Jama v. Marshall et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Muna Jama,
Plaintiff,
v.
William K. Marshall III, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons; Andre Matevousian, Regional
Director of North Central Region, Federal Bureau
of Prisons; Warden Lance Molis of FCI Waseca; in
their official capacities only,
Defendants.
Case No. 23-CV-3075 (JMB/SGE)
ORDER
Alec Shaw, CAIR Minnesota, St. Paul, MN; Aya Beydoun, pro hac vice, CAIR, Dearborn,
MI; Deborah Golden, pro hac vice, the Law Office of Deborah M. Golden, Washington,
DC; Lena Fatina Masri, pro hac vice, Zanah Ghalawanji, pro hac vice, and Gadeir Ibrahim
Abbas, pro hac vice, CAIR National Legal Defense Fund, Washington, DC; for Plaintiff
Muna Jama.
Marianne F. Kies, pro hac vice, and Andrew Warden, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Division, Washington, DC, for Defendant William K. Marshall III.
Brian J. Boyd, pro hac vice, Marianne F. Kies, pro hac vice, and Andrew Warden, U.S.
Department 	of 	Justice, 	Civil 	Division, 	Washington, 	DC, 	for 	Defendants 	Andre
Matevousian and Warden Michael Segal.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants William K. Marshall III’s, Andre
Matevousian’s, 	and 	Michael 	Segal’s 	(together, 	Defendants) 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 103) and Plaintiff Muna Jama’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 110). 	For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion and grants
Plaintiff’s Motion.
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BACKGROUND
A. 	Jama’s Incarceration
Plaintiff Muna Jama is a Muslim woman who wears a hijab, a headscarf that covers
the hair, ears, and neck, as part of her religious practice. 	(Doc. No. 105-12 at 21:3–12,
79:1–10; Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23, 25, 26.) Jama’s faith requires her always to wear a hijab when
she is in mixed-gender spaces outside of her immediate family. 	(Doc. No. 105-1 at 2;
Compl. ¶ 26.) She has worn a hijab since she was a child, and she has never willingly been
seen in public without it. (Doc. No. 105-12 at 81:18–21; Compl. ¶ 23.) Appearing in public
without a hijab or being photograph without wearing a hijab and having the photo
accessible to strangers is “a serious breach” of her faith and “a deeply humiliating and
defiling experience” in conflict with her sincerely held religious beliefs. (Compl. ¶ 27; see
also Doc. No. 105-12 at 92:19–25, 93:1–15.)
Jama is currently incarcerated at FCI Waseca. (Doc. No. 105-12 at 6:2–4; Compl.
¶ 22.) When she arrived at the prison in 2019, officers did not permit her to wear her hijab
for her identification photo. 	(Doc. No. 105-12 at 142:9–19; Compl. ¶ 36.) 	Officers
photographed Jama without her hijab, and used this uncovered photo for Jama’s ID card,
the “Bed Book” (a physical book used to identify inmates), and the front of Jama’s locker.
(Doc. No. 105-12 at 105:25, 106:1–3; Compl. ¶¶ 37, 38, 40.) Each time Jama swiped her
ID card at the commissary, the uncovered photo would appear on a screen visible to other
persons nearby. (Doc. No. 105-12 at 106:3–6; Compl. ¶ 39.)
In July 2022, Jama filed a complaint with the BOP alleging violation of her religious
rights resulting from the taking of the uncovered photo, the photo’s existence in the
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facility’s database, and the required use of the ID card throughout the facility. (Doc. No.
105-12 at 135:11–17; Compl. ¶ 41.) Jama was then brought in for a new ID photo with her
hijab on; however, officers also required Jama to take a second, uncovered photo. 	(Doc.
No. 105-12 at 139:7–14; Compl. ¶ 44.) 	Jama later discovered that her uncovered photo
continued to be used for her ID card, when she swiped her ID at the commissary, in the
Bed Book, and on her locker, just as before. (Doc. No. 105-12 at 141:10–25; Compl. ¶¶ 47,
48, 49, 50.)
B. 	This Action
Jama filed suit in October 2023. 	(Compl.) 	Her Complaint includes one count:
violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. (Id. at
¶¶ 61–72.) The Complaint seeks to have her “illegally captured photographs and security
footage destroyed,” to “have official capacity FCI Waseca Defendants provide [her] with a
new ID with a covered photograph,” to “require official capacity Defendants to adopt
RFRA compliant policies of jail identification and photos,” and to “have individual
capacity defendants provide monetary damages for violations of RFRA.” (Id. ¶ 60.)
In January 2024, Jama filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (See
Doc. No. 21.) This motion asked the Court to order FCI Waseca to replace the uncovered
photo with a covered photo, to order FCI Waseca to stop using the uncovered photo in
every way it impacts Jama’s daily activities, and to replace her ID card with a covered
photo. (Doc. No. 22 at 15.) After meeting and conferring, the parties addressed the issues
raised by the preliminary injunction, and the prison adopted a dual photograph waiver.
(Doc. No. 61 ¶ 13.) Under the dual photograph waiver, the prison would keep an uncovered
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photograph of Jama sealed in an envelope or in a restricted digital format, to be accessed
only if Jama escapes. (Id. ¶ 14.) The prison would then use a covered photo of Jama for
use throughout the facility. 	(Id.) 	In exchange for the adoption of this waiver, Jama
withdrew her motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 34 ¶ 7.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Jama’s claim for injunctive relief (see Doc.
No. 53) and a Motion to Dismiss Jama’s claims against them in their individual capacities
(see Doc. No. 58). 	The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss Jama’s claim for injunctive
relief, but granted the Individual-Capacity Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 75.)
The Court concluded that the dual photograph waiver could not prevent recurrence of the
challenged conduct and failed to remedy the BOP’s continued retention of Jama’s
uncovered photograph, which was a separate harm alleged in the Complaint. (Id. at 8.)
DISCUSSION
Both parties now move for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 103, 110.) Defendants
move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing that as a
matter of law, Jama’s Complaint is moot because the BOP has restricted the use of her
uncovered photograph, and because she is no longer subject to the BOP policy requiring
an uncovered photograph during the intake process, which was the policy her Complaint
challenged.1 (Doc. No. 104 at 9–10.) Jama argues that she is entitled to summary judgment
on the merits of her RFRA claim because the taking and retention of the uncovered photos
1 Defendants also argue that Jama is not entitled to a nationwide injunction, nor is she
entitled to a jury trial. (Doc. No. 104 at 37–41.) Jama is no longer pursuing a nationwide
injunction, and she concedes that she is not entitled to a jury trial for her RFRA claims, and
so the Court need not address these arguments. (See Doc. No. 111 at 6 n.1.)
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constitute a substantial burden on Jama’s religious exercise that is not the least restrictive
means of protecting the government’s interest in identifying inmates. (Doc. No. 111 at 5,
35.) She further argues that the dual photograph waiver is an additional burden that is also
not the least restrictive means of protecting the government’s interests. (Id. at 35.)
Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law determines which facts are “material” and which
are irrelevant: material facts are those whose resolution affects the outcome of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To survive the motion, a non-
moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a
genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. Cnty. of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). As
is normally the case in a summary judgment motion, all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in the non-moving party’s favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, meaning that the Court
views the record in the light most favorable to Defendants when considering Plaintiff’s
motion, and in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs when considering Defendants’ motion.
See, e.g., Fjelstad v. State Farm Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 981, 984 (D. Minn. 2012).
I. 	JURISDICTION
Defendants argue that this case is moot and that Jama lacks standing. 	Because it
remains possible for the Court to grant some effectual relief for the claimed harms, and
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because the challenged conduct does not relate to only the intake policy, the Court
concludes that a controversy remains and that Jama has standing.
A. 	Mootness
The 	Constitution 	limits 	federal 	courts’ 	jurisdiction 	to 	actual 	“Cases” 	or
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “A case becomes moot—and therefore no
longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are
no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Davis v.
Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted); see also Chafin v.
Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (reversing court of appeals determination of mootness
and describing mootness as occurring when it is “impossible for [the Court] to grant any
effectual relief whatever” (quotation omitted)).
This can occur, for example, when “a complaining party manages to secure outside
of litigation all the relief he might have won in it. . . ., a federal court must dismiss the case
as moot.” Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 240 (2024). When, in such
a case, a defendant chooses to change its practices such that a plaintiff obtains the requested
relief, “[i]t is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice
does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(quotation omitted). 	To be clear, “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot reasonably
be expected to recur.” Fikre, 601 U.S. at 241 (quotations omitted); see also Friends of the
Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (noting that voluntary cessation does not moot a case when the
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defendant is “free to return to his old ways” (citation omitted)).
Although 	plaintiffs 	typically 	bear 	the 	burden 	of 	establishing 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, e.g., Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019), defendants
bear a “heavy” burden when arguing that a case or controversy has become moot because
of voluntary cessation of complained-of activity. 	W. Va. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S.
697, 719 (2022). The Court also observes that when resolving a factual attack to subject-
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), as here, courts may consider matters outside of the
pleadings, such as uncontested factual allegations in sworn declarations. 	Carlsen v.
GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Fikre, 601 U.S. at 242
(accepting “as true the supplemental evidence the government offered,” which included
declarations from government officials).
In this case, the Court concludes that this case is not moot, for two primary reasons.
First, contrary to Defendants’ argument, the challenged conduct has not been remedied,
and Jama continues to have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of this case. Jama’s
Complaint alleges harm resulting from the taking and retention of the uncovered photo.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30, 35, 41, 53, 60; see also id. at 16–17.) 	Jama also sought an
“injunction ordering official capacity Defendants to destroy Plaintiff’s ID photographs
taken without her hijab and any security footage showing Plaintiff without her hijab.”
(Compl. at 17; see also id. ¶ 60 (“This action aims to have Mrs. Jama’s illegally captured
photographs and security footage destroyed . . . .”).) 	Jama continues to assert this harm.
(Doc. No. 105-12 at 149:11–25, 150:1–10; Doc. No. 111 at 25–26.) 	Based on these
allegations 	and 	record 	evidence, 	Jama’s 	legally 	cognizable 	interest 	remains 	until
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Defendants have destroyed all photographs showing Jama without her hijab. At this time,
however, Defendants have not destroyed the physical and digital copies of the uncovered
photo and have not committed to doing so even after Jama’s release. 	(See Doc. No. 61
¶¶ 14, 19, 20.) Therefore, it is not “impossible for [the Court] to grant any effectual relief
whatever” to Jama, Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172, and Jama’s claim is not moot.
Second, Defendants have not guaranteed that the current dual photograph waiver
will not be rescinded before Jama’s release. Nothing prevents Defendants from rescinding
the dual photograph waiver; in fact, the waiver is subject to an annual review. (See Doc.
No. 105-9 at 112:21–25, 113:1–2 (“Once [a policy waiver is] granted, they are granted and
reviewed every year to ensure they are still needed.”).)2 	Furthermore, it is important to
acknowledge that Defendants have already failed to secure Jama’s uncovered photo at least
once: in May 2023, Jama was told that her uncovered photo was for only confidential
Bureau records, but she later discovered that her uncovered photo continued to be used for
her ID card, when she swiped her ID at the commissary, in the Bed Book, and on her locker.
(Compl. ¶¶ 47, 48, 49, 50; see also Doc. No. 105-12 at 141:10–25.) The uncovered photo
was kept on file, available for staff to view, and displayed for day-to-day purposes. (Compl.
¶¶ 51, 53.) 	The option of rescission, when taken together with the previous use of the
uncovered photo, compels the Court to conclude that Defendants have not met their
“formidable burden” to establish that there is no reasonable expectation of a return to
2 On January 10, 2026, Defendants filed a letter (Doc. No. 137) saying the dual photograph
waiver has been extended to January 2027. This fact, however, does not change the Court’s
analysis because the waiver could still be rescinded—or, if not rescinded, still subject to
annual review.
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challenged conduct. See Fikre, 601 U.S. at 241 (quotation omitted).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the identified harm to Jama has not been
remedied, and the case is not moot.
