Bolibruch v. Frovarp

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Terezia Bolibruch,
Plaintiff,
v.
Andrew Frovarp, acting in his individual
capacity,
Defendant.
File No. 24-cv-3893 (ECT/LIB)
OPINION AND ORDER
Eric A. Rice, Law Office of Eric A. Rice, LLC, St. Paul, MN; and Dane DeKrey, Ringstrom
DeKrey PLLP, Moorhead, MN, for Plaintiff Terezia Bolibruch.
Ashley Marie Ramstad, Jason M. Hiveley, and Michael Conlin-Brandenburg, Iverson
Reuvers Condon, Bloomington, MN, for Defendant Andrew Frovarp.
Clay County Deputy Sheriff Andrew Frovarp utilized a “Pursuit Intervention
Technique” (or “PIT”) maneuver to stop a pickup truck he believed was attempting to flee.
Plaintiff Terezia Bolibruch was a passenger in the truck. 	In this § 1983 case, she claims
Deputy Frovarp’s use of the PIT maneuver and other actions he subsequently took while
detaining and investigating her violated the Fourth Amendment.
Deputy Frovarp seeks summary judgment, arguing he is entitled to qualified
immunity. 	The motion will be granted for the most part, but not entirely. 	On the
plaintiff-friendly version of the record, three of Deputy Frovarp’s actions—the PIT
maneuver, aiming his firearm in Ms. Bolibruch’s direction, and handcuffing and detaining
Ms. Bolibruch for a time in the back seat of his squad—did not violate Ms. Bolibruch’s
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 1 of 25

2
clearly 	established 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights. 	However, 	based 	on 	the 	same
plaintiff-friendly version of the record, a reasonable juror could conclude that Deputy
Frovarp’s decision to leave Ms. Bolibruch handcuffed for roughly 17 minutes after he
determined she had done nothing wrong and without any safety-related justification
violated a clearly established right.
I1
On July 29, 2021, Deputy Frovarp was on routine patrol on Highway 10 near
Glyndon, Minnesota; at just before 6:00 p.m., he observed a truck he suspected was
speeding. 	ECF No. 23-1 at 14:1–3; 15:7–16:12; ECF No. 24-2 at 2–3. 	Deputy Frovarp
was driving eastbound on Highway 10 when he observed the truck traveling westbound on
the same road. ECF No. 24-2 at 2; ECF No. 24-3 at 00:20–26. Deputy Frovarp’s squad
radar indicated the vehicle was traveling 87 miles per hour in a 65-miles-per-hour zone.
ECF No. 23-1 at 16:13–17:8; see ECF No. 24-1 at 00:10 (showing radar screen reflecting
87 mile-per-hour speed). After obtaining the radar speed reading, Deputy Frovarp turned
around, crossing over to the westbound side of the highway. 	ECF No. 23-1 at 17:9–14;
ECF No. 29-1 at 00:21–28. Deputy Frovarp activated his lights and sirens and pursued the
truck. 	ECF No. 29-1 at 00:27–1:08. 	As Deputy Frovarp approached from behind, the
vehicle’s driver slowed down and turned right onto an interchange road. Id. at 00:58–1:09.
When Deputy Frovarp’s squad car got close to the truck, the driver pulled over to the left
shoulder of the interchange road and continued to slow down, making it appear the vehicle
1 	In accordance with the summary-judgment standards, the facts are undisputed or
described in a light most favorable to Ms. Bolibruch.
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 2 of 25

3
was going to stop. 	Id. at 1:08–14. 	Rather than stop, however, the vehicle’s brake lights
turned off, the truck began to accelerate, and it exited the shoulder and reentered the center
of the driving lane on the interchange road. Id. at 1:13–18. At this point, Deputy Frovarp
utilized a PIT maneuver—he drove his squad into the rear passenger side panel of the truck,
causing the truck to spin to the right and come to a stop on the road. Id. 1:20–27.
Deputy Frovarp then drew his firearm, exited his squad car, directed the driver of
the truck to turn off the vehicle, and commanded the occupants to roll down the windows
and put their hands out of the windows. ECF No. 24-1 at 1:23–43. With his firearm still
pointed at the truck, Deputy Frovarp approached the truck. 	Id. at 1:43–51. 	He directed
Ms. Bolibruch, who was in the passenger seat, to exit the vehicle, turn away from him,
walk backwards towards him, and get on her knees. 	Id. at 2:01–08. 	Ms. Bolibruch
complied. Id. Deputy Frovarp then instructed the driver, Mr. Brown, to exit the vehicle,
walk backwards, lay down on his stomach, turn his head to the right, and remain still. Id.
at 2:10–35. Mr. Brown complied at first, though he later turned his head to the left. Id. at
2:09–38. Deputy Frovarp yelled at Mr. Brown to turn his head to the right and remain still,
and Mr. Brown complied. 	Id. at 2:38–42. 	Deputy Frovarp then holstered his gun,
handcuffed Ms. Bolibruch, and placed her in the back seat of his squad car. 	Id. at 2:41–
3:00. While Deputy Frovarp was in the process of handcuffing Mr. Brown, another deputy
arrived, and Mr. Brown was placed in the back seat of the second deputy’s squad car. Id.
at 3:04–43. Deputy Frovarp then checked the truck for additional passengers and removed
the keys from the ignition. Id. at 3:44–4:12.
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 3 of 25

4
Deputy Frovarp asked Ms. Bolibruch for identification, but she informed him that
she did not have her driver’s license with her because she was not driving. 	Id. at 4:47–
5:01. Deputy Frovarp asked her name and date of birth, which she provided. Id. at 5:10–
30. Deputy Frovarp ran Ms. Bolibruch’s information, which came back clear,2 id. at 6:07–
7:42; ECF No. 23-1 at 54:21–55:2, and asked if Ms. Bolibruch was injured, to which she
responded that she was not, ECF No. 24-1 at 8:11–13; ECF No. 29-2 at 8:13–15.
Deputy Frovarp then left to speak with Mr. Brown. ECF No. 24-1 at 8:14–45. By
this time, there were at least three officers present, excluding Deputy Frovarp. Id. at 8:14–
37. 	Mr. Brown informed Deputy Frovarp that his identification was in his wallet in the
truck. Id. at 8:43–55. After retrieving Mr. Brown’s license from the truck and running the
information, Deputy Frovarp returned to interview Mr. Brown. Id. at 8:56–13:56. Deputy
2 	The parties dispute whether Ms. Bolibruch was cleared after this initial search.
Consistent with the summary-judgment standard, I conclude that the plaintiff-friendly
version of the record shows that Ms. Bolibruch was cleared after Deputy Frovarp ran the
initial search in his computer. Deputy Frovarp’s body-worn camera shows that he asked
Ms. Bolibruch for her name and date of birth. ECF No. 24-1 at 5:10–30. Ms. Bolibruch
provided the requested information, after which Deputy Frovarp immediately entered his
squad car and began to run searches on his computer. 	Id. at 5:10–6:25. 	While running
searches, Deputy Frovarp asked Ms. Bolibruch which state had issued her driver’s license.
Id. at 6:25–28. 	Ms. Bolibruch answered him, after which the computer stated, “License
status invalid.” Id. at 6:25–45. Deputy Frovarp then asked Ms. Bolibruch if she had “ever
been in trouble before,” and as she answered, he clarified that he meant to ask whether she
had never been to jail before or “anything crazy like that.” Id. at 7:04–21. Deputy Frovarp
can be seen entering information into his computer throughout this time. Id. at 6:10–7:41.
Twice, the computer stated, “NCIC person clear,” presumably referring to the National
Crime Information Center. Id. at 6:26–29, 6:37–40. At that time, Deputy Frovarp did not
possess Mr. Brown’s name or date of birth, and could not have been running a search on
him. 	It was only after running the initial search on Ms. Bolibruch that Deputy Frovarp
collected Mr. Brown’s identification, id. at 8:42–11:05, after which he ran another search,
id. at 11:15–13:00, which appears to be on Mr. Brown. The computer can again be heard
saying, “NCIC person clear” during the second search. Id. at 11:38–51.
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 4 of 25

5
Frovarp read Mr. Brown his Miranda rights, and Mr. Brown confirmed he wished to speak
with Deputy Frovarp. 	Id. at 13:56–14:29. The interview lasted about three minutes. Id.
at 14:29–17:15. 	Mr. Brown claimed he did not see Deputy Frovarp initially, and that he
pulled over because he thought Deputy Frovarp was attempting to pass him, but he then
panicked. 	Id. at 14:40–15:41. 	Mr. Brown communicated to Deputy Frovarp that Ms.
Bolibruch would need to get a ride from his parents because she did not have family or
friends near the location of the stop. Id. at 16:44–59.
Deputy Frovarp retrieved Mr. Brown’s cell phone from the truck, and arrangements
were made for Mr. Brown’s mother to pick Ms. Bolibruch up at a gas station near the site
of the traffic stop. Id. at 16:59–22:30. Another officer agreed to give Ms. Bolibruch a ride
to the gas station, and Deputy Frovarp retrieved Ms. Bolibruch’s cell phone and wallet
from the truck. Id. at 22:20–37. Ms. Bolibruch was unhandcuffed and placed in another
officer’s squad car, and Mr. Brown was placed in Deputy Frovarp’s squad car. Id. at 23:37–
24:23; ECF No. 24-4 at 23:25–30; ECF No. 23-1 at 63:11–12. Ms. Bolibruch was dropped
off at the gas station, ECF No. 23-2 at 61:2–62:24, and Mr. Brown’s parents picked her up,
id. at 64:1–6. 	All in all, Ms. Bolibruch was handcuffed for about 22 minutes. 	Compare
ECF No. 24-1 at 2:45 (handcuffing Ms. Bolibruch) and id. at 23:49 (opening door of second
squad car to remove Mr. Brown), with ECF No. 24-4 at 22:34 (opening door to remove
Mr. Brown from second squad car), and id. at 23:29 (showing Ms. Bolibruch entering the
second squad car without handcuffs).
Ms. Bolibruch claims Deputy Frovarp (1) used excessive force in conducting a PIT
maneuver to stop the truck, (2) used excessive force when he held Ms. Bolibruch at
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 5 of 25

