USA v. Edison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Bryan Wesley Edison,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-336 (JRT/JFD)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1 for a report and recommendation
on Defendant Bryan Wesley Edison’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 45).1 The United States
filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on March 10, 2026 (Dkt. No. 53), and the Court
took the motion under advisement as of that date. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
recommends that the motion to dismiss be denied.
Mr. Edison is charged with 16 counts of Animal Crushing, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 48(a)(1). (Indictment at 3–9, Dkt. No. 1.) The Court quotes the entirety of § 48(a) in this
Report and Recommendation because all three subsections—(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)—
will come into play.
1 Mr. Edison also filed a document captioned “Speedy Trial Demand,” which was docketed
as a “Motion for a Speedy Trial” (Dkt. No. 46). Because the motion asks for what Mr.
Edison is already entitled to by the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h), the Court
recommends that the motion be denied as moot.
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(a) Offenses.--
(1) Crushing.--It shall be unlawful for any person to purposely engage in
animal crushing in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
(2) Creation of animal crush videos.--It shall be unlawful for any person
to knowingly create an animal crush video, if--
(A) the person intends or has reason to know that the animal crush
video will be distributed in, or using a means or facility of, interstate
or foreign commerce; or
(B) the animal crush video is distributed in, or using a means or
facility of, interstate or foreign commerce.
(3) Distribution of animal crush videos.--It shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly sell, market, advertise, exchange, or distribute an
animal crush video in, or using a means or facility of, interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 48(a).
In seeking dismissal, Mr. Edison first argues that the conduct described in the
Indictment does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 48 because the conduct is not obscene. (Def.’s
Mot. Dismiss at 1–3.) The Court analyses this argument as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the Indictment.
“[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged
and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second,
enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same
offense.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). “An indictment will
ordinarily be held sufficient unless it is so defective that it cannot be said, by any reasonable
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construction, to charge the offense for which the defendant was convicted.” United States
v. Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1993).
The problem with Mr. Edison’s argument is that the statutory provision he is
charged with violating—§ 48(a)(1)—does not have an obscenity element. Obscenity is an
element of two other provisions—§ 48(a)(2) and (a)(3). Subsection (a)(2) prohibits the
creation of animal crush videos, and subsection (a)(3) prohibits the distribution of animal
crush videos. An animal crush video is defined as “any photograph, motion-picture film,
video or digital recording, or electronic image that--(A) depicts animal crushing; and (B) is
obscene.” 18 U.S.C. § 48(f)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, obscenity is an element of creating
or distributing animal crush videos, but it is not an element of animal crushing. Mr. Edison
is not charged with creating animal crush videos; he is charged with animal crushing. It is
true that the United States has video evidence of Mr. Edison’s alleged animal crushing, but
the videos are not the crime itself. The United States has not charged Mr. Edison with the
creation of animal crush videos. Therefore, Mr. Edison’s argument that the conduct alleged
is not obscene is not a basis for dismissal.2
Mr. Edison next argues that the animal crushing statute is unconstitutionally vague
on its face because it invites arbitrary enforcement by the government. (Def.’s Suppl. Mem.
at 1–2, Dkt. No. 47.) Mr. Edison observes there are three different ways someone can
2 With respect to Mr. Edison’s argument that the alleged conduct was no worse than nature
videos, the Court considers this part of his obscenity argument and thus does not address it
separately. In addition, although the Court doubts that the videos in this case mimic nature,
even if they did, Mr. Edison leaves it unclear why mimicking nature is a basis for
dismissing a criminal indictment.
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violate 	the 	statute: 	(1) 	animal 	crushing, 	(2) 	creating 	animal 	crush 	videos, 	and
(3) distributing animal crush videos. (Id. at 2); see 18 U.S.C. § 48(a). As discussed above,
the United States must prove obscenity for the crimes of creating animal crush videos and
distributing animal crush videos, but not for the crime of animal crushing. Mr. Edison
contends that the language of the statute creates unfettered prosecutorial discretion and
invites arbitrary enforcement. (Id. at 4–5.)
A criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague when “it fails to give ordinary people
fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so standardless that it invites arbitrary
enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). With respect to the
latter half of this standard, “Congress must provide minimal requirements to guide law
enforcement in order to prevent police officers, prosecutors, and juries from pursuing their
personal predilections.” United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 2002)
(cleaned up). In other words, a statute must “describe with sufficient particularity what a
suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361
(1983).
Mr. Edison argues that § 48 is vague because it provides three ways the United
States can prove animal crushing. (Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 2.) The premise of Mr. Edison’s
argument is flawed, however, because there is only one offense for the actual act of animal
crushing. Title 18 U.S.C. § 48 criminalizes three acts: (1) animal crushing, (2) creating
animal crush videos, and (3) distributing animal crush videos. There is only one crime for
crushing—the offense described in § 48(a)(1). The two other offenses criminalize the
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creation and distribution of videos that depict crushing in an obscene manner. 18 U.S.C.
§ 48(a)(2), (a)(3), (f)(2).
In enacting § 48, Congress chose to prohibit the act of animal crushing, as well as
the creation and distribution of obscene videos depicting animal crushing. Thus, the video-
creation and video-distribution crimes contain an obscenity element that the crushing crime
does not. Section § 48’s prohibition of both non-obscene animal crushing and the creation
or distribution of obscene animal crushing videos in the same statute does not invite
arbitrary enforcement, however. If an individual engages in animal crushing, they are
charged under § 48(a)(1); if an individual creates an obscene video of animal crushing,
they are charged under § 48(a)(2); and if an individual distributes an obscene video of
animal crushing, they are charged under § 48(a)(3). The United States did not “subvert the
obscenity element by charging only ‘crushing.’” (See Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 4.) The
prosecution viewed the videos and apparently determined they were not obscene—a point
with which Mr. Edison agrees.
That the alleged animal crushing in this particular case also happened to be
videotaped does not make § 48 susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. If the animal crushing
in this case were videotaped and the video were obscene, for example, Mr. Edison could
have been charged under § 48(a)(2). If the alleged animal crushing were not obscene—
then whether or not it were videotaped—it should have been (and was) charged under
§ 48(a)(1).
Nor does the United States’ intended use of the video-recordings as evidence make
enforcement arbitrary. The videos contain evidence of Mr. Edison’s alleged conduct, but
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they are not an element of the charged offense. There is nothing vague or arbitrary about a
prosecutor deciding to charge animal crushing under § 48(a)(1) and then using video
evidence to prove the elements of the crime, including, for that matter, the interstate
commerce requirement. (See Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 4 (accusing the United States of
“pigeonholing” the videos to satisfy the interstate commerce element).)
Mr. Edison asks why the United States 	would ever charge the creation or
distribution of an animal crush video when it would then have to prove the additional
element of obscenity. (See Def.’s Suppl. Mem. at 5.) The Court has already explained how
the elements of the three crimes differ, but the United States’ response to this argument is
worth noting too. The United States correctly explains that, in some cases, the identity of
the person who tortured the animal might be unknown, but the identity of the person who
created or distributed the obscene video is known. In that situation, it would be appropriate
to charge the person under § 48(a)(2) or (a)(3), not (a)(1).
In light of all the above, the Court concludes that the possibility that a person could
be charged with one, two, or all three types of crimes under § 48 does not invite arbitrary
enforcement 	or 	unfettered 	prosecutorial 	discretion. 	Section 	48(a)(1) 	describes 	with
particularity what a person must do to violate it: purposely engage in animal crushing.
Similarly, § 48(a)(2) and (a)(3) describe with particularity what a person must do to be
convicted of creating animal crush videos and distributing animal crush videos.
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Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendant 	Bryan 	Wesley 	Edison’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(Dkt. 	No. 	45) 	be
DENIED; and
2. 	Defendant Bryan Wesley Edison’s “Motion for a Speedy Trial” (Dkt. No. 46)
be DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated: April 1, 2026
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under LR 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. D. Minn. LR
72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth
in LR 72.2(c).
s/ John F. Docherty
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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