Salazar-Gutierrez #690888 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
DANIEL SALAZAR-GUTIERREZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-260
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 2) for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate
order. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The
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events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the Michigan Department
of Corrections and URF employees Sergeant Unknown King, Administrative Assistant Kim
Atkinson, and Corrections Officer Unknown Pierce. Plaintiff names Defendants in their official
capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
Plaintiff presents his allegations in the body of his complaint (ECF No. 1), as well as in his
attached affidavit and statement (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.7–9). Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from
a seizure disorder for which he takes medication. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff states that on
May 16, 2025, while he was confined at URF, he suffered from a seizure at around 9:37 a.m. while
in his GED class. (Id.; ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff’s teacher and fellow student provided help
to Plaintiff during his seizure. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff states that Defendant King and
medical staff came and placed Plaintiff in a restraint chair in order to take him to health care. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.3.)
Plaintiff states that while he was in health care, he suffered a second seizure. (Id.) Plaintiff
asserts that while he was having the second seizure, he grabbed Defendant King’s arm, which
caused Defendant King to “knee and punch” Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff attests that Defendant King
“rammed [his] face into the wall, causing serious injuries to the right side of [his] face, including
swelling and a black eye.” (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.7.) Plaintiff claims that the assault by Defendant
King was witnessed by another prisoner. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
Defendant King then falsified a Class I misconduct report against Plaintiff for assault and
battery and disobeying a direct order. (Id.; ECF No. 1-1, PageID.7.) On May 28, 2025, Plaintiff
was found not guilty of the misconduct charges. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.8.)
In the misconduct report, Defendant King stated:
While responding to a medical emergency in the West School [Plaintiff] started to
become assaultive towards staff. [Plaintiff] started to try and pull my right hand off
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his right arm. [Plaintiff] was then placed in wrist restraints and again grabbed my
hand to try and pull away. I gave [Plaintiff] loud verbal orders to stop resisting as
he continued to try and pull away from this supervisor. These actions were carried
out to interfere with my job duties and to cause injuries to this supervisor.
(Id., PageID.12.)
Plaintiff attaches a copy of the Class I hearing report to his complaint, which addresses the
evidence considered during the hearing:
The hearing is commenced by watching of the video that is found to be confidential
for the security of the facility. The video is consistent with the report. The prisoner
is informed. The hearing is conducted via Video Teleconferencing. Unless
otherwise noted, documents are one page. This hearing is timely held within the
required 7 business days. The prisoner is present and the misconduct report is
reviewed with him along with his statement he had a seizure and does not recall
what happened until he woke up in health care, Sgt Rosebrock’s statement that he
used a translator for the review, Translator Confirmation, Health Care Disclosure,
Health Care records (10 pg), and Memo regarding the Video that is found to be
confidential for the security of the facility. [Plaintiff] has nothing further to add. No
further evidence is needed. Prisoner is informed of the findings, sanction and
sanction dates and told he will receive report later.
(Id., PageID.13.)
In finding that Plaintiff was not guilty of the charge of assault and battery, the Hearing
Officer stated that because Plaintiff was having a seizure at the time he grabbed Defendant King,
he could not be responsible for his actions nor was his intent to physically resist or harm staff. (Id.)
The Hearings Officer further stated that Plaintiff was not guilty of disobeying a direct order
because he was not capable of following orders while he was having a seizure. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that Defendant Pierce retaliated against him for beating the misconduct
ticket by falsifying a Class II misconduct report which stated that Plaintiff had been in the base
area without authorization while on non-bond status. (Id., PageID.8.) Plaintiff states that Defendant
Pierce backdated the misconduct to May 27, 2025, to fit the time that Plaintiff had been on non-
bond status. (Id.) This misconduct charge was later rescinded. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
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Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance on Defendant King on June 5, 2025, complaining
of the fact that Defendant King had assaulted him while handcuffing him during the second seizure.
(Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Atkinson erred when she claimed that Plaintiff’s step II appeal
of this grievance was untimely, and that any delay in the filing of the step II appeal could only be
attributable to MDOC staff. (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of 2.5 million dollars. (Id., PageID.4.) He also notes
that he does not feel safe at URF and asks that he not interact with the Defendants. (Id.)
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
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(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Claims Against Defendant MDOC and Official Capacity Claims Against
Individual Defendants
As noted above, Plaintiff names the MDOC and individual employees at URF solely in
their official capacities. Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC. A suit
against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental
entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The State of Michigan (acting through the
MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd.
of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d
768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013). Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against the
individual Defendants in their respective official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that
neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the MDOC and the individually named
Defendants in their official capacities are properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
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The Court notes that in addition to damages, Plaintiff asks that he not interact with
Defendants. Arguably, this request might as a claim for injunctive relief. Although damages claims
against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief is not treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)).
The Ex parte Young doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a ‘fiction’—that when
a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal
law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes.” Va. Ofc. for Prot. and Advoc. v. Stewart,
563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (internal citation omitted.) The Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex
parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v.
Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). In the present action, Plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to past
harm, not future risk of harm. Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek relief properly characterized as
prospective, and his claims do not fit within the Ex parte Young exception. See Ladd, 971 F.3d at
581.