6
gunpoint, (3) subjected her to an unreasonable seizure when he placed her in handcuffs,
and (4) detained Ms. Bolibruch for an unreasonable amount of time when he held her,
handcuffed, in his squad car. 	Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 27–29. 	For relief, Ms. Bolibruch
seeks compensatory, punitive, and other damages, as well as costs, including reasonable
attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest, and “any other relief that this Court may deem
just and equitable.” Id. at 5.
II
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if its resolution might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). 	A dispute over a fact is “genuine” only if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “The evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Id. at 255.
A
Whether Deputy Frovarp has qualified immunity from Ms. Bolibruch’s Fourth
Amendment claim depends on the answers to two questions: “(1) whether the facts shown
by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional . . . right, and (2) whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. City
of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Watson v.
Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021). 	Courts may consider the questions in either
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 25

7
order. 	Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 	A § 1983 plaintiff can defeat a
claim of qualified immunity only if the answer to both questions is yes. Krout v. Goemmer,
583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009). 	“Qualified immunity ‘protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Sok Kong ex rel. Map Kong v. City
of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,
104 (2018) (per curiam)). 	If the material facts are not genuinely disputed, then the
constitutionality of an officer’s conduct is a question of law. 	Thompson v. Reuting,
968 F.2d 756, 759 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Pollreis v. Marzolf, 66 F.4th 726, 732 n.2 (8th
Cir. 2023); Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
“For purposes of the second prong, [courts] look to ‘the legal rules that were clearly
established at the time’ the action at issue was taken.” 	Graham v. Barnette, 5 F.4th 872,
881 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 711 (8th Cir. 2004)). “A right is
clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” 	Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,
595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). While
Supreme Court “case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly
established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (citation modified). “This inquiry
‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition.’” Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5–6 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
198 (2004) (per curiam)); see also Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (stating that “[s]pecificity is
especially important in the Fourth Amendment context” and the “[u]se of excessive force
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 7 of 25

8
is an area of the law in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case”
(citation modified)). 	As the Eighth Circuit has explained, a plaintiff can show that a right
was clearly established in different ways:
[1] [A] plaintiff may point to existing circuit precedent that
involves sufficiently “similar facts” to “squarely govern[ ]” the
officer’s actions such that the officer had “notice that [his]
specific use of force [was] unlawful,” Kisela v. Hughes, 584
U.S. [100, 104–05] (2018) (per curiam), [2] present “a robust
consensus of cases of persuasive authority” doing the same, see
De La Rosa v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2017), or
[3] demonstrate that a general constitutional rule applied with
“obvious clarity” to the facts at issue, see Rokusek v. Jansen,
899 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2018).
Boudoin v. Harsson, 962 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2020) (third, fourth, and fifth alterations
in original).
“To establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment’s right to be
free from excessive force, the test is whether the amount of force used was objectively
reasonable under the particular circumstances.” 	Brown, 574 F.3d at 496 (citations
omitted); accord Kohorst v. Smith, 968 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2020). Under that standard,
the Court must evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of force,
“careful[ly] balancing . . . the nature and quality of the intrusion on [Ms. Bolibruch’s]
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation modified). 	“Once the predicate
facts are established, the reasonableness of the [officer’s] conduct under the circumstances
is a question of law.” 	Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 8 of 25

9
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” 	Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 	Importantly, the “reasonableness of the force
used” is evaluated “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with the
benefit of hindsight.” 	Kohorst, 968 F.3d at 876. 	“This evaluation entails careful
consideration of the case’s particular facts and circumstances, including: ‘(1) the severity
of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight.’” 	Id. (quoting Michael v. Trevena, 899 F.3d 528, 532 (8th
Cir. 2018)). “The degree of injury suffered, to the extent ‘it tends to show the amount and
type of force used,’ is also relevant to our excessive force inquiry.” 	Montoya v. City of
Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d
898, 906 (8th Cir. 2011)). 	“[F]orce is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants
who do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of the
officers or the public.” Jackson v. Stair, 944 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown,
574 F.3d at 499).
B
1
Ms. Bolibruch claims that Deputy Frovarp’s use of the PIT maneuver constituted
excessive force because a reasonable officer would only have suspected the truck of
speeding, which is a petty misdemeanor under Minnesota law. ECF No. 28 at 15; Minn.
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 9 of 25

