Adams v. Marquette Police Department et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JAMES HARMON ADAMS, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-00226
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
MARQUETTE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
On October 15, 2025, the Court remanded this matter “to the Magistrate Judge
to 	consider 	whether 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	(ECF 	No. 	7) 	affects 	the
Magistrate Judge’s prior recommendations.” (ECF No. 8.) For the reasons, discussed
below, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this lawsuit.
Pro se Plaintiff James Harmon Adams filed an amended complaint against
Defendants Marquette City Police Department, Officer Jack Vogler, Marquette
County Prosecutor Nelson, and Chief District Judge Kangas. 	(ECF No. 7.) 	Adams
brings this action under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments for deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. 	(Id., PageID.24.) 	He invokes 18 U.S.C. § 242 for
deprivation of his rights under color of law and 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiracy against
rights under color of law. (Id.)
Adams alleges:
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(Id., PageID.25.) 	Adams seeks over $5,000,000.00 in damages. (Id.)
Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status on October 7, 2025. 	(ECF No.
5.)
II. Standard of Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any action brought in
forma pauperis if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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In addition, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
III. 	Analysis
Initially, Plaintiff indicates that this Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
241 and §242, which are criminal statutes. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks criminal
prosecution of the named Defendants, the Court notes that such a request has no
merit where the “authority to initiate a criminal complaint rests exclusively with
state and federal prosecutors.” Gonzalez v. Perez, No. 98-6575, 2000 WL 222584, at
*2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2000) (citing Mercer v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov’t.,
No. 94-6645, 1995 WL 222178, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 1995) (unpublished order)). A
private 	citizen 	“lacks 	a 	judicially 	cognizable 	interest 	in 	the 	prosecution 	or
nonprosecution of another.” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986). Simply put,
Plaintiff cannot compel a criminal prosecution of Defendants because private citizens
cannot compel a criminal prosecution of another. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,
64-65 (1986); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Martin v. Koljonen,
No. 03-2169, 2004 WL 445720, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2004).
Adams asserts Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against Defendants.
Although he fails to set forth the vehicle for bringing constitutional claims, the Court
can assume that Adams is proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Adams names
the Marquette Police Department as a Defendant. 	Under Michigan law, municipal
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departments are not separate entities capable of being sued because they are agencies
of the city. Exclusive Brands LLC v. City of Garden City, Michigan, No. 19-cv-11062,
2020 WL 5367331, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2020); Carey v. Hall, No. 12-cv-14777,
2013 WL 174503, * 1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2013). 	In the opinion of the undersigned,
Adams cannot sue the Marquette Police Department because it is a municipal
department not capable of being sued. 	Even if Adams properly named the City of
Marquette as a Defendant, his claim would necessarily fail.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United
States Supreme Court held that municipalities could be subject to Section 1983
actions for alleged constitutional violations, albeit in a narrow set of circumstances.
“A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory
– in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747
F.3d 378, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in
original)). Instead, a municipality may only be liable under § 1983 when its policy or
custom causes the injury, regardless of the form of relief sought by the plaintiff. Los
Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-37 (2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694
(1974)).
In a municipal liability claim, the finding of a policy or custom is the initial
determination to be made. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996).
The policy or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury. 	A
plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity, and
show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.
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Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d
802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe, 103 F.3d at 508–509. Adams has set forth no policy or
custom by the City of Marquette that could have violated his rights.
Adams alleges that Judge Kangas is presiding over his case which “conveys an
obvious conspiracy against rights under color of law.” (ECF No., PageID.25.) Adams
fails to allege any details of how Judge Kangas conspired against him by presiding
over his case.
Judges are absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages. 	Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance
to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”) (internal quotations omitted);
Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d
1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in only two
instances. 	First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e.,
actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (noting that immunity is grounded in “the nature
of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”). Second, a
judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence
of all jurisdiction. Id. at 12; Bright v. Gallia Cnty., 753 F.3d 639, 649 (6th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing the difference between an “excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of
all jurisdiction over the subject matter[,]” and noting that only the latter deprives a
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judge of judicial immunity).
Plaintiff’s factual allegations clearly fail to implicate any exceptions to judicial
immunity. 	Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested, or at least placed in
handcuffs, in Marquette County and that there are current and pending criminal
proceedings against him involving driving with an expired registration and license
plate and not having automobile insurance. 	(ECF No. 7-1, PageID.29.) 	Plaintiff’s
complaint shows that Judge Kangas took actions in his judicial capacity. Accordingly,
in the opinion of the undersigned, Judge Kangas is entitled to judicial immunity.
Adams sues Marquette Prosecutor Nelson for prosecuting the case against
him. 	(Id., PageID.25.) 	Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damages when
engaging in activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” 	Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 (1976). Immunity shields
against liability for actions “undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation
of judicial proceedings for trial,” which includes the evaluation of the evidence
assembled by police. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-273 (1993). 	Adams
fails to allege anything other than that Prosecutor Nelson is prosecuting him for the
alleged crimes. Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Prosecutor Nelson is
entitled to immunity.
Adams 	alleges 	that 	Officer 	Vogler 	“fraudulently 	issued” 	citations. 	(Id.,
PageID.25.) Adams may be arguing a technicality because his citation cited to Mich.
Comp. Laws § 500.3102 and not to Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3101. 	However, it
appears that regardless of the statute cited in the citation, Adams is asserting that
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under Michigan law he does not need automobile insurance to legally drive an
automobile in the State. 	In general, it appears that Adams challenges the State of
Michigan requirement to have automobile insurance. 	In his original complaint,
Adams cites Shavers v. Kelly, 402 Mich. 554 (1978), and asserted that under that
authority Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3102 (the statute he also cites in his amended
complaint), is only applicable to non-residents of Michigan. 	Adams is correct about
that claim. Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3102 states that nonresident owners of a motor
vehicle not registered in the State “shall not operate or permit the motor vehicle or
motorcycle to be operated in this state for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any
calendar year unless he or she continuously maintains security for the payment of
benefits.” Id.
Importantly, 	however, 	all 	Michigan 	drivers 	must 	“maintain 	security 	for
payment of benefits under personal protection insurance and property protection
insurance . . . ., and residual liability insurance.” Mich. Comp. Laws §500.3101. 	In
his amended complaint, Adams asserts that this requirement is unconstitutional.
Although, the Michigan Supreme Court in Shavers stuck down portions of Michigan’s
No Fault Insurance Act laws in 1978, the law has 	been rewritten and survives
constitutional scrutiny. Under Michigan law, an owