Benson v. Stewart et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Brandon Keith Benson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Kent Johanson, Nicki Marvel, Darien
Menten, Thane Murphy, Ken Stewart,
Troy Swartout, Brandon Tatum, in their
individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
Case No. 22-cv-3059 (JWB/DLM)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Defendants Kent Johanson, Nicole
Kielty,1 Darien Menten, Thane Murphy, Ken Stewart, Troy Swartout, Brandon Tatum
(collectively 	“Defendants”) 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Docs. 	119 	(Motion), 	121
(Memorandum)). 	This 	Motion 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	the 	undersigned 	United 	States
Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons explained below, the Court
recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 119) be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Brandon Benson, proceeding pro se, is involuntarily and indefinitely civilly
committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program in Moose Lake, Minnesota (“MSOP-
1 Mr. Benson names this Defendant as Ms. Nicki Marvel, although Defendants refer to her
as Ms. Nicole Kielty. This Report and Recommendation follows the correction set by
Defendants’ briefing.
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Moose Lake”),2 under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, Minn. Stat. §
253B.01 et seq. (Doc 1, ¶ 7; see also Doc. 47 at 1.) Defendants, sued in their official and
individual capacities, were employed by MSOP-Moose Lake at the time of the alleged
violations.
Mr. Benson filed his operative Amended Complaint on February 2, 2023, alleging
a bevy of constitutional violations by many defendants, including those named above.
(Doc. 10.) Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. (Doc. 44.) Upon that motion, the Court
dismissed all but two of Mr. Benson’s claims, as well as most of the original defendants to
Mr. 	Benson’s 	action.3 (Doc. 	58.) 	Mr. 	Benson’s 	first 	remaining 	claim 	alleges 	that
Defendants Murphy and Stewart misrepresented their authority to a third party to gain
access to Mr. Benson’s financial records in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 10,
¶ 75.) Mr. Benson’s second remaining claim alleges that Defendants Swartout, Johanson,
Kielty, Tatum, and Menten violated his substantive Due Process rights during a June 2014
incident at the MSOP-Moose Lake facility. (Doc. 10, ¶¶ 81-83, 102-103.) Defendants now
move for summary judgment on both claims. (Doc. 119.)
2 MSOP-Moose Lake is a medium-security Minnesota state correctional facility that houses
about 1000 adult male prisoners and civil detainees. See MNDOC, Minnesota Correctional
Facility – Moose Lake, https://perma.cc/GB42-8NRX (last visited Dec. 16, 2025). (See
also Doc. 10 ¶ 43.)
3 Dismissed defendants include Lucinda Jesson, Nancy Johnston, Dennis Benson, Kevin
Moser, Scott Benoit, Terry Kneisel, Troy Basaraba, Gene Anderson, Ann Zimmerman,
Steve Sayovitz, Juliana Beavens, Kevin Carlson, Rob Rose, Brian S. Minneman, Sue
Johnson, Sara Kulas, Jannine Hebert, Peter Puffer, Janel Lindgren, Yvette Anderson,
Allison Collins, Angie Ottum, Laurie Severson, Gemma Watson. (See Doc. 58.)
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). A
fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 248. And a genuine dispute
exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court “must view
the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party,’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.
650, 657 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)), drawing
“all justifiable inferences” in the opposing party’s favor, Tolan, 572 U.S. at 651 (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (further citations omitted)). But a court should not accept a
party’s unsupported allegations that are “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe” them. Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
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ANALYSIS
I. 	DEFENDANTS 	MURPHY 	AND 	STEWART 	ARE 	ENTILTED 	TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. BENSON’S FOURTH AMENDMENT
CLAIM.
The Court first addresses Mr. Benson’s claim that Defendants Murphy and Stewart
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Benson contends that Defendants knowingly
misrepresented themselves to gain access to his bank records. (Doc. 10, ¶ 75.) Defendants,
for their part, argue that summary judgment is appropriate because Mr. Benson’s Fourth
Amendment claim fails for lack of legal and factual merit. On the facts, they represent that
Mr. Benson has supplied no evidence showing that Defendants knowingly misrepresented
themselves to gain illegal access to his financial records. On the law, they assert that Mr.
Benson lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in his financial records such that his claim
must fail.
The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV. It applies where an individual “seeks to preserve something as private”
and her expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 296 (2018) (cleaned up). But “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties.”
