Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Karla J. P.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
No. 24-cv-4348 (JMB/DLM)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the Court for a second time. In 2022, Plaintiff Karla P. sought
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). On review, this Court determined that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to adequately explain why she rejected
certain prior administrative medical findings about Plaintiff’s impairments. See generally
Karla J. P. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-2131 (WMW/DLM), 2023 WL 4851434 (D. Minn. July
5, 2023), R. & R. adopted, 2023 WL 4851094 (D. Minn. July 28, 2023). The matter was
remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Id.
On remand, the matter was assigned to a different ALJ, who considered anew
Plaintiff’s applications for benefits. Again, Plaintiff’s benefits were denied. And again, she
seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her benefits under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). The case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a
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Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local
Rule 72.1. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the Commissioner’s
denial of benefits be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2019, Karla P. applied for DIB and SSI. (Tr.1 at 371-77 (DIB),
378-87 (SSI).) As noted above, Plaintiff’s claim was denied by the Commissioner, but this
Court remanded for further consideration given an error of law related to the ALJ’s failure
to properly evaluate prior administrative medical findings. Karla P., 2023 WL 4851434, at
*4-5. On remand, the matter was heard by a different ALJ, who accepted new documentary
evidence and convened a new evidentiary hearing. (See generally Tr. at 842-68 (ALJ
Decision), 945-83 (Hearing Transcript).) As before, Plaintiff was represented by counsel,
appeared at the hearing, and testified on her own behalf. (Tr. at 951-54, 965-76.) The ALJ
also called three expert witnesses at the evidentiary hearing: Dr. Betty L. Borden, Ph.D.,
who testified as an expert in the field of mental health (Tr. at 954-58); Dr. Nikerson
Geneve, DO, who testified as an expert in the filed of “non-psychiatric medicine” (Tr. at
958-65); and Pamela J. Nelligan, MS, CRC, who testified as a vocational expert (Tr. at
976-83). Relevant to this appeal, Ms. Nelligan opined there were several representative
jobs in the national economy that were suitable for a person with physical and mental
1 The Commissioner filed the consecutively paginated transcript of the administrative
record on January 29, 2025. (Docs. 8 (Part 1), 8-1 (Part 2), 8-2 (Part 3).) For ease of
reference, citations to the transcript will identify the page number listed on the lower right
corner of the cited document rather than docket page number or exhibit number.
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limitations like Plaintiff’s (at least as those limitations were described by the ALJ). (Tr. at
976-78.)
On August 30, 2024, the Commissioner issued a notice of an unfavorable decision
to Plaintiff. (Tr. at 842-68.) In that decision, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff suffered from
several severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; hypertension;
obesity; left distal clavicle osteolysis; major depressive disorder; generalized anxiety
disorder; and adjustment disorder. (Tr. at 845.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered
from several additional impairments that did not qualify as severe: kidney disease;
gastroesophageal reflux disease; headaches; tachycardia; nevus pigmentosus;
dermatoheliosis elevated liver-function tests; and non-alcoholic steatohepatitis.2 (Tr. at
846-47.)
Despite Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments, the ALJ found that she did not
qualify for benefits. (Tr. at 868.) First, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”)3 to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),4 provided that the work included a number of additional
2 The ALJ also concluded that several other ailments identified by Plaintiff, including
asthma, low vision, migraines, and fibromyalgia, were not medically determinable. (Tr. at
846-47.)
3 “RFC is defined as the most a claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental
limitations.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leckenby v.
Astrue, 487 F.3d 626, 631 n.5 (8th Cir. 2007)) (cleaned up).
4 By regulation, “light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). See also
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). Even if the weight lifted is very little, “a job is in this category if
it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time
with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); see also
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
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restrictions to account for Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations. (Tr. at 851.) With
those limitations in place, the ALJ credited the testimony of the vocational expert that there
were at least three representative occupations which were listed in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) that a person with similar limitations to Plaintiff could
perform: routing clerk (DOT 222.687-022); marker (DOT 209.587-034)5; and delivery
route clerk (DOT 222.587-038). (Tr. at 867; see also Tr. at 977-78 (vocational expert
testimony).) Because there were sufficient jobs available within the national economy for
someone with Plaintiff’s limitations, the ALJ found her not disabled under the evaluative
process outlined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. (Tr. at 867-68.)
Plaintiff does not assert that the ALJ failed to follow the five-step sequential process
laid out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4)6 for evaluating SSI and DIB
claims. Nor does she suggest (as she did before) that the ALJ conducted a less-than-fulsome
evaluation of the evidence. Rather, she asserts that the ALJ erred in crafting the RFC.
