USA v. Alm, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Tyler Lawrence Alm,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-289(1)-LMP-EMB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are two motions filed by Defendant Tyler Lawrence
Alm: a “Motion to Suppress Evidence of Search and Seizure” (Dkt. No. 134)
and a “Motion to Suppress Evidence from a Search Warrant” (Dkt. No. 135).
Both motions have been referred to me for a report and recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. I
recommend that the motions be DENIED.
I. Factual Background
In late 2024, the Paul Bunyan Drug Task Force began investigating
methamphetamine trafficking in areas of Minnesota outside the Twin Cities
metro area. Task Force agents determined that several people were
trafficking methamphetamine from a home in Anoka County that belonged to
John Michael Duffy.
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On January 28, 2025, Task Force agents obtained a warrant to search
Duffy’s home, which they executed two days later. Agents found suspected
methamphetamine, drug-packaging materials, cash, a firearm, and multiple
cell phones. They seized Duffy’s cell phone but didn’t arrest Duffy.
In searching Duffy’s phone pursuant to a warrant about two weeks
later, agents found messages between Duffy and a person identified “Tyler”
discussing changing phone numbers frequently and exchanging photos of
methamphetamine paraphernalia. (Gov’t Ex. 4 at 14–15.) Agents also found
messages between Duffy and other individuals that referenced “Tyler” and
discussed drug trafficking.
On March 7, 2025, Task Force Special Agent Jeffrey Douglas Amey
signed an affidavit in support of a second search warrant for Duffy’s home.
In the affidavit, Amey swore that Task Force agents had “received
information from human sources on numerous occasions and over an
extended period of time” indicating that methamphetamine was being
distributing from Duffy’s home to “outstate Minnesota.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 4.)
Based on Amey’s affidavit and application, Judge Karin McCarthy
found probable cause to sign a search warrant the following day, on March 8,
2025. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 21–24.) The search warrant authorized officers to
search Duffy’s home for:
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Controlled substances including but not limited to
methamphetamine, items indicative of drug sales such as
packaging materials, scales, distribution materials, cutting
agents, US currency and precious metals in the presence of
controlled substances, documents including letters, ledgers,
financial transaction statements, indicia of occupancy and
ownership, proof of residency, electronic communications
devices, storage locker keys, and permission to photograph and
record the scene.
(Gov’t Ex. 2 at 21 (emphasis added).)
Agents executed the search warrant at Duffy’s home on March 17,
2025. In the home, agents found 1.5 pounds of methamphetamine packaged
in separate bags, a loaded firearm, a digital scale, cash, and other items.
Also in the home, agents found Defendant Tyler Lawarence Alm,
making breakfast in the kitchen. Alm had two cell phones in his possession.
He explained that one was his “personal phone” and the other was his “work
phone.” (Gov’t Ex. 4 at 19.) When agents asked Alm to make a phone call
from his “work phone,” they saw him struggle to navigate and use it. (Id.)
Agents seized both of Alm’s phones. They advised Alm of his rights
under Miranda. Alm waived his right to silence and denied any involvement
in drug trafficking. Special Agent Amey explained that he believed Alm’s
statements were false because of the messages agents had previously found
on Duffy’s phones implicating “Tyler” in drug trafficking.
On April 7, 2025, Judge John Melbye issued a search warrant for both
of Alm’s phones.
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A grand jury returned an indictment charging Alm with one count of
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Alm now seeks to suppress the evidence obtained from the phones on
grounds that they were unreasonably seized and searched. (Pl. Mots., Dkt.
Nos. 134, 135.) The Government filed an omnibus response to the motions.
(See Gov’t Mem., Dkt. No. 155.) I held a hearing on these motions on
January 13, 2026, at which the Government introduced three relevant
exhibits, which were admitted without objection,1 and FBI Task Force Special
Agent Newhouse testified. After the hearing, Alm filed a supplemental brief
(Pl. Supp. Br., Dkt. No. 179) and the Government filed a supplemental
response (Gov’t Supp. Br., Dkt. No. 182).
II. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects a person’s
right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures” and states that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
1 The Government provided these exhibits to Alm and the Court at the
hearing. Neither party attached them to their briefing or otherwise filed
them in the record. Exhibits 2 and 4 are attached to this report and
recommendation. Exhibit 3 is an audio file.
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Here, Alm argues that agents violated the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibitions against (A) unreasonable seizures when they took and held his
phones and (B) unreasonable searches when they searched his phones.2
A. Seizure of Alm’s phones.
Alm argues that the agents’ taking of his phones constituted a “seizure”
for Fourth Amendment purposes. I agree that this was a seizure as there
was “meaningful interference with [Alm’s] possessory interests in that
property.” United States v. Jackson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
The question is whether the seizure was reasonable. Alm says no, for
three reasons. First, he argues that the March 8 warrant didn’t justify the
seizure because it failed to mention Alm’s name or effects. Second, he argues
there was not probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of the phones.