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant MDOC or
the individual Defendants in their official capacities upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. 	Merits review of claims
As noted above, Plaintiff names Defendants solely in their official capacities. However,
even if he did name Defendants in their personal capacities, his claims would be properly dismissed
for lack of merit.
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1. 	Defendant Atkinson
Plaintiff’s only claim against Defendant Atkinson is that she erred when she claimed that
Plaintiff’s step II appeal of this grievance was untimely, and that any delay in the filing of the step
II appeal could only be attributable to MDOC staff. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
a. 	Due Process
Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The courts repeatedly have held
that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance
procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F.
App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young
v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 99-3562, 2000
WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does
not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249
(1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994
WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance
process, Defendants’ conduct did not deprive him of due process.
b. 	First Amendment - Right to Petition Government
Plaintiff’s right to petition government is not violated by Defendant’s failure to process or
act on his grievances. The First Amendment “right to petition the government does not guarantee
a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s
views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty.
Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to
address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond).
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Moreover, Defendants’ actions have not barred Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his
grievances. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). “A prisoner’s constitutional right to assert
grievances typically is not violated when prison officials prohibit only ‘one of several ways in
which inmates may voice their complaints . . . .” Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 415–16
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977)).
Indeed, Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial
process. See Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been
improperly prevented from exhausting his grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition
for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to
file institutional grievances, and he therefore cannot demonstrate the actual injury required for an
access-to-the-courts claim. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (requiring actual
injury); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–24 (1977).
The 	exhaustion 	requirement 	only 	mandates 	exhaustion 	of 	available administrative
remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were improperly denied access to the grievance
process, the process would be rendered unavailable, and exhaustion would not be a prerequisite
for initiation of a civil rights action. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating
that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials,
the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required); Kennedy v. Tallio, 20 F.
App’x 469, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2001). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to
state a cognizable claim against Defendant Atkinson.
2. 	Defendant Pierce
Plaintiff states that after he was found not guilty on a major misconduct ticket issued by
Defendant King, Defendant Pierce retaliated against him by falsifying a Class II misconduct report
for being in the base area without authorization while on non-bond status. (ECF No. 1-1,
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PageID.8.) Plaintiff states that Defendant Pierce backdated the misconduct to May 27, 2025, to fit
the time that Plaintiff had been on non-bond status. (Id.) This misconduct charge was later
rescinded. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to
set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was
engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove
that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s
alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
Assuming that Plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct when he successfully challenged
the major misconduct ticket written by Defendant King, his claim that Defendant Pierce acted with
a retaliatory motive is entirely conclusory. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be
demonstrated by direct evidence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005);
Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1987). “[A]lleging merely the ultimate fact of
retaliation is insufficient.” Murphy, 833 F.2d at 108. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory
motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’”
Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir.
1987)); see also Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (in complaints
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screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no
concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial”) (internal quotations
omitted); Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on
the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims” that will survive § 1915A
screening) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998)). Plaintiff merely alleges the
ultimate fact of retaliation in this action. Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts showing that his
success in challenging the major misconduct ticket written by Defendant King was a substantial
or motivating factor in Defendant Pierce’s conduct. Accordingly, his speculative allegation fails
to state a claim against Defendant Pierce.
3. 	Defendant King
Plaintiff claims that Defendant King subjected him to excessive force in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the
power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor
may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 345–46 (1981); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Eighth Amendment
also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. Among unnecessary and
wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Id.
Generally, restrictions and even harsh conditions of confinement are not necessarily cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 347. The
Supreme Court has held that “whenever guards use force to keep order,” the standards enunciated
in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) should be applied. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7
(1992); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–39 (2010). Under Whitley, the core judicial
inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
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maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7; Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37. In
determining whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary, the court should evaluate the
need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the
threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,” and any efforts made to temper the
severity of the forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); accord
Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953–54 (6th Cir. 2010); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184
(6th Cir. 1990).
As noted above, Plaintiff attaches copies of the misconduct report and the misconduct
hearing report to his complaint as exhibits. According to the misconduct report, Plaintiff “started
to become assaultive towards staff . . . [and] to try and pull [Defendant King’s] right hand off his
right arm. [Plaintiff] was then placed in wrist restraints and again grabbed [Defendant King’s]
hand to try and pull away.” (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12.) The report also states that Defendant King
gave Plaintiff loud verbal orders to stop resisting as Plaintiff continued to try and pull away from
Defendant King. (Id.) The misconduct hearing report indicates that video of the incident was
consistent with Defendant King’s account of the events. (Id., PageID.13.) Plaintiff states that he
has no memory of the events, as he was suffering from a seizure at the time. (Id.)
Based on Plaintiff’s complaint and the attachments thereto, it is clear that Plaintiff was
resisting Defendant King at the time of the incident and that Defendant King acted in order to
restrain Plaintiff. Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant King was aware that Plaintiff was having
a second seizure and was not in control of his actions. Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint indicates
that the use and amount of force was not “reasonably perceived” by Defendant King as necessary
at the time it was employed. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Therefore, even if Plaintiff had named
Defendant King in his personal capacity, he fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against him.
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Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an
appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might
raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should
Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to
§ 1915(b)(1). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	December 9, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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