5 In his decision, the ALJ listed the same DOT number for the positions of routing clerk
and marker. (Tr. at 867.) However, at the evidentiary hearing the vocational expert made
clear that she was identifying different positions (routing clerk and marker) and identified
each of them by their correct, distinct DOT numbers. (Tr. at 977.)
6 Step one of this process involves determining whether a claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity. If not, the ALJ must next decide (in step two) whether the claimant’s
impairments are severe, and of a duration of least 12 continuous months. At step three, the
ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairments are severe enough to equal a listed
impairment under appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404. If so, the claimant is considered
disabled without further inquiry. If not, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, and
determine (at step four) whether the claimant can still do their past work given their
limitations. Finally, if the ALJ concludes a claimant cannot perform their prior work, step
five requires the ALJ to determine whether they can do other work considering their RFC,
age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v), (d-e);
416.920(a)(4)(i-v), (d-e).
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Specifically, she argues that the ALJ inappropriately narrowed the RFC’s limitation of
“superficial interaction with supervisors/coworkers” by indicating that such limitations
meant Plaintiff could perform work where the fifth digit of the DOT code, often referred
to as the “people rating,” is a 7 or 8. (Doc. 15 (Plaintiff’s Brief).) For his part, the
Commissioner asserts it is the ALJ who is ultimately responsible for assessing a Plaintiff’s
RFC, and doing so by reference to the DOT’s own codes reflects no error when that
limitation is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 16 (Commissioner’s Brief).)
ANALYSIS
This Court reviews an ALJ’s denial-of-benefits decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, and whether the decision is
infected by legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 728 (8th Cir.
2022). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154
(2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also Nash v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin, 907 F.3d
1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (characterizing “substantial evidence” as “less than a
preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusions”). Courts reviewing ALJ decisions must look to the entire
administrative record to determine whether it contains sufficient evidence to support (or
detract from, as the case may be) the ALJ’s conclusion. Id.; Grindley v. Kijakazi, 9 F.4th
622, 627 (8th Cir. 2021). Where substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the
Court will not reverse, even if substantial evidence also supports a contrary outcome. Nash,
907 F.3d at 1089.
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Plaintiff concedes that the RFC’s limitation to superficial interaction with
supervisors and coworkers was appropriate and supported by the record. (Doc. 15 at 10.)
On independent review, the Court agrees. As the ALJ correctly noted (Tr. at 849-51), the
SSA has identified four broad functional areas relevant to determining the severity of a
person’s mental impairments: (1) the person’s ability to understand, remember, or apply
information; (2) the person’s ability to interact with others; (3) the person’s ability to
concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) the person’s ability to adapt or manage
themself. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). The ALJ is required to rate the
degree of a person’s limitations in each of these functional areas on a five-point scale: none,
mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4); 416.920a(c)(4). Once
an ALJ does so, they may then determine whether and how to account for the claimant’s
functional restrictions in the RFC.
Here, the ALJ’s analysis was aided by Dr. Borden, who testified at the evidentiary
hearing that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her ability to interact with others; her
ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and her ability to adapt or manage herself;
but no limitation in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information. (Tr. at 956.)
This meant, according to Dr. Borden, that Plaintiff “can have at least superficial contact
with supervisors and co-workers.” (Tr. at 957.) Likewise, while the evaluation of
psychological consultative examiner Dr. Monique Bourdeaux, Psy.D., LP, did not
lockstep-track the four functional areas above, she rendered opinions on Plaintiff’s ability
to function in the workplace and concluded Plaintiff “is able to relate appropriately with at
least brief and superficial contact with coworkers and supervisors.” (Tr. at 549.) Based on
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these evaluations, as well as the ALJ’s own independent assessment of Plaintiff’s
functional abilities and restrictions (see Tr. at 849-51), substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s conclusions that Plaintiff had no limitation in understanding, remembering, or
applying information, but moderate limitations in the remaining three functional areas.
Finding substantial evidence supported the mental-impairment limitations identified
by the ALJ, the question becomes whether those limitations were adequately accounted for
in the RFC. Again, Plaintiff does not quibble with the imposition of a superficial-
interaction restriction. Rather, she contends that this should have been the end of it—that
the ALJ erred by limiting his superficial-interaction restriction to particular numerical
ratings on the DOT job code. According to Plaintiff, since the term “superficial” is well
defined in the context of disability-benefits determinations, it was error to for the ALJ to
announce a different, ad hoc meaning for the term.