10
Stat. § 169.14, subdiv. 13(a). 	This is unpersuasive. 	The plaintiff-friendly version of the
facts would indicate to a reasonable officer that the suspect was fleeing the police, which
is a felony. Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subdiv. 3. By the time the truck entered the highway
interchange road, Deputy Frovarp was close behind in a marked car with sirens and lights
activated. 	ECF No. 29-1 at 1:08–14. 	That the truck pulled over onto the shoulder and
slowed to a crawl, id., would indicate to a reasonable officer that the driver knew the police
vehicle was behind them and was aware that the officer was attempting to pull the vehicle
over. The truck’s sudden release of the brakes, acceleration, and return to the center of the
driving lane objectively indicated a decision not to submit to the officer but instead to flee.
See Kaleta v. Johnson, No. 12-cv-170 (JNE/FLN), 2013 WL 3448148, at *4 (D. Minn.
July 9, 2013) (“Where the driver does not immediately stop for the police—even if the
driver fails to stop because he is unaware that the police are pursuing him—a reasonable
officer could believe that the driver is attempting to flee or resist arrest.” (citing McCoy v.
City 	of 	Monticello, 	342 	F.3d 	842, 	848 	(8th 	Cir. 	2003)); 	Moore-Jones 	v. 	Quick,
909 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that “[f]rom a reasonable officer's perspective,
[a suspect] refused to comply with commands to pull over” when she initially pulled over
and then pulled back onto the road and accelerated); Bowman v. Sheriff of Columbia Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., No. 24-13195, 2025 WL 2629753, at *1 n.6 (11th Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (“To
be clear, when an officer initiates lights and sirens to effectuate a stop, a driver should
promptly stop . . . . If the driver fails to stop and continues driving, it is entirely reasonable
for an officer to conclude that the driver is attempting to flee and elude the officer.”).
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 10 of 25

11
Ms. Bolibruch argues that “[a] reasonable officer would understand that the driver
of the [truck] may try to find a safe and suitable site after the interchange for the traffic
stop to occur.” ECF No. 28 at 14. But “[l]aw enforcement officers are not required to read
a suspect’s motivations in failing to obey commands—it is enough that the officer
reasonably perceives that the suspect is not following orders as given.” Neal v. Ficcadenti,
895 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 2018). 	Moreover, the cases cited by Ms. Bolibruch are
inapposite. None involved a suspect that began pulling over only to reenter the roadway
and accelerate. 	See United States v. Fickas, No. 21-cr-160 (WMW/LIB), 2022 WL
1479764, at *1–2, *10–11 (D. Minn. Feb. 11, 2022), R. & R. adopted, 2022 WL 1090885
(D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2022); United States v. Garrott, No. 2:25CR79-MHT, 2025 WL
3068739, at *1, *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2025); United States v. Miller, 54 F.4th 219, 224,
230 (4th Cir. 2022).
In determining whether use of a PIT maneuver is reasonable, a court must “consider
the risk of bodily harm that [the officer’s] action posed to [the suspect] in light of the threat
to the public that [the officer] was trying to eliminate.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383
(2007). 	A PIT maneuver may be reasonably used even if the suspect does not pose “an
immediate threat” to others at the time it is used. Christiansen v. Eral, 52 F.4th 377, 380
(8th Cir. 2022).
No reasonable juror could conclude that Deputy Frovarp’s use of the PIT maneuver
was excessive. When Deputy Frovarp first clocked the truck, it was traveling 22 miles per
hour over the speed limit, which posed a danger to others on the road. 	And from an
objective officer’s point of view, the truck attempted to flee once Deputy Frovarp was close
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 11 of 25

12
behind it, creating additional reasonable concerns for the safety of others driving on the
roadway. When Deputy Frovarp conducted the PIT maneuver, the truck was accelerating
from a slow speed; it was not moving at highway speeds at that time. This relatively low
speed reduced the risk of injury to Ms. Bolibruch and Mr. Brown. After Deputy Frovarp
executed the PIT maneuver, the truck spun around, but it did not leave the road. See ECF
No. 24-1 at 2:34 (showing the truck’s position on the road). 	At the time, Ms. Bolibruch
reported she was uninjured. 	ECF No. 24-1 at 8:11–13; ECF No. 29-2 at 8:13–15.
Balancing the reasonable concerns for the truck’s speeding, the attempt to flee, and the
relatively low risk of the PIT maneuver used by Deputy Frovarp, excessive force was not
used here.
Even if Deputy Frovarp used excessive force in executing the PIT maneuver,
Ms. Bolibruch has failed to show that the law was clearly established that using a PIT
maneuver in these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. On this issue, the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Moore-Jones is instructive. 	There, the court addressed an officer’s
use of a PIT maneuver where the officer had attempted to initiate a traffic stop due to
expired car registration. 	Moore-Jones, 909 F.3d at 985. 	After the officer turned on his
lights and sirens, the suspect decelerated, pulled onto the right shoulder, and then pulled
back onto the road, where she accelerated to 35–38 miles per hour, maintaining that speed
for the remainder of the pursuit. Id. The officer then initiated a PIT maneuver, causing the
suspect’s car to “spin into a ditch, hitting a cement culvert.” 	Id. 	After analyzing other
cases in which PIT maneuvers were used, the Eighth Circuit held that the officer’s use of
the PIT maneuver fell in the “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,” id. at
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 12 of 25