B. 	Standing
Defendants also argue that Jama lacks standing to challenge both the intake
photograph 	policy 	and 	the 	dual 	photograph 	waiver. 	Standing 	is 	a 	jurisdictional
prerequisite. City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, 495 F.3d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 2007); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (providing that courts must dismiss any part of lawsuit over which
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction). The plaintiff must establish each of the following three
factors: (1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
Defendants claim that Jama is no longer subject to the intake photograph policy
because she was granted the dual photograph waiver. 	Defendants further argue that the
dual photograph waiver remedied the routine uses of Jama’s uncovered photograph. These
arguments, however, mischaracterize the Complaint, which does not assert a challenge to
only the intake policy. 	As discussed above, Jama’s Complaint also raises a challenge to
the taking and retention of the uncovered photo. (See Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30, 35, 41, 53, 60; see
also id. at 16–17.) Jama continues to assert this challenge and claim an injury as a result.
(Doc. No. 105-12 at 149:11–25, 150–1–10; Doc. No. 111 at 25–26.) Jama need not refer
explicitly to the name of the policy that led to the taking and retention of the uncovered
photo; for the reasons discussed above, she has established that she has standing.
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II. 	MERITS
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of
Jama’s RFRA claim because the dual photograph waiver does not substantially burden
Jama’s religion, and because the retained uncovered photo serves a compelling government
interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. For her part, Jama
argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because the taking and retention of her
uncovered photo was a substantial burden on her religious exercise that is not the least
restrictive means of protecting Defendants’ interest. The Court concludes that there is no
genuine dispute that Defendants’ taking and retention of Jama’s uncovered photo is not the
least restrictive means of furthering their compelling interest in safety and security. 	The
Court therefore denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Jama’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
RFRA prohibits the Government from imposing substantial burdens on religious
exercise, absent a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means. 	42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 45 (2020). A substantial burden exists
when the Government forces a person to act in violation of her religious beliefs, by
threatening sanctions, punishment, or denial of an important benefit as a consequence for
noncompliance. New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1026 (8th Cir. 2018).
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the challenged action substantially
burdened her exercise of religion. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). If the plaintiff
satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendants to show that the
challenged action was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was the
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least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 	Id. at 363.
RFRA contemplates a “focused” inquiry and requires the defendant to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged policy “to the
person”—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened. Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, Jama satisfies this initial burden. Defendants—more than once—threatened
Jama with solitary confinement if she did not remove her hijab to be photographed, and
removal of Jama’s hijab was conduct that violated her religious beliefs. (Doc. No. 105-12
at 21:3–12; Compl. ¶¶ 30, 36, 44.) Because any policy that requires Jama to remove her
hijab and be photographed requires her to choose between disciplinary action and the
violation of her religious beliefs, there is no genuine dispute that Defendants have
substantially burdened Jama’s religious exercise. The retention of Jama’s uncovered photo
further substantially burdens Jama’s religious exercise because the photo’s mere existence
means a non-familial male could potentially view the photo, thereby violating Jama’s
religious beliefs.
Because the Court concludes that Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on
Jama’s religious exercise, the Court must consider whether Defendants have a compelling
interest pursued through the least restrictive means. 	The parties do not dispute that
Defendants have a compelling interest in prison safety and security, including the ability
to identify inmates.3 	However, the parties dispute whether taking and retaining Jama’s
3 Although the parties do not dispute that Defendants have a compelling interest generally
in prison safety and security, see Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008)
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uncovered photograph for use in the event of her escape is the least restrictive means of
pursuing this interest. The Court concludes that Defendants have failed to show that taking
and retaining Jama’s uncovered photograph is the least restrictive means of furthering their
compelling governmental interest in safety and security.
