Crisman et al v. Chicago Title Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Erik F. Hansen and Kirk Tisher, BURNS & HANSEN, P.A., 8401 Wayzata
Boulevard, Suite 300, Minneapolis, MN 55426; and Joshua D. Christensen,
DUDLEY AND SMITH, P.A., 1295 Northland Drive, Suite 250, Mendota
Heights, MN 55120, for Plaintiffs.
Kevin P. Kitchen, Timothy M. Kelley, STINSON LLP, 50 South Sixth Street,
Suite 2600, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs Andrew and Renee Crisman acquired 120 acres of real property in
Kanabec County, Minnesota in 2013. They also purchased a title insurance policy from
Defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company. 	In relevant part, that policy provides
coverage in the event the Crismans did not possess a right of access to and from their
property as of the date the policy took effect, October 2, 2013.
ANDREW CRISMAN and
RENEE CRISMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
Civil No. 24-3188 (JRT/LIB)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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The Crismans are now involved in state court litigation concerning the legal status
of “Hornet Street,” a gravel road which the Crismans argue provides them with the only
means of accessing their property from public roads. 	The Crismans filed a claim with
Chicago Title seeking coverage for costs associated with their state court lawsuit, and
Chicago Title denied the claim. The Crismans sued, alleging that Chicago Title has a duty
to defend the Crismans under the title insurance policy, and therefore committed breach
of contract in failing to provide coverage for the Crismans’ legal costs. The Crismans now
move for partial summary judgment seeking declaratory judgment to that effect. Chicago
Title also seeks summary judgment, arguing that it can prove that the Crismans possessed
a legal right of access to the Property as of the date of the policy, and therefore has no
duty to defend the Crismans in state court.
Because genuine disputes of material fact remain regarding the Crismans’ legal
right of access to their property as of October 2, 2013, the Court concludes that Chicago
Title is not entitled to summary judgment. Furthermore, because Chicago Title failed to
demonstrate that the state court litigation is outside the scope of protection afforded by
the policy, the Court will grant the Crismans’ motion for partial summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
The Crismans purchased 120 acres of real property (“the Property”) in Kanabec
County, Minnesota in 2013. (Aff. of Renee Crisman (“Crisman Aff.”) ¶¶ 1–3, Oct. 3, 2025,
Docket No. 42.) The Crismans also purchased a title insurance policy (“the Policy”) from
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Defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company. 	(Id. ¶ 4.) 	As relevant here, Chicago Title
provided the following coverage:
Chicago Title Insurance Company . . . insures, as of Date of Policy . . . against
loss or damage . . . sustained or incurred by the Insured by reason of: . . . No
right of access to and from the Land.
(Crisman Aff., Ex. A at 13.)
In the years since they purchased the Property, the Crismans have engaged in
multiple rounds of litigation against Hillman Township and other relevant parties to clarify
the legal status of “Hornet Street”—a dead-end gravel “road [that] measures two rods
wide and runs north one-half mile from County Road 3.” Crisman v. Hillman Township,
No. A22-0123, 2022 WL 3581816, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2022). 	From the
Crismans’ perspective, Hornet Street has always been the only way through which the
Crismans can access their property from public roads. The underlying state court cases
broadly concern the subject of Hornet Street’s ownership and control, and specifically,
whether Hillman Township has a legal obligation to maintain Hornet Street.1 See Crisman,
2022 WL 3581816, at *2.
1 The Court notes that the parties to the underlying state court litigation seem to have
had difficulty agreeing to what the case is about. See Crisman v. Hillman Township, No. 33-CV-
23-187, Order Continuing Trial (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2025) (stating that “[a]fter hearing from
several witnesses, it became apparent to the parties that there were substantial areas of
disagreement about evidentiary matters,” and granting a trial continuance).
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The Crismans’ filings reference Minnesota Court File Nos. 33-CV-20-4; 33-CV-23-
187; 33-CV-23-190 as the relevant state court matters. 2 These cases involve the following
subjects:
• 	33-CV-20-4: 	The 	Crismans 	sought 	“a 	declaratory 	judgment”
including confirmation “that Hornet Street is a township road” and
that the “Township bears a statutorily duty . . . to maintain Hornet
Street[.]” 	(Compl. ¶¶ 31, 40–42, Crisman et al. v. Hillman Twp,
Minn., No. 33-CV-20-4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 2020).) This case is now
closed.