13
987 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 18 (2015)), and thus the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that his conduct violated the
Fourth Amendment, id. This case’s facts are remarkably similar to those in Moore-Jones.
Like the driver in Moore-Jones, the driver of the truck was initially suspected of a low-level
offense (speeding). 	However, once Deputy Frovarp attempted to pull the driver over by
activating his emergency lights and sirens, Mr. Brown initially began to pull over, but then
he accelerated and re-entered the driving lane. In Moore-Jones, the Eighth Circuit held the
law was not clearly established that an officer’s PIT maneuver under similar conditions
constitutes excessive force. That determination controls here.
Ms. Bolibruch contends that Marshall v. West, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala.
2008), supports her position that the law was clearly established at the time of the incident.
ECF No. 28 at 17–18. 	There, the court held that law enforcement subjected a suspect to
an unreasonable seizure by using a PIT maneuver. Marshall, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. The
court found that an objectively reasonable officer would not have thought the suspect was
fleeing law enforcement by failing to pull over because the officers were in plain clothes
and driving in an unmarked vehicle without flashing lights illuminated. 	Id. at 1234–37.
We don’t have anything like that here.
2
Ms. Bolibruch next claims Deputy Frovarp used excessive force when he held her
at gunpoint. Pointing a gun at a suspect may constitute excessive force, see Clark v. Clark,
926 F.3d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 2019), particularly when the gun is pointed at a “compliant
suspect for an unreasonably long period of time after the police have taken control of the
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 13 of 25

14
situation,” Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 747. 	“When officers are presented with serious danger in
the course of carrying out an investigative detention, they may brandish weapons or even
constrain the suspect with handcuffs in order to control the scene and protect their safety.”
United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). In Clark, the
Eighth Circuit held an officer did not use excessive force in pointing a gun at a pulled-over
suspect the officers knew to be armed, even after the suspect “signaled compliance by
putting his hands out the driver’s side window.” 926 F.3d at 979. The court held that “[a]
reasonable officer was justified in believing the situation was not fully under control until
[the suspect] had been removed from the vehicle, patted down, and restrained.” 	Id. 	The
court reasoned that “[w]hen [the suspect] stopped his vehicle, officers knew [he] had a
weapon, were aware that he had been the only identified person present in an area where
shots had reportedly been fired, and had reason to believe he might be a suspect attempting
to evade capture.” Id.
In Pollreis, the Eighth Circuit held that an officer did not use excessive force in
holding two boys—one twelve and the other fourteen—at gunpoint. 	9 F.4th at 741.
Officers were “conducting a gang-related stakeout” which resulted in a car chase, leading
to a car crash. Id. at 740–41. Several of the car’s occupants fled on foot, and the officers
knew that one of the suspects was often armed. Id. Two boys were in the area and matched
a description of two of the fleeing suspects. Id. at 741. The officer ordered the boys to lie
on the ground, and the officer held them at gunpoint for seven minutes until other officers
arrived. Id. The Eighth Circuit held the officer did not use excessive force in continuing
to point his gun at the boys, even though they were compliant, because the situation was
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 14 of 25

15
not under control at the time. 	Id. at 748. 	In other words, because the boys were not
restrained, patted down, or definitively identified, and the officer was alone, he was
justified in holding the boys at gunpoint. Id.
Relying on Clark and Pollreis, the district court in Biggs v. City of Maryland
Heights held that an officer did not use excessive force when he pointed his firearm at a
suspect for nearly two minutes. No. 4:20-cv-01499-JCH, 2022 WL 1451670, at *6 (E.D.
Mo. May 9, 2022), aff’d, 2022 WL 17517394 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022). The officer there
attempted to conduct a traffic stop, but the suspect continued driving and did not pull over
until the officer pulled in front of the suspect’s vehicle, forcing him to stop. Id. at *1. The
officer exited his vehicle, drew his firearm, pointed it at the suspect, and ordered him to
raise his hands. Id. The suspect was compliant, but the officer did not lower his weapon
until backup arrived. Id. at *1, *6. The court held the officer’s conduct did not constitute
excessive force, reasoning that
all [Officer Munoz] knew was that Biggs did not stop his
vehicle 	for 	a 	quarter 	of 	a 	mile, 	despite 	Officer 	Munoz
activating his lights and siren. 	Officer Munoz was not aware
of the reason for Biggs’s failure to pull over, and it was
reasonable for him to believe that Biggs was intoxicated or
fleeing, and that he possibly represented a danger to Munoz
and the public at large. Pulling his firearm and pointing it at
Biggs until he was certain the situation was under control and
his safety was not threatened was objectively reasonable under
the circumstances.
Id. at *7. 	The circumstances here are comparable to those in Biggs. As already discussed,
it was objectively reasonable for Deputy Frovarp to believe that Mr. Brown was attempting
to flee. Deputy Frovarp was alone, and he pointed his firearm at Ms. Bolibruch only until
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 15 of 25