Defendants argue that the dual photograph waiver would allow law enforcement to
quickly and reliably identify Jama if she escapes. (Doc. No. 104 at 36.) Defendants note
that “an escapee who wears a head covering in prison may remove it” and that, “[t]o evade
capture, there is a very real likelihood that escapees will attempt to alter the appearance by
which they were known during their incarceration.” (Id. at 35 (quotation omitted).) Having
only a covered photograph of Jama, however, better meets the goal of having an accurate
representation of Jama’s appearance. As Jama notes in her Complaint, she wears a hijab
every day; a covered photo therefore “better matches Ms. Jama’s everyday appearance”
and “actually serves Defendants[’] purposes better than the uncovered photos . . . .”
(Compl. ¶ 5.) In fact, Jama “often found that officers in the facility would actually have a
hard time identifying her by her [uncovered photo] ID card because she was always in her
hijab.” (Id. ¶ 34.)
Defendants’ expert Eichenlaub asserted that an uncovered photo is necessary for
law enforcement if an inmate escapes, saying a “clear, complete, and accurate photograph”
(“A prison’s interest in order and security is always compelling.”), there is nothing in the
record to suggest that Defendants themselves (as opposed to the law enforcement agencies
responsible for investigating and rearresting an escaped inmate) have a compelling interest
in the taking and retention of an uncovered photo. 	However, because the arguments
presented concern only the second prong, the Court assumes without deciding that
Defendants have a compelling interest.
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is the primary means of identifying escapees. 	(Doc. No. 105-5 at 21.) 	Although
Eichenlaub claims that an image of an escapee wearing a hijab “is neither complete nor
clear, as the hijab covers the wearer’s hair and ears and neck,” he does not assert that the
law enforcement authorities responsible for finding escapees have specifically requested
uncovered photographs of Muslim inmates—nor does he assert that the lack of an
uncovered photograph has impeded the search for an escapee. 	(See id. at 21–24.) 	The
Court cannot “defer[] to . . . prison officials’ mere say-so that they could not accommodate
petitioner’s request.” 	Holt, 574 U.S. at 369 (“Courts must hold prisons to their statutory
burden, and they must not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be
ineffective.” (quotation omitted)).
Furthermore, Defendants do not apply a dual photograph policy to other inmates,
even though other inmates could easily alter their appearance if they were to escape from
prison. 	For instance, a non-Muslim inmate who never wore a headscarf in prison could
begin wearing a headscarf upon escaping—but Defendants do not require non-Muslim
inmates to be photographed both with and without a headscarf. Any escapee could begin
wearing a headscarf as a disguise, but Defendants apparently “do[] not think that this
possibility raises a serious security concern.” 	Id. at 367. 	Additionally, it is highly
speculative that Jama, who wears a hijab as part of her deeply held religious views, would
cease to do so in an attempt to disguise herself if she were to escape from prison. See id.
at 371 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[P]rison policies grounded on mere speculation are
exactly the ones that motivated Congress to enact RLUIPA.” (quotation omitted)).
Finally, Defendants have failed to show, in the face of Plaintiff’s evidence, that its
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prison system is so different from the many other institutions that do not require hijab-less
photos for identification purposes. 	See, e.g., CAIR Announces Settlement with Kentucky
Jail over Removal of Muslim Woman’s Hijab for Booking Photo, CAIR (Apr. 17, 2024),
https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-announces-settlement-with-kentucky-jail-over-
removal-of-muslim-womans-hijab-for-booking-photo/; 	Passport 	Photos,
Travel.State.Gov, 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of 	State,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/how-apply/photos.html 	(permitting
head coverings worn for religious purposes in passport photos so long as the full face is
visible and no shadows or clothing block the face). 	Defendants have therefore failed to
establish why the risk that Jama could remove her hijab to disguise herself is so great that
Defendants could not destroy all uncovered photographs of her.4 	There is therefore no
genuine dispute that Defendants’ taking and retention of Jama’s uncovered photo is not the
least restrictive means of furthering their compelling interest in safety and security. 	The
Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Jama’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. 	Consequently, the Court orders that all uncovered photographs of
Jama be destroyed.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	The Official-Capacity Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
4 To the extent that the parties raise a factual dispute about whether there is a safety and
security benefit to retaining Jama’s uncovered photograph, the Court concludes that no
reasonable juror could find such a benefit.
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103) is DENIED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 110) is GRANTED.
Dated: March 25, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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