Id. That remains true “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose.” Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976)). Though this rule is not absolute, it largely allows the government to obtain
information shared with third parties “without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.”
Id. at 308, 319. This is true—and relevant here—where the government accesses an
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individual’s banking and financial records. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976). Because a person has effectively “take[n] the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to the Government,” there
exists no reasonable expectation of privacy in banking records. Id. at 443. In other words,
financial records and banking statements—while admittedly personal in nature—are
considered “business records of the bank” to which no Fourth Amendment protections
attach. Id.
In this case, the record is sparse on Mr. Benson’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Discovery has clarified that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants gained access only to his
financial records during an unspecified time between the years of 2014-2016. (Doc. 124-9
at 3,5.) Mr. Benson provides little in the way of evidentiary support for this claim, but his
deposition testimony establishes that he received alerts from his financial institutions and
a store regarding suspicious account activity. (Id. at 11,12.) The record before the Court
also shows that Mr. Benson believed that Defendant Murphy harbored animus against him
(Id. at 8.) Mr. Benson testified that he thought Defendants Murphy and Stewart wrongfully
accessed his financial records because he had received notice of suspicious activity on
some accounts and these defendants were “the only ones that had my personal information
at that time” (a statement Mr. Benson’s own testimony contradicted since he admitted
sharing his financial records with at least one other individual). (Id. at 9-11.) Mr. Benson
believed that Defendant Murphy misrepresented himself to gain this alleged access because
“[h]e’s an angry man” who disliked Mr. Benson, and Defendant Stewart assisted because
he worked closely with Defendant Murphy. (Id. at 8.) Besides this testimony, Mr. Benson
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offers no further evidence to support his claim or provide any connection between the
alleged data breach and Defendants. Defendants, for their part, rest their case on the dearth
of Mr. Benson’s evidence, and note the legality of MSOP’s mail and telephone monitoring
policies.
Based on the record before it, the Court recommends granting summary judgment
as to Defendants Murphy and Stewart on Mr. Benson’s Fourth Amendment claim. The
record yields little (if any) support Mr. Benson’s version of events, and nothing in terms of
a causal link that could support a jury verdict in Mr. Benson’s favor. First, Mr. Benson
provides no evidence at all that the Defendants misrepresented their authority. (See Doc.
124-9 at 9.) At most, the record shows that Mr. Benson believed Defendant Murphy to be
an angry person who harbored personal animus toward him, and that Defendant Stewart
worked closely with Defendant Murphy. (Doc. 124-9 at 8.) Second, the record supplies no
evidence 	that 	Defendants 	personally 	accessed 	his 	records—the 	heart 	of 	alleged
wrongdoing to support Mr. Benson’s claim. Finally, the Court notes that Mr. Benson’s
allegations do not occur in isolation, but rather are informed by the fact that third parties
had legitimate access to the records Mr. Benson considers private. In short, the Court agrees
with Defendants that Mr. Benson’s Fourth Amendment claim fails as both a matter of fact
and a matter of law.
The Court also considers Mr. Benson’s inferred claim that MSOP’s policy of
monitoring client mail and telephone calls alone violates the Fourth Amendment. (Doc.
124-9 at 8.) To the extent that Mr. Benson presents such a claim, it fails. The Eighth Circuit
and courts in this District have repeatedly denied similar challenges and upheld the
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constitutionality of MSOP’s mail and telephone monitoring policies. See Beaulieu v.
Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Senty-Haugen, No. 17-
CR-0182, 2017 WL 6543824, at *8-10 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2017); see generally Semler v.
Ludeman, No. 09-CV-0732, 2010 WL 145275 (D. Minn. Jan 8, 2010). Accordingly, the
Court recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants Murphy and Stewart.
II. 	DEFENDANTS 	SWARTOUT, 	KIELTY, 	TATUM, 	MENTEN, 	AND
JOHANSON 	ARE 	ENTITLED 	TO 	SUMMARY 	JUDGMENT 	ON 	MR.
BENSON’S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS.
The Court next turns to Mr. Benson’s substantive due process claim. In his
Amended Complaint, Mr. Benson alleges that Defendants Swartout, Kielty, Tatum,
Menten, and Johanson violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by using conscience-
shocking 	force 	against 	him 	during 	a 	June 	2014 	incident 	at 	MSOP-Moose 	Lake.