Third, he argues that the seizure was unduly prolonged.
2 Alm’s supplemental briefing states that “when officers entered the Duffy
residence and found Alm merely cooking eggs in the kitchen, they needed to
at least temporarily detain him to secure the premises.” (Pl. Supp. Br. at 3.)
Alm thus seemingly concedes that he was lawfully detained during the
search. However, he also states: “the issue is whether the officers had a
legally sufficient reason to detain him . . . .” (Id.) Alm does not at all develop
this detention issue. To the extent that Alm’s supplemental brief seeks to
challenge the lawfulness of his detention, I recommend that it be denied as
waived because he has not carried his burden “to come forth with some
evidence and argument to support” that position. United States v. Edwards,
563 F. Supp. 2d 977, 994 (D. Minn. 2008), aff’d sub nom, United States v.
Bowie, 618 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2010).)
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1. The March 8 warrant authorized seizure of Alm’s
phones.
As stated, the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant
“particularly” describe the “things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
particularity requirement avoids “a general, exploratory rummaging in a
person’s belongings.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (citing
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)). Courts evaluate
compliance with the particularity requirement according to “a standard of
practical accuracy rather than a hypertechnical one.” United States v.
Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 346 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
How particular a warrant must be varies “depending on the circumstances
and the type of items involved.” United States v. Frederickson, 846 F.2d 517,
519 (8th Cir. 1988). As such, a court does not resolve issues concerning
particularity “in a vacuum,” but instead “will base its determination on such
factors as the purpose for which the warrant was issued, the nature of the
items to which it is directed, and the total circumstances surrounding the
case.” Fiorito, 640 F.3d at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Alm argues that his phones’ seizure was not justified by the
March 8 residential search warrant “since the search warrant clearly did not
include Alm.” (Def. Supp. Br. at 4.) In other words, he contends, the warrant
was insufficiently particular.
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It’s true that the warrant did not mention Alm. But the purpose for
which the warrant was issued (to search the home for evidence of
methamphetamine trafficking), the nature of the items (“electronic
communication devices”) to which it is directed, and the total circumstances
surrounding the case make the seizure of Alm’s phones pursuant to the
warrant reasonable. See Fiorito, 640 F.3d at 346.
Special Agent Amey provided a twenty-page warrant application in
which he swore that his training and experience led him to believe that as a
general matter “persons involved in the use and distribution of drugs often
have conversations with drug suppliers and drug customers via phone, email,
and other electronic devices.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 3; see also id. at 4.) Amey also
swore that he was generally “aware that individuals involved in drug
trafficking will often change their . . . phone numbers in an attempt to avoid
law enforcement detection.” (Id. at 9.)
Amey also specifically explained that in the investigation leading up to
the warrant application, a confidential informant had “overheard phone
conversations between Duffy and others to arrange purchasing
methamphetamine from him.” (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 6.) Another confidential
informant stated that they “prearranged” methamphetamine transactions
“over cellular phone communications with Duffy” before traveling to Duffy’s
home in Nowthen to obtain the methamphetamine. (Id. at 7.)
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Based on this information, the warrant authorized seizure of “electronic
communication devices” found in Duffy’s home. Indeed, “it would [have been]
unreasonable and impractical” if Judge McCarthy “turn[ed] a blind eye to the
virtual certainty that drug dealers use[d] cell phones” in the alleged
trafficking operation given Amey’s application. United States v. Eggerson,
999 F.3d 1121, 1127 (8th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added); see also United States
v. Vizcarra-Milan, 15 F.4th 473, 505 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding there was an
“obvious likely connection between the [drug-trafficking] crime and the
phones” and therefore “good reason to think that the [defendant] and his crew
had multiple phones that would be difficult to identify as being used by
particular people”). Under these circumstances, I recommend finding that
the search warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement.
2. Probable cause independently supported agents’
seizure of Alm’s phones.
Alm next argues that agents did not have reason to conduct a
warrantless seizure of the phones because “there was no independent
probable cause.” (Def. Supp. Br. at 3.) As just discussed, I recommend
finding that the seizure of Alm’s phones was authorized by the March 8
warrant. But even without the warrant, I recommend finding that agents
had probable cause to seize the phones.
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“The warrantless seizure of property is per se unreasonable unless it
falls within a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” United
States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). One exception is when agents “have probable cause to
believe” that (a) property “holds contraband or evidence of a crime” and
(b) “the exigencies of the circumstances demand” immediate seizure “pending
issuance of a warrant to examine its contents.” United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 701 (1983); see also Mays, 993 F.3d at 614.