• 	33-CV-23-187: 	The Crismans sought “declaratory judgment” that
“Hornet Street is a township road,” that the “Hillman Town Board
erroneously signed the ‘40-Yr Resolution’ attempting to void its
interest 	in 	Hornet 	Street 	based 	upon 	false 	statements 	and
assumptions,” and that “the Township has maintained Hornet Street
within the last forty (40) years[.]” (Petition at ¶¶ 32–33, 40, Crisman
et al. v. Hillman Twp., No. 33-CV-23-187 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24,
2023.)
• 	33-CV-23-190: 	The Crismans sought injunctive relief including an
order enjoining the relocation of a bus stop near the Crismans’ home,
arguing if relocated, the school district would be “fail[ing] to provide
a bus stop location that [ensures] the health, safety and welfare of
the Crisman children.” (Compl. ¶ 30), Crisman v. Ind. Pub. Sch. Dist.
No. 332, No. 33-CV-23-190 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 2023).) 	The
Crismans also sought “an Order enjoining . . . Defendants . . . from
making any threats, engaging in any harassing behaviors as it relates
to Plaintiffs or Hornet Street, or making any statements that they are
the sole owners of Hornet Street and thus, no other members of the
public may drive down Hornet Street.” 	(Id. at 8.) This case is now
closed.
2 A federal district court may take judicial notice of public state-court records. See, e.g.,
Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8 th Cir. 2005).
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The Crismans filed a title insurance claim with Chicago Title for costs associated
with their litigation. Chicago Title denied the claim. (Crisman Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. A at 1–12.) The
Crismans requested that Chicago Title reconsider the denial of coverage multiple times,
but Chicago Title maintained its position that “the Property enjoyed a legal right of access
along [Hornet Street] as of the Date of Policy” and that, therefore, it “is not obligated by
the terms of the Policy to take action at this time[.]” (Id. at 12.)
On June 25, 2024, the Crismans initiated a state court action against Chicago Title.
(See Compl., Aug. 9, 2024, Docket No. 1.) The Crismans alleged that “[d]ue to the acts of
Hillman Township and others related to the Crismans lack of access to the Property, the
Crismans have been involved in several court cases [to] attempt to protect their interest
and access to the Property.” (Id. ¶ 19.) They argued that “[p]ursuant to the terms of the
Policy, Chicago Title is liable for the Crismans’ costs and expenses in defending their rights
under the Policy and to the Property.” 	(Compl. ¶ 24.) 	The Crismans, alleging that
“Chicago Title has inexplicably denied the Crismans’ claim and has refused to provide the
Crismans with any coverage under the Policy” (id. ¶ 26), brought claims for breach of
contract and sought declaratory judgment that “the Crismans’ claim is covered under the
terms of the Policy” (id. ¶ 39). Chicago Title removed the case to federal court on August
9, 2024. (See Docket No. 1.)
The Crismans seek partial summary judgment, and Chicago Title seeks full
summary judgment. (Pls.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 20; Def.’s Mot.
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Summ. J., Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 27.) The Crismans argue that the Crismans’ litigation
triggers Chicago Title’s duty to defend under the Policy, and seek declaratory judgment
to that effect. Chicago Title contends that as a matter of law, the Crismans possessed a
right of access to and from the Property as of October 2, 2013, and that, accordingly, it
properly denied the Crismans’ insurance claim. 	Chicago Title argues that the Crismans
possessed a right of access through two different roads—Hornet Street or Hillman Drive
(also known as 297 th Avenue), a road that abuts the Crisman’s property but does not allow
them to access their driveway or provide access to the buildings on their property. (See
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 4 (providing a map), Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 29.) Chicago
Title argues that because it can prove that the Crismans’ right of access was intact when
the Policy took effect, it has no obligation to defend the Crismans in state court.
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party can demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit,
and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could lead a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
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inferences to be drawn from those facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
II. 	MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Crismans move for partial summary judgment, arguing that Chicago Title owes
the Crismans a duty to defend them in their state court litigation over their access to the
Property. Chicago Title opposes the Crismans’ motion and seeks summary judgment in
its favor, on the grounds that it is undisputed that the Crismans possessed legal access to
their land as of the date of the Policy, and therefore, the Crismans’ claims fail as a matter
of law.3
A. 	Duty to Defend Standard
“It is axiomatic that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.”
Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 722 N.W.2d 283, 302 (Minn. 2006). 	The
Minnesota Supreme Court has “consistently held that an insurer’s duty to defend arises
when any part of the claim against the insured is arguably within the scope of protection
afforded by the policy.” Franklin v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d 405, 406–07
(Minn. 1998). 	Moreover, “the duty to defend one claim creates a duty to defend all
claims; and . . . the duty to defend exists regardless of the merits of the underlying claims.”
Wooddale, 772 N.W.2d at 302. “In determining the existence of such a duty, a court will
3 Chicago Title never engages with the issue of whether the Crismans’ state court litigation
is related to their right of access to the Property. Chicago Title relies exclusively on proving here
that the Crismans did possess such right of access.
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compare the allegations in the complaint in the underlying action with the relevant
language in the insurance policy.” Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411,
415 (Minn. 1997).
“An insurer seeking to escape the duty to defend bears the burden of establishing
that all parts of a cause of action clearly fall outside the scope of coverage.” Franklin, 574
N.W.2d at 407. “Any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the insured, and the burden is on
the insurer to prove that the claim clearly falls outside the coverage afforded by the
policy. 	If the claim is not clearly outside coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend.”
Prahm v. Rupp Const. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1979). “An insurer who wishes to
escape [the] duty [to defend] has the burden of showing that all parts of the cause of
action fall clearly outside the scope of coverage.” 	Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387
N.W.2d 161, 165–66 (Minn. 1986).
B. 	Analysis
The relevant policy language here is clear, and the parties do not dispute its
meaning. The Crismans’ Policy guarantees the following:
Chicago Title Insurance Company . . . insures, as of Date of Policy . . . against
loss or damage . . . sustained or incurred by the Insured by reason of: . . . No
right of access to and from the land.
(Crisman Aff., Ex. A at 13.) Thus, the core question is whether the underlying state court
litigation is “arguably within the scope of the protection afforded by” this policy language.
See Franklin, 574 N.W.2d at 406–07.
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1. 	The Crismans’ Right of Access
The sole argument Chicago Title offers in support of its motion for summary
judgment and in opposition to the Crismans’ motion is that it can prove as a matter of law
that the Crismans possessed legal right of access to the Property as of the date of the
Policy. 	The parties therefore agree that the threshold issue for the Court to decide is
whether Plaintiffs possessed legal access to the Property as of October 2, 2013.
“An abutting landowner has, in addition to the public right of travel, the separate
and distinct right of access to his [or her] property.” Underwood v. Town Bd. of Empire,
14 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Minn. 1944). “Minnesota law treats the right of access—ingress and
egress—as a distinct property right.” State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Elbert, 942 N.W.2d
182, 189–90 (Minn. 2020). 	“Specifically, property owners have a right of ‘reasonably
convenient and suitable access’ to a highway that abuts their property.” Id. at 190. “What
is reasonable access is typically a fact question.” Id.
Chicago Title argues that two different roads provided the Crismans with a right of
access as of October 2, 2013: Hornet Street and Hilman Drive.
Chicago Title argues that Hornet Street, the stretch of road that has been at the
center of the Crismans’ dispute with Hillman Township from the outset of this saga,
provided the Crismans with an undisputed right of access to the Property from the time
it was purchased. 	Chicago Title offers two primary arguments in support of this
contention. 	First, because Hillman Township admitted in its briefing at the Minnesota
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Court of Appeals that the “northern quarter mile of Hornet Street is a town road[.]”
Appellate Brief, Hillman Township v. Crisman, No. A22-0123, 2022 WL 1811180, at *5
(Minn. App. Apr. 13, 2022). Second, because Hillman Township’s “40-Year Resolution,”
which was passed as an attempt by Hillman Township to disclaim any obligation to
maintain Hornet Street, cannot give rise to any insurance claims by the Crismans because
it arose eight years after the Policy took effect.
Chicago Title also argues that a different stretch of road, Hillman Drive, provided
the Crismans with a right of access as of the date of the Policy. Chicago Title states that
an official Kanabec County plat records Hillman Drive as “dedicate[d] to the public for
public use forever,” and that Hillman Drive abuts the Property. (See Decl. of Timothy M.
Kelly ¶ 4, Ex. C, Aug. 29, 2025, Docket No. 30.) Chicago Title also relies on a Declaration
from Richard Martens, “supervisor on the Hillman Town Board,” filed in one of the
underlying state court matters. 	(Id. ¶ 6, Ex. E (“Martens Decl.”).) 	Martens states that
“Hornet Street is not the only public access to [the Property],” and that:
A four-rod (66 feet) platted and maintained road (297 th Avenue) extends in
the Raspberry Acres plat to the eastern boundary of [the Property] and
provides unfettered access to their property.
(Id. at 16.) Chicago Title argues that although Hillman Drive “may not be [the Crismans’]
preferred right of access location,” the Crismans, “as of the Date of Policy, had a right of
access . . . via 297th Avenue f/k/a Hillman Drive.” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 9.)
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The Crismans respond that, at minimum, factual disputes remain as to whether
either road provided them with legal or actual access to the Property. As to Hornet Street,
the Crismans contend that whether Hornet Street provided a right of access is far from a
resolved question, and that this dispute, contrary to Chicago Title’s argument, long
predates Hillman Township’s “40-Year Resolution.” And as to Hillman Drive, the Crismans
dispute whether “the mere fact that Kanabec County recorded the plat” means that legal
access existed; the Crismans attest that the area between the Property and the end of
Hillman Drive was “completely abandoned, wooded and blocked until the Township
entered and cleared it in July 2021.” (Crisman Aff. ¶ 8.) They state that they have never
possessed legal access to the Property through Hillman Drive, and that such access is at
best “hypothetical.” The Crismans also contend that as of October 2, 2013, the date of
the Policy, Hillman Township had already abandoned Hillman Drive pursuant to a
Minnesota Statute that provides that only a town board can authorize maintenance on
“town roads or town cartways . . . upon which no maintenance or construction has been
conducted for 25 years or more.” See Minn. Stat. § 365.10, subd. 11.
The Court concludes that factual disputes remain as to whether the Crismans
possessed a legal right of access to the property as of October 2, 2013. 	While further
discovery and litigation may bear out that either Hornet Street or Hillman Drive did
provide the Crismans with a legal right of access, Chicago Title has not proved as much as
a matter of law. 	The parties have presented numerous facts relating to the legal and
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physical status of the two roads at the time the Policy took effect—some facts are
consistent with the position that the Crismans’ right of access was intact in 2013, but
others not. The Court cannot conclude on this record that the Crismans’ right of access
to their land was unimpeded as a matter of law as of the date of the Policy. The Court
will therefore deny Chicago Title’s motion for summary judgment.
2. 	Chicago Title’s Duty to Defend
Having concluded that genuine disputes remain as to whether the Crismans
possessed a right of access to the Property as of the date of the Policy, the Court turns to
whether Chicago Title breached its contract with the Crismans in denying their claim for
costs associated with the underlying state court litigation. 	Whether Chicago Title
breached its contract turns on whether Chicago Title owes a duty to defend the Crismans
in litigation over the legal status of Hornet Street.
In Minnesota, “an insurer’s duty to defend arises when any part of the claim
against the insured is arguably within the scope of protection afforded by the policy.”
Franklin, 574 N.W.2d at 406–07. “[T]he burden is on the insurer to prove that the claim
clearly falls outside the coverage afforded by the policy.” 	Prahm, 277 N.W.2d at 390
(emphasis added). 	Chicago Title failed to meet that burden. 	In opposition to the
Crismans’ motion for summary judgment, Chicago Title focused only on proving, as a
matter of law, that the Crismans possessed a right of access to the Property as of the date
of the Policy. The Court has rejected that argument, finding that factual disputes remain
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as to the Crismans’ right of access. 	But importantly, Chicago Title did not present any
alternative argument regarding its duty to defend. Chicago Title did not argue that the
Crismans’ state court litigation is not “arguably within the scope” of the Policy, and in fact,
did not discuss the applicable “arguably within the scope” standard at all in its briefing.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Crismans’ motion for partial summary
judgment and hold that Chicago Title owes the Crismans a duty to defend in the
underlying state court litigation because that litigation is arguably within the scope of the
protection afforded by the Policy. The extent of damages stemming from Chicago Title’s
breach was not part of the Crismans’ motion for summary judgment and must be the
subject of further litigation.
CONCLUSION
“If any part of a cause of action is arguably within the scope of coverage, the insurer
must defend.” Prahm, 277 N.W.2d at 390. Because Chicago Title failed to demonstrate
that the Crismans’ claim falls outside the coverage afforded by their title insurance policy,
the Court concludes that Chicago Title has a duty to defend the Crismans in the relevant
state court litigation. The Court will deny Chicago Title’s motion for summary judgment
and grant the Crismans’ motion for partial summary judgment.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. [20]) is GRANTED
as follows:
a. 	Defendant is under a duty to defend Plaintiffs in the underlying state
court 	litigation 	relating 	to 	the 	access 	rights, 	ownership, 	and
maintenance of Hornet Street.
b. 	Issues of fact remain regarding the extent of Defendants’ liability for
breach of contract.
2. 	Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. [27]) is DENIED.
DATED: March 17, 2026 	_____/s/ John R. Tunheim ____
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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