Smith #644493 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
BRUCE EDWARD SMITH, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-256
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss
any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim against the named Defendants.
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff1 is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. The events about
which he complains, however, occurred at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe,
Chippewa County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the MDOC, URF Warden James Corrigan, and MDOC
Director Heidi Washington.
Plaintiff alleges that on December 15, 2024, he provided “transcripts[,] evidence[,] and
confidential files” to another prisoner designated as Plaintiff’s legal writer.2 (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.1.) Plaintiff alleges that his legal writer was assisting him with an actual innocence claim
related to his criminal conviction. (Id., PageID.2.) On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff alleges that
his legal paperwork was confiscated from the legal writer’s cell because of a “false ticket” where
“URF Staff” were able to “seize unlawfully, frustrate[,] and disrupt all legal pleadings.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that his legal files and pleadings were seized from the legal writer’s cell “without
just cause or written notice justifying the seizure.” (Id.)
1 The Plaintiff in this action is Bruce Edward Smith, Jr., but the “Statement of Facts” section of
the complaint (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–8) describes numerous incidents between prisoner
Donald Merritt-El and non-party correctional staff. Mr. Merritt-El is Plaintiff’s “legal writer” and
is not a party to this action. To the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint attempts to raise any claims or
causes of action on behalf of Mr. Merritt-El, Plaintiff may not do so and any intended claims
brought on Mr. Merritt-El’s behalf are not addressed in this opinion. See Claybrook v. Birchwell,
199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In the Sixth Circuit, a section 1983 cause of action is entirely
personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.” (citations omitted)); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage
and conduct causes therein.” (emphasis added)).
2 MDOC’s Legal Writer Program is governed by MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.116.
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According to Plaintiff’s complaint, there were several other incidents where URF
correctional staff removed his legal papers from the legal writer’s possession. Specifically, on
February 16, 2025, “legal files” provided to Plaintiff’s legal writer were “seized and concealed”
by URF correctional staff and not returned. (Id., PageID.2–3.) On August 15, 2025, URF
correctional staff removed items from Plaintiff’s legal writer’s cell, including “several small brown
address books,” one of which belonged to Plaintiff. (Id., PageID.6.) Next, on September 2, 2025,
URF correctional staff searched the legal writer’s cell, and Plaintiff alleges that his “legal brief . . .
had been ripped in half and many files missing.” (Id., PageID.7)
Plaintiff claims that his confiscated legal papers were essential to his postconviction
Motion for Relief from Judgment under Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G), alleging “new evidence”
to support his motion. (Id., PageID.9–10.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s new evidence was “an affidavit
from another prisoner . . . [regarding Plaintiff’s] actual innocence.” (Id., PageID.10.) This new
evidence was “repeatedly seized and destroyed” by prison officials. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “it
would be completely futile to attempt to pursue [his motion for relief from judgment] without any
of his new evidence because doing so would yield pre-determin[ed] results [i.e., rejected for filing
or dismissed].” (Id.)
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges he filed a civil rights complaint with the Michigan Department of
Civil Rights (MDCR) regarding the “unlawful seizure and destruction of [his] legal mail in [his]
legal writer’s possession.” (Id., PageID.12.) Plaintiff claims that MDCR “forwarded [him] forms
to fill out and return by [August 25, 2025] or face dismissal” but that the “URF mailroom” “sat on
the mail and delivered it to [him] . . . on the date of the deadline.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege
how long the mailroom “sat on” his mail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges this resulted in the termination of
his MDCR complaint. (Id.)
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Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise an
access to the courts claim and a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim regarding
the confiscation of his property. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief relating to the confiscation and
return of his “evidence and files.” (Id., PageID.13–14.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
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a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
Analysis
A. Defendant MDOC
Plaintiff names the MDOC as a Defendant. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) As an initial
matter, Plaintiff does not name Defendant MDOC in the body of his complaint. See Gilmore v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff
failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights). Defendant
MDOC is subject to dismissal for this reason alone.
Moreover, § 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, the State of Michigan (acting through the
MDOC) is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding a state is not a “person”); Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App’x
922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Will and holding that the MDOC is not a “person.”).
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Defendant MDOC
upon which relief may be granted.
B. Defendants Corrigan and Washington
Plaintiff lists URF Warden Corrigan and MDOC Director Washington as Defendants in
this action; however, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing how Defendants were personally
involved in the violation of his constitutional rights. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
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It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–61 (2007) (holding that, in order
to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the
claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the
complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.
See Gilmore, 92 F. App’x at 190; Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged
violation of rights).
Here, Plaintiff does not name Defendants Corrigan or Washington in the body of his
complaint. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants
therefore fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Corrigan and Washington
liable due to their supervisory positions, government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Everson v. Leis,
556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active
unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v.
Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can
supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may
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not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act
based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the minimum required to constitute active
conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995
F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants Corrigan or Washington
encouraged or condoned the conduct of their subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in their conduct.
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim against Defendants Corrigan and Washington.
C. Non-Parties Referenced in the Complaint
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he describes the actions of several non-parties at URF. (See
generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that a plaintiff “name all of the parties” in
“[t]he title of the complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Further, this Court has previously concluded
that “[o]nly those individuals and entities identified in the caption of the complaint are properly
considered defendants in an action, regardless of the complaint’s other contents or allegations.”
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Jones v. Smith, No. 1:10-cv-568, 2012 WL 726665, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2012), R & R
adopted, 2012 WL 726621 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2012); see also Brown v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 1:22-cv-16, 2022 WL 2900888, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Jul. 22, 2022) (concluding that
corrections officers identified as defendants in a particular count of the complaint, but not named
in the caption or in the form complaint “list of parties” were not parties to the action). Accordingly,
any intended claims against the non-party individuals discussed in the complaint will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s references to “correctional staff” or “mailroom staff,”
“[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or officers] does not support a
reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant
did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556,
564 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)). Here,
Plaintiff’s general references to “correctional staff” and “mailroom staff” are insufficient to show
that any individuals, let alone named Defendants, were personally involved in the actions that
Plaintiff attributes to these groups of people.
Accordingly, for these reasons all intended claims against non-parties will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an
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appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue
Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 2, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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