Specifically, Mr. Benson alleges that he was subject to excessive force that shocked the
conscience when he was tackled to the ground, placed in a chokehold, and restrained with
wrist cuffs. He alleges that Defendant Tatum “attack”[ed] him and placed him in a
chokehold while restrained. (Doc. 10, ¶ 102; see also Doc. 124-9 at 13.) He also alleges
that Defendants Swartout and Menten attacked him using excessive physical force. (Doc.
10, ¶ 103.) Mr. Benson maintains that this use of force caused him physical injury. (Id.)
Additionally, Mr. Benson also alleges that Defendants “continuously” used chemical
capsaicin pepper spray against him once he was subdued. (Doc. 10, ¶ 103.) Defendants
object and argue that their use of physical force and pepper spray was calibrated to the
evolving security situation and falls below the Eighth Circuit’s bar for conscience shocking
behavior, such that summary judgment should be granted in their favor.
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“When evaluating an excessive force claim in the involuntary commitment setting,
the constitutional right at issue is an individual’s ‘right to substantive due process arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Hall v. Ramsey County, 801 F.3d 912, 917 (8th Cir.
2015). And to establish a violation of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	both 	that 	the 	official 	violated 	a 	fundamental
constitutional right and that the conduct was shocking to the conscience. Truong v. Hassan,
82 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 2016). “Only in the rare situation when the state action is ‘truly
egregious and extraordinary’ will a substantive due process claim arise.” Strutton v. Meade,
668 F.3d 549, 557 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield,
963 F.2d 1102, 1104–05 (8th Cir. 1992)). The Eighth Circuit has explained that this
standard is a high bar to meet, requiring “conduct so severe[,] . . . so disproportionate to
the need presented, and . . . so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless
or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power
literally shocking to the conscience.” Id. This inquiry looks to the “totality of the facts in a
given case.” Cnty of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998). For a substantive
due process claim arising from an evolving security situation, the state actor usually must
have “intended to cause harm.” Neal v. St. Louis County Bd. Of Police Comm’rs, 217 F.3d
955, 958 (8th Cir. 2000). In contrast, in the absence of an evolving security situation where
reflection is practicable, an official’s deliberate indifference is sufficient to meet the
substantive due process threshold. Truong, 829 F.3d at 631 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-
49). “Whether conduct shocks the conscience is a question of law for the Court.” Folkerts
v. City of Waverly, Iowa, 707 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2013.)
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The law condones the calibrated use of force by state officials to restrain non-
compliant individuals. See Hall v. Ramsey County, 801 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2015). This is
particularly true in evolving security situations where an official must make “instant
judgments.” Golden ex rel. Balch v. Anders, 342 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850). The Eighth Circuit has primarily considered excessive force claims
involving chemical irritants in custodial settings in the context of the Eighth Amendment.
Though Mr. Benson brings a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth, that
precedent is nonetheless instructive here. See Glover v. Paul, 78 F.4th 1019, 1021 (8th Cir.
2023) (“The due process rights of a detainee are ‘at least as great’ as the protections
available to convicted prisoners under the Eight amendment” (quoting City of Revere v.
Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). That precedent affirms the constitutionality
of limited uses of chemical sprays to control non-compliant inmates. See Jones v. Shields,
752, F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000); Leonard v. St. Charles County Police Dep’t, 59 F.4th
355, 359-60 (8th Cir. 2023); but see Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014))
(noting that use of “super-soaker” quantities of pepper spray and denying detainee
opportunity to decontaminate may be excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment).
In analyzing these cases, courts also consider whether officials provided advance warning
before deploying chemical spray. See Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir.
2006); Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1189 (8th Cir. 2008).
Here, the record establishes that Mr. Benson and another client became involved in
verbal argument in the rotunda of the MSOP-Moose Lake facility. (Doc. 122-6 at 1; Doc.
122-3 at 0:00-32; Doc. 122-5 at 0:00-0:33.) The argument escalated and Mr. Benson and
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the other client began yelling at one another. (Id.) Defendant Menten approached Mr.
Benson and the other client and directed them to calm down. (Doc. 122-6 at 1; Doc. 122-3
at 0:32-0:42; Doc. 122-5 at 0:29-37.) Both clients turned their attention to Defendant
Menten and the clients adopted an aggressive posture towards him. (Doc. 122-6 at 2.)
Defendant Menten continued to direct Mr. Benson and the other client to calm down, and
Mr. Benson yelled back that staff could not tell him what to do. (Doc. 122-6 at 2; Doc. 122-
5 at 0:52-1:42.)