16
he was able to put her in handcuffs. ECF No. 24-1 at 2:42–43. Under these circumstances,
it was objectively reasonable to hold Ms. Bolibruch at gunpoint, and Deputy Frovarp only
did so until the situation was under control.
Even if Deputy Frovarp used excessive force in holding Ms. Bolibruch at gunpoint,
Ms. Bolibruch has failed to show it was clearly established that Deputy Frovarp’s conduct
was unconstitutional at the time of the incident. 	Ms. Bolibruch cites Wilson v. Lamp,
901 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2018), arguing it clearly establishes “that an officer cannot point a
firearm at someone who is not threatening or resisting.” 	ECF No. 28 at 19. 	But Wilson
does not support Ms. Bolibruch’s argument. 	There, officers believed a convicted child
molester named David was meeting a minor girl at a park. 	901 F.3d at 985. 	David had
several outstanding warrants. 	Id. 	A pickup truck the officers knew belonged to David’s
brother, Levi, left the park. Id. The officers followed the truck, and initiated a traffic stop.
Id. The officers approached the truck with their guns drawn, and commanded the driver to
put his hands up. The driver complied. Id. One of the officers recognized the driver was
Levi. Id. The officers ordered him to exit the truck, which he did. Id. One of the officers
grabbed Levi, threw him against the truck, and pointed a gun at the back of his head. Id.
The officers patted Levi down, searched the truck, and then left. Id. Throughout the stop,
Levi and another minor child, who was riding in the vehicle, had at least one firearm
pointed at them. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that “[t]he officers’ drawing and pointing of
weapons as they approached the truck, which they reasonably believed was being driven
by David, was not excessive.” 	Id. 	at 990. 	But the Eighth Circuit held the officers used
excessive force by continuing to point their weapons, even after the officers realized the
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 16 of 25

17
driver was Levi (not David), the passenger was another child, and the officers had patted
Levi down. Id.
Here, unlike Wilson, it was objectively reasonable for Deputy Frovarp to think the
truck had attempted to flee, there was no mistake about who the occupants were, Deputy
Frovarp was alone, and he stopped aiming his firearm at Ms. Bolibruch once she was
handcuffed. 	Wilson does not support the conclusion that Deputy Frovarp used excessive
force in holding Ms. Bolibruch at gunpoint, nor does it show the law was clearly established
that Deputy Frovarp’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
3
Ms. Bolibruch claims she was unreasonably seized when Deputy Frovarp placed her
in handcuffs. “During a Terry stop, officers must use ‘the least intrusive means of detention
and investigation, in terms of scope and duration, that are reasonably necessary to achieve
the purpose of the Terry stop.’” United States v. Sanford, 813 F.3d 708, 713 (8th Cir. 2016)
(quoting United States v. Newell, 596 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2010)). “As part of a lawful
Terry stop, officers may take any measures that are reasonably necessary to protect their
personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” 	Smith,
648 F.3d at 659 (citation modified). As the Eighth Circuit has explained:
[B]ecause handcuffs constitute “greater than a de minimus
intrusion,” their use “requires the [officer] to demonstrate that
the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of
reasonable caution in [believing] that the action taken was
appropriate.” [El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 457
(8th 	Cir. 	2011)] 	(first 	alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting
Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1122–23 (10th Cir.
2010)). 	In particular, Terry “requires some reasonable belief
that the suspect is armed and dangerous or that the restraints
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 17 of 25

18
are necessary for some other legitimate purpose, evaluated on
the 	facts 	of 	each 	case.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Bennett 	v. 	City 	of
Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 836 (6th Cir. 2005)). We have
already held that handcuffing “absent any concern for safety”
violates the second Terry prong. Id. at 460 (citing Manzanares
v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1150 (10th Cir. 2009)).
Haynes v. Minnehan, 14 F.4th 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2021) (footnote omitted).
If Deputy Frovarp subjected Ms. Bolibruch to an unreasonable seizure by placing
her in handcuffs, Ms. Bolibruch has failed to show Deputy Frovarp’s conduct violated
clearly established law. In her brief, Ms. Bolibruch does not appear to argue that the law
was clearly established in her favor regarding this issue at the time of the incident. 	See
ECF No. 28 at 19–20. 	The two cases she cites in her brief do not clearly establish that
Deputy Frovarp’s actions were unconstitutional. See Haynes, 14 F.4th 830 (holding officer
was not entitled to qualified immunity for handcuffing cooperative suspect where there
was no basis for safety concerns and no attempt to flee); El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 458
(holding officer violated suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights by handcuffing him prior to
interviewing him where suspect did not act in a threatening manner or refuse to cooperate
and there was no attempt to flee).
4
Ms. Bolibruch argues her continued detention in which she remained handcuffed in
the back of Deputy Frovarp’s squad car violated her Fourth Amendment rights. A lawful
Terry stop “may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it is excessively intrusive in
its scope or manner of execution.” El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 457 (citation modified). In
other words, officers must “employ the least intrusive means of detention and investigation,
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 18 of 25