The argument that an ALJ errs generally by referring to a specific DOT job code in
an RFC “has been consistently rejected” by courts in this District. Julie P. v. O’Malley,
No. 23-cv-2980 (LMP/ECW), 2024 WL 4880375, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2024); see also
Katie R. v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-1139 (PAM/DLM), 2024 WL 1050822, at *2-3 (D. Minn.
Mar. 11, 2024), aff’d sub nom. Rygmyr v. Dudek, No. 24-2005, 2025 WL 1143244 (8th
Cir. Apr. 18, 2025); Nicolas J. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1340 (WMW/ECW), 2022 WL
1109810, at *20 (D. Minn. Jan. 20, 2022), R. & R. adopted sub nom. Nicholas C. J. v.
Kijakazi, 2022 WL 807605 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2022) (rejecting similar argument as
“relying on immaterial semantics”). This makes sense, as “the ALJ alone is responsible for
determining Plaintiff’s limitations.” Jamie E. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-2393 (ECT/JFD),
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2023 WL 5021807, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2023). For the ALJ to do so by shorthand
reference to DOT codes does nothing to usurp the role of medical providers in disability
determinations.
The more precise question is whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could
perform jobs where “the 5th digit of the DOT code is a ‘7’ or ‘8’”7 is supported by
substantial evidence. The DOT quantifies the degree of people-based interactions required
for any particular job in the fifth digit of the nine-digit code (the “people rating”); the higher
the number, the less possible interaction is required. See Tiffany B. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-
1227 (ECT/DLM), 2023 WL 3958424, at *5 (D. Minn. May 22, 2023) (noting that a “Level
8” job has the lowest level of interpersonal interaction recognized by the DOT), R. & R.
adopted, 2023 WL 3955348 (D. Minn. June 12, 2023). Level 8 interaction means
“[a]ttending to the work assignment instructions or orders of supervisor. (No immediate
response required unless clarification of instructions or orders is needed.)” See DOT App’x
B, Explanation of Data, People and Things, 1991 WL 688701 (1991). Level 7 interaction
means “[a]ttending to the needs or requests of people or animals or the expressed or implicit
wishes of people. Immediate response is involved.” Id.
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could
perform jobs with these requirements, particularly given the other limitations set forth in
the RFC. The ALJ’s conclusions about Plaintiff’s functional restrictions show she had no
difficulty understanding, remembering, or applying information—something well
7 (Tr. at 851; see also Tr. at 977.)
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supported by evidence of her mental acuity and cognitive abilities. (Tr. at 849.) While
Plaintiff has moderate limitations in other functional categories, the ALJ accounted for this
not only by virtue of the limitations imposed by a people rating of 7 or 8 with respect to
supervisor and coworker interaction, but also by: limiting Plaintiff to no public interaction;
performing simple, repetitive tasks; having no complex decision-making responsibility;
having only occasional changes to her work setting; and performing no rapid, assembly
line paced work (such as work with hourly quotas). (Tr at 850-51.) This meant, at most,
that Plaintiff would be required attend to the needs or requests of her coworkers and
supervisors in a prompt manner—but with a bevy of other limitations in place, too.8 There
was substantial evidence before the ALJ to support his conclusion that Plaintiff could do
so: she was coherent and logical in examinations; had a goal-directed thought process;
focused attention and concentration; could drive; prepared meals; and assisted her autistic
son as a caregiver. (Tr. at 849-51; see also Tr. at 951-54, 965-76.)
In short, the Court simply cannot agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s reference to
DOT people ratings was “entirely arbitrary.” (Doc. 15 at 10.) It is not inappropriate as a
general matter for the ALJ to use DOT codes in the RFC, and here the decision to do so
was amply supported by substantial evidence.
8 This description is consistent with the interactions required by a job that has a people
rating of 7. However, the Court notes that each of representative jobs identified by ALJ
had a people rating of 8, meaning Plaintiff would be required to have even less interaction
in any of those positions.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the above findings, as well as the files, records, and proceedings above,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff’s request to reverse or remand the decision of the Commissioner
(Doc. 15) be DENIED; and
2. Defendant’s request to affirm the decision of the Commissioner (Doc. 16) be
GRANTED.
DATED: January 5, 2026 s/Douglas L. Micko
DOUGLAS L. MICKO
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days
after being served with a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of
the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with
the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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