At that point, Defendant Swartout entered the rotunda, along with Defendant Kielty.
(Doc. 122-5 at 1:41.) Defendant Swartout approached Mr. Benson and directed him to step
away from Defendant Menten. (Doc. 122-6 at 2.) Defendant Swartout extended his arm
indicating for Mr. Benson to stop, and Mr. Benson walked into Defendant Swartout’s hand
and pushed his arm down. (Doc. 122-6 at 2; Doc. 122-5 at 1:55-1:58.) After engaging the
other client, Defendant Menten took out his canister of pepper spray and stated that he
would use the chemical spray in the event of further non-compliance from Mr. Benson and
the other client. (Doc. 122-6 at 2.) Defendant Swartout also directed Mr. Benson to “turn
around and place his hands behind his back or chemicals would be used.” (Id.) Defendant
Menten took a can of pepper spray from his belt, holding it in his right hand. (Doc. 122-2
at 2:13-2:14.) Mr. Benson then turned towards a door to leave the area. (Doc. 122-2 at
2:17-2:25.) Defendant Tatum entered the area. (Doc. 122-2 at 2:23.) Defendant Swartout
then removed his canister of pepper spray from his belt, and both Defendant Menten and
Swartout held up the canisters with arms outstretched. (Doc. 122-5 at 2:23-2:25.)
Defendant Swartout again directed Mr. Benson to turn around and place his hands behind
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his back. (Id.) Mr. Benson threatened Defendant Swartout that if he sprayed him with
chemical irritant, Mr. Benson would try to harm him.4 (Id.) Defendant Menten began
spraying the other client with pepper spray. (Doc. 122-6 at 2; Doc. 122-5 at 3:07-3:10.)
At this point, the conflict escalated, and the other client punched Defendant Menten
three times in the face. (Doc. 122-6 at 2.) Mr. Benson then punched Defendant Swartout
and Defendant Swartout deployed chemical irritant at Mr. Benson. (Doc. 122-6 at 2; Doc.
122-4 at 3:08-09.) Mr. Benson, Defendant Swartout, and the other client toppled to the
floor. (Doc. 122-6 at 2; Doc. 122-3 at 3:15-17; Doc. 122-4 at 3:09-3:11.) While Mr. Benson
was on the floor, Defendant Tatum placed him in a chokehold. (Ex. 1 at 3:17; Doc. 122-4
at 3:12.) Defendant Swartout observed Mr. Tatum holding down Mr. Benson and
restraining him with wrist cuffs. (Doc. 122-6 at 2.)
Staff then escorted Mr. Benson to another room where he was offered a shower and
subjected to an unclothed visual strip search. (Doc. 122-9 at 2; Doc. 122-11 at 2.) Mr.
Benson was then seen by the staff nurse, and he represented that he was in no acute distress
beyond the lingering sensation from the pepper spray and an injury to his right shoulder
blade. (Doc. 122-17 at 1.) He was then transported by Carlton County officers to the county
jail, where he was charged with felony assault on secure treatment facility personnel in
violation of state statute §609.2231, Subd. 3a(b)(1). (Doc. 122-21 at 1; Doc. 124-2.) Mr.
Benson 	ultimately 	pled 	guilty 	to 	misdemeanor 	assault 	in 	the 	fifth 	degree 	for 	his
4 The record is not conclusive as to Mr. Benson’s precise statement. But after a close review
of the record, the Court understands that the general meaning of Mr. Benson’s statement
was a threat to harm or kill Defendant Swartout. (See Doc. 122-7 at 2; Doc. 122-8 at 1.)
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participation in the June 24, 2014, incident. (Doc. 124-3.) During his criminal proceeding,
Mr. Benson testified under oath that he “[p]unched a security counselor, like 6 times” in
self-defense. (Doc. 124-4 at 5-6.)
Based on the record before it, the Court concludes that Defendants’ actions fall
below the high bar of conscience-shocking conduct. Given the evolving security concerns
evident in the June 2014 altercation, the Court applies the intent-to-harm analysis to Mr.
Benson’s claim. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Benson, the Court
determines the evidence to be insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Defendants’
actions would shock the conscience. The Court acknowledges the lasting effects of this
event on Mr. Benson but nonetheless concludes that his substantive due process claim
cannot survive Defendants’ instant Motion. The Court thus recommends granting summary
judgment for Defendants Swartout, Kielty, Tatum, Menten, and Johanson.
First, the chokehold and restraint of Mr. Benson do not rise to the level of
conscience-shocking conduct. The video footage and staff reports establish that after Mr.
Benson toppled to the ground, Defendant Tatum placed Mr. Benson in a chokehold. (Doc.
122-6 at 2; Ex. 1 at 3:17; Doc. 122-3 at 3:15-17; Doc. 122-4 at 3:09-3:12.) But this occurred
only in response to Mr. Benson’s continuing non-compliance with staff directives and
assault on Defendant Swartout, and while Mr. Benson remained an active threat. (Doc.
122-6 at 2; Doc. 122-4 at 3:08-09.) Given that Defendant Tatum only took Mr. Benson
down and restrained him after he punched Defendant Swartout, his actions qualify as the
type of “instant judgments” that the Eighth Circuit condones in evolving security settings.
And while Defendant Tatum’s use of a chokehold likely represents excessive zeal, it does
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not evince the sort of sadism, malice, or intent to harm required for a substantive due
process claim.
Nor 	do 	Defendants 	Swartout 	and 	Menten’s 	use 	of 	pepper 	spray 	shock 	the
conscience. While Mr. Benson alleges continuous usage of pepper spray against him, he
points to no evidence in the record to substantiate such an allegation. By contrast, video
evidence and Defendants’ staff reports establish that Defendants Menten and Swartout
deployed pepper spray only at the initial moment that the altercation with Mr. Benson
became physical, after he refused to comply with staff directives, and after multiple
warnings that Defendants intended to use chemical spray if Mr. Benson refused to comply.
(Doc. 122-6 at 2; Doc. 122-7 at 2; Doc. 122-3 at 3:11-3:16; Doc. 122-4 at 3:11-3:20.) Given
the intermittent and relatively brief use of chemical spray (notwithstanding the spray’s
durational effect), along with the fact that Mr. Benson had prior notice that spray would be
used, the Court finds that Defendants’ use of pepper spray falls within the range of use
permitted under the circumstances.
Lastly, the Court considers Mr. Benson’s claims against Defendants Johanson and
Kielty. Summary judgment is appropriate for these Defendants because they did not
participate physically in the June 2014 altercation. As to Defendant Johanson, Mr. Benson
alleges that he failed to deescalate the situation and taunted the client. (Doc. 10, ¶ 83.) An
officer may be liable for failure to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force when
“(1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being
used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from
occurring.” Robinson v. Payton, 791 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up.) Because
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Defendants’ actions do not amount to constitutionally excessive force in the first instance,
the corollary is that Mr. Benson’s claim against Defendant Johanson fails too. Secondly,
the Court discerns no claim against Defendant Kielty that can survive summary judgment.
Defendant Kielty is not mentioned in the operative paragraphs of Mr. Benson’s complaint,
and Mr. Benson’s deposition testimony mentions only that she oversaw the other
Defendants (Doc. 124-9 at 14) and that she put the wrist cuffs on Mr. Benson improperly.
(Id. at 13.) Without further evidence, the Court recommends granting summary judgment
as to Defendant Kielty.
Based on this record, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could return a
verdict in Mr. Benson’s favor on any iteration of his excessive force claims. Accordingly,
the Court recommends that summary judgment be granted in Defendants Swartout, Kielty,
Tatum, Johanson and Menten’s favor on Mr. Benson’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process claim.
III. 	QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
Defendants also argue that even if there were a constitutional violation, they are
entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Benson’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
To survive a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, Mr. Benson
“must assert a violation of a constitutional right[,] demonstrate that the alleged right is
clearly established[,] [and] raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether [Defendants] would
have known that [their] alleged conduct would have violated [his] clearly established
right.” Brockington v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up)).
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Here, the threshold question is whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that
Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 377 (2007)). As discussed above, Mr. Benson has not established any constitutional
violation on either his Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claims. Therefore, he cannot
overcome a qualified immunity defense on summary judgment. Because the evidence
presented does not establish any violation, this Court need not and will not proceed with
the qualified immunity analysis. Brockington, 503 F.3d at 672 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings 	above, 	IT IS
RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendants’ Kent Johanson, Nicole Kielty, Troy Swartout, Brandon Tatum,
Darien Menten’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 119) be GRANTED;
and
2. 	Plaintiff Brandon Benson’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
Date: December 22, 2025 	s/Douglas L. Micko
DOUGLAS L. MICKO
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days
after being served with a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the
objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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