First, there was probable cause to believe that Alm’s phones would
contain evidence of methamphetamine trafficking. “Probable cause exists
when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”
United States v. Reed, 921 F.3d 751, 757 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 238 (1983)).
Here, agents were investigating Duffy’s home for methamphetamine
trafficking; searched Duffy’s home in January and found significant amounts
of drugs and cash there; seized and searched Duffy’s phone, finding
indications of drug trafficking in messages between him and “Tyler” and
between him and others about “Tyler”; and, less than six weeks later, found
(Tyler) Alm in Duffy’s home—in possession of two phones and in proximity to
yet another large quantity of methamphetamine and cash.
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Considering the totality of these circumstances, there was at least a
fair probability that evidence of criminal activity would be found on Alm’s
phones. See Eggerson, 999 F.3d at 1127. Alm argues that the agents didn’t
know for sure whether the two phones they seized from him that day were
the same ones used to communicate with Duffy earlier. But he acknowledges
that they needed only a “fair probability” that criminal evidence would be
found on the phones. (Pl. Supp. Br. at 4.) They had that much.
Second, agents had an objectively reasonable belief that exigent
circumstances justified their seizure of Alm’s phones. Exigent circumstances
exist when, if the property is not seized immediately, there is a risk that the
evidence contained therein would be destroyed. See Radloff v. City of
Oelwein, 380 F.3d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 2004). The analysis focuses on whether
a “reasonable, experienced police officer would believe” objectively that
exigent circumstances exist. United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1118
(8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, without immediately seizing the phones, agents “risked losing
digital evidence” because Alm easily could have removed or destroyed any
evidence on the phones if he retained possession of them. Mays, 993 F.3d at
616 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Stephen, 984 F.3d 625, 631 (8th
Cir. 2021)).
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To be sure, “evidence . . . stored on an electronic device does not itself
constitute exigent circumstances.” United States v. Shrum, 59 F.4th 968, 972
(8th Cir. 2023). But here, Alm knew that agents had identified him on the
scene of their methamphetamine-trafficking investigation and knew that
they suspected him of being involved in the operation due to his cell phone
communications with Duffy. Special Agent Amey told Alm at the time of the
search that agents had found suspicious messages between him and Duffy,
leading Amey to believe that Alm was being untruthful when he told agents
that he was not involved in drug trafficking. (Gov’t Ex. 3.)
“Under the circumstances, and knowing how easily evidence could be
deleted from a cell phone, it was objectively reasonable for [agents] to be
concerned that [Alm] could destroy the evidence on the phones.” United
States v. Wright, No. 23-cr-160-NEB-JFD, 2025 WL 602465, at *7 (D. Minn.
Feb. 25, 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
United States v. Clutter, 674 F.3d 980, 983, 985 (8th Cir. 2012) (warrantless
seizure reasonable because evidence on defendant’s computers could be
removed or destroyed even though the defendant was in jail at time of
seizure); Shrum, 59 F.4th at 973 (finding phone seizure justified under
exigent-circumstances exception because defendant was aware of allegations
against him and other individuals implicated in offense were suspected of
having tried to destroy evidence). Thus, agents reasonably seized the phones.
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3. The seizure was not unduly prolonged.
Alm next argues that even if the initial seizure was reasonable, it
became unreasonable when agents waited three weeks to get a search
warrant for the phones. Alm contends that this “‘was . . . longer than
reasonably necessary for the [agents], acting with diligence, to obtain the
warrant.’” (Pl. Supp. Br. at 5 (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 337
(2001)).
Courts look at the totality of the circumstances when assessing
whether agents’ delay in obtaining a search warrant was objectively
reasonable, balancing law-enforcement concerns against privacy concerns.
See Mays, 993 F.3d at 616–17.
On the law-enforcement side of the ledger are the government’s interest
in holding the property as evidence, the investigation’s nature and
complexity, the warrant application’s quality, and “any other evidence
proving or disproving [agents’] diligence in obtaining the warrant.” Id. at
617.
Here, as discussed, agents had significant interest in holding the
phones as evidence given their months-long, complex investigation into the
methamphetamine-trafficking operation involving multiple confidential
sources, suspects, and warrants; repeated seizures of drugs and cash from
Duffy’s house; evidence obtained from Duffy’s phones implicating Alm in drug
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trafficking; presence of Alm at Duffy’s house with two phones at the same
time that agents found a large amount of drugs and cash; and the fair
probability that Alm would destroy any incriminating evidence on the phones
if allowed to retain them. The twenty-one-page search warrant application
ultimately produced was detailed and robust.
I find under these circumstances that the agents had a significant
interest in retaining possession of the phones for the three-week period.
On the privacy-interests side of the ledger, I consider the nature of the
seized property and how significantly its seizure interfered with Alm’s
possessory interest, if he consented to the seizure, and the length of the
delay. See Mays, 994 F.3d at 617.
Here, the essential nature of the phones was data storage and
communication. The delay didn’t significantly interfere with Alm’s
possessory interest in the phones as data-storage devices because it was
unlikely to result in the loss of the phones’ data. United States v. Bragg, 44
F.4th 1067, 1072 (8th Cir. 2022). Nor did the delay otherwise significantly
interfere with Alm’s possessory interest in the phones since Alm “never
sought return of the property.” Id. Although Alm didn’t consent to the
seizure, the fact that he never asked for the phones back makes it tough for
him to now “prove[] that the delay in the search . . . adversely affect[ed]
legitimate interests.” Id.
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Finally, the twenty-one-day delay, while “of concern,” was not
unreasonable. Bragg, 44 F.4th at 1072. In Bragg, the Eighth Circuit held
that a twenty-four-day delay in applying for a warrant to search the
defendant’s cell phone was not unreasonable given that the defendant never
sought the phone’s return and there was no risk of data loss. Id. at 1072–73.
In United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third
Circuit held that a delay of three months was troubling but reasonable when
the defendant never sought return of the hard drivers in question.
On balance, I find that the government’s interests outweigh Alm’s and
that the three-week delay in obtaining a phone search warrant was
reasonable. I therefore recommend denying Alm’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the phones on the grounds that the seizure was
unduly prolonged or otherwise unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Search of the phones.
Alm also seeks suppression on the ground that the phone search
warrant that Judge Melbye issued lacked probable cause. Alm summarily
argues that the warrant application didn’t set forth facts sufficient to show a
fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found on the phones. The
only allegation that Alm makes to support this argument is that “the search
warrant included several pages of information relating almost entirely to
Duffy before even mentioning Alm.” (Id. at 7.) That doesn’t persuade me.
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Courts reviewing whether a warrant was supported by probable cause
pay “great deference” to the judge who issued the warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at
236. When the issuing judge relies only on an affidavit to issue the warrant,
the reviewing court may look only at the information “found within the four
corners of the affidavit” to determine if probable cause existed. United States
v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
Using “common sense” and considering the “totality of the
circumstances,” I find deference to Judge Melbye’s probable-cause
determination is warranted here. United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 631
(2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Special Agent Amey’s
twenty-one-page warrant application averred that Alm and Duffy were the
only two people at Duffy’s house during the March 17, 2025, search, when
agents found large quantities of methamphetamine and cash. Agents found
messages between Alm and Duffy sharing photos of drug paraphernalia and
discussing regularly changing phone numbers; Amey swore that the latter
fact, along with the fact that Alm possessed two phones, is common drug-
trafficking behavior. Agents also discovered phone messages between Duffy
and other individuals implicating Alm in drug-trafficking activity. And Alm
had several prior felony drug convictions, the most recent of which was in
2023. There is a fair probability, based on these facts contained in the
application, that evidence of a crime would be found on Alm’s phones.
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Finally, the Government argues that even if probable cause was
lacking, suppression isn’t warranted because officers had a good-faith belief
in the validity of the warrant. (Gov’t Supp. Br. at 13–14) (citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).)
Typically, “[e]vidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment”—based on a warrant lacking probable cause, for example— is
subject to the so-called exclusionary rule, meaning it must be excluded from
use “in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and
seizure.” United States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). But an exception to the exclusionary
rule exists “‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a
search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,’ even if
the warrant is subsequently invalidated.” Cannon, 703 F.3d at 412 (8th Cir.
2013) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920–21).
Leon’s “good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable
question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that
the search was illegal despite the issuing judge’s authorization.” United
States v. Norey, 31 F.4th 631, 635 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Courts here consider “the totality of the circumstances,
including information known to the officer but not presented to the issuing
judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Leon recognizes four circumstances when an officer’s reliance on the
warrant is not in good faith:
(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant
contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or
with reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing
judge; (2) when the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial
role in issuing the warrant; (3) when the affidavit in support of the
warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when
the warrant is so facially deficient that no police officer could
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.
Fiorito, 640 F.3d at 345 (quoting United States v. Perry, 531 F.3d 662, 665
(8th Cir. 2008)). Alm does not allege the first two circumstances, and I find
no evidence of either. As discussed above, the latter two circumstances are
not present here. Thus, even if the phone search warrant lacked probable
cause, I would recommend finding that the Leon good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies such that suppression is not warranted.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons and upon careful consideration of the entire
record, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Alm’s Motion to Suppress from Search and Seizure (Dkt. No. 134) be
DENIED; and
2. Alm’s Motion to Suppress from Search Warrant (Dkt. No. 135) be
DENIED.
Date: April 2, 2026 s/Elsa M. Bullard
ELSA M. BULLARD
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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