19
in terms of scope and duration, that are reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the
Terry stop.” 	United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999). 	“In
assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative
stop,” a court “examine[s] whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant.” 	United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
“There is no bright line rule.” 	Irvin v. Richardson, 20 F.4th 1199, 1207 (8th Cir. 2021)
(citation modified). 	However, an officer subjects a person to an unreasonably long
detention when the person is detained “beyond the amount of time otherwise justified by
the purpose of the stop” and “without reasonable suspicion.” Pollreis, 9 F.4th at 744.
The duration of the stop was not unreasonable. 	Throughout the stop, Deputy
Frovarp was engaged in efforts to investigate the suspected decision to flee. 	He ran Ms.
Bolibruch’s information and Mr. Brown’s information, and he interviewed Mr. Brown.
These actions represented diligent attempts to “confirm or dispel [Deputy Frovarp’s]
suspicions quickly.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. Moreover, Ms. Bolibruch was detained for
a total of 22 minutes, and the Eighth Circuit has found longer detentions to be reasonable.
See Williams v. Decker, 767 F.3d 734, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding thirty-minute
detention was reasonable where officers removed passengers from the vehicle, handcuffed
them, swept the vehicle, questioned the passengers, and searched their criminal histories).
However, Deputy Frovarp’s actions in keeping Ms. Bolibruch handcuffed in the
back of his squad car after he received information clearing her and after he had no reason
to suspect her of any wrongdoing was clearly unreasonable. By that point, other officers
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 19 of 25

20
had arrived on the scene, and there was no reason to believe Ms. Bolibruch posed a safety
concern. 	See Smith, 648 F.3d at 659. 	As Deputy Frovarp acknowledged several times,
Ms. Bolibruch was only a passenger; she was not the one who attempted to flee. ECF No.
24-1 at 5:48–51, 	8:04–10. 	Ms. Bolibruch was compliant and honest throughout the
entirety of her interactions with Deputy Frovarp. See id. at 4:49–5:54. At no point did Ms.
Bolibruch indicate she was unwilling to cooperate. Cf. Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725,
738 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding officers did not use unreasonable force in handcuffing suspect
where he displayed “argumentative, evasive, and uncooperative behavior”). Despite this,
Ms. Bolibruch remained detained for an additional 17 minutes after Deputy Frovarp ran
her information.3 	See ECF No. 24-1 at 6:09–8:02. 	Cf. Mhanna v. Metro. Council,
No. 21-cv-1974 (ECT/DTS), 2023 WL 3179347, at *10 (D. Minn. May 1, 2023) (finding
plaintiff was subject to an unreasonable seizure when officers left her handcuffed for six
minutes longer than necessary). 	In these circumstances, Ms. Bolibruch was subjected to
an unreasonable seizure.
Having determined Ms. Bolibruch was unreasonably seized in this respect, the
question is whether “case law would have fairly notified every reasonable officer in
3 	Even if I am incorrect that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms.
Bolibruch, shows that she was cleared after running the initial search, Deputy Frovarp
conceded at the hearing that she was cleared when Deputy Frovarp announced to another
officer that he was “going to cut her [loose]” and indicated she would need a ride into town.
ECF No. 24-1 at 12:20–25. Despite this, Ms. Bolibruch’s handcuffs were still not removed
for another twelve minutes. 	Compare ECF No. 24-1 at 12:20–25 (indicating Deputy
Frovarp was going to cut Ms. Bolibruch loose) and id. at 23:49 (opening door of second
squad car to remove Mr. Brown), with ECF No. 24-4 at 22:34 (opening door to remove
Mr. Brown from second squad car), and id. at 23:29 (showing Ms. Bolibruch entering the
second squad car without handcuffs).
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 20 of 25

21
[Deputy Frovarp’s] shoes that [his] conduct would violate the Constitution.” 	Haynes,
14 F.4th at 837 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Eighth Circuit
answered this question in the affirmative in Haynes. There, the court explained:
More than six years before [the defendant officer] Steinkamp
handcuffed [the plaintiff] Haynes, we said that it was “well
established that if suspects are cooperative and officers have
no objective concerns for safety, the officers may not use
intrusive tactics such as handcuffing absent any extraordinary
circumstances.” El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 460. We concluded
that “the prior case law provided fair warning to [an officer] at
the time of the incident” that a reasonable officer in her place
“could not have believed it was lawful to handcuff and frisk a
suspect absent any concern for safety.” Id. And even earlier,
we rejected an argument that reasonable suspicion justified
handcuffing a suspect after a frisk confirmed that the suspect
lacked a weapon or contraband. [United States v.] Tovar-
Valdivia, 	193 	F.3d 	[1025,] 	1028 	n.1 	[(8th 	Cir. 	1999)];
Manzanares [v. Higdon, 575 F.3d [1135,] 1150 [(10th Cir.
2009)] (“[A]ny reasonable officer would understand that it is
unconstitutional to handcuff someone absent probable cause or
an 	articulable 	basis 	to 	suspect 	a 	threat 	to 	officer 	safety
combined with reasonable suspicion.”).
Id. (footnote omitted)
Deputy Frovarp argues the length of Ms. Bolibruch’s detention and handcuffing did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because Deputy Frovarp was still conducting his
investigation, and he did so in a diligent manner. ECF No. 22 at 20–24, 29–30. 	But the
fact of an ongoing investigation does not on its own entitle an officer to leave a suspect in
handcuffs when there is no reason to believe they pose a safety concern. In Haynes, police
officers conducted a Terry stop of Haynes, suspecting his involvement in a drug deal.
Haynes, 14 F.4th at 832–33. 	When Haynes could not produce his license, the officers
handcuffed him and conducted a pat down. 	Id. at 833–34. 	Despite finding no weapons
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 21 of 25

22
and Haynes being cooperative and polite throughout the interaction, the officers left
Haynes in handcuffs for another five minutes. Id. at 834, 836. The Eighth Circuit held it
was clearly established that Haynes’s continued handcuffing for the additional five minutes
violated Haynes’s Fourth Amendment rights, as Haynes posed no safety concern. 	Id. at
837. 	In so holding, the court did not rule that the entire encounter needed to end five
minutes earlier; only that Haynes should not have been left in handcuffs for the five minutes
after the objective safety concern had dissipated. 	Id. at 837–38. 	El-Ghazzawy is also
instructive here. There, El-Ghazzawy was suspected of selling fake watches. 636 F.3d at
455. 	When the police officer arrived, she immediately put El-Ghazzawy in handcuffs,
despite there being no objective safety concern. Id. at 455, 457. The officer subsequently
proceeded to investigate the situation. Id. at 455–57. The Eighth Circuit held it was clearly
established that El-Ghazzawy’s handcuffing violated his Fourth Amendment right, but it
did not indicate the police officer was wrong to investigate the suspected crime. Id. at 460.
Haynes and El-Ghazzawy show that an ongoing investigation does not automatically justify
handcuffing, or continued handcuffing, of a suspect when there is no objective safety
concern. See also Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding it was
clearly established that officers could not leave an eleven-year-old boy in handcuffs for
fifteen to twenty minutes where he was not attempting to flee and posed no safety concern
while police executed warrant).
The cases on which Deputy Frovarp relies are distinguishable. 	In Williams v.
Decker, two officers stopped Williams on suspicion that he was operating a vehicle while
intoxicated. 767 F.3d 734, 737, 739 (8th Cir. 2014). The officers instructed Williams to
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 22 of 25

23
show his hands, but Williams could not hear them, and the officers observed Williams
continue to conceal his hands from officers’ view. Id. at 738, 740–41. The officers drew
their firearms, after which Williams and his passenger raised their hands. Id. at 738. The
officers removed Williams and his passenger from the vehicle and placed them in
handcuffs. 	Id. 	The officers inquired whether the vehicle contained any weapons, and
Williams told them he had a firearm in the vehicle. Id. The officers proceeded to remove
the firearm and conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle. 	Id. 	The officers retrieved
Williams’s and his passenger’s criminal histories. Id. After discovering the passenger had
no outstanding warrants, he was permitted to leave. Id. However, the police were informed
that Williams had “a felony conviction for a weapons violation while intoxicated.” Id. It
took approximately thirty minutes for the officers to conduct their investigation. Id. at 742.
Williams is distinguishable because the officers there knew a firearm was present, and they
were informed that Williams’s criminal history indicated he was a felon. Id. at 738. Again,
this case isn’t anything like that.
Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 2019), is also inapposite. There, officers
handcuffed Mr. Waters when he refused to allow Menards store employees to search his
trunk prior to leaving the store’s lumber yard, in accordance with store policy. Id. at 731–
32. “The officers did not know Mr. Waters’s background and witnessed his argumentative,
evasive, and uncooperative behavior,” as well as his refusal to comply with officer
commands. 	Id. at 738. 	Additionally, Mr. Waters was “significantly taller than either of
the female officers” who had responded to the scene. Id. at 732. The Eighth Circuit held
that these circumstances justified handcuffing Mr. Waters for twenty minutes until the store
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 23 of 25

24
employees and officers were able to inspect Mr. Waters’s trunk. Id. at 736, 738. As with
Williams, in Waters, the officers did not leave Mr. Waters handcuffed after reasonable
safety concerns had dissipated. Once the officers realized there was nothing suspicious in
the trunk and that Mr. Waters’s uncooperative behavior was not due to criminal mischief,
he was released.
The remaining cases cited by Deputy Frovarp are equally distinguishable. 	See
United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 974–75 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding forty-five minute
detention was not unconstitutional where suspect was not held after she had been cleared);
United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917–18 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding hour-long
detention without handcuffs was not unreasonable when waiting for drug-sniffing dog to
arrive); 	Sharpe, 	470 	U.S. 	at 	686–88 	(holding 	twenty-minute 	detention 	was 	not
unreasonable where suspect was not handcuffed); Irvin v. Richardson, 20 F.4th 1199,
1206–07 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding thirteen-minute detention with handcuffs was not
unreasonable where officers did not hold suspects after determining they were not involved
in possible disturbance involving a gun).
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 24 of 25

25
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant Andrew Frovarp’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 20] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as described
above.
Dated: October 13, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
Chief Judge, United States District Court
CASE 0:24-cv-03893-ECT-LIB Doc. 35 Filed 10/13/26 Page 25 of 25