion resolves both issues.
CASE 0:25-cr-00437-DWF-LIB Doc. 37 Filed 02/06/26 Page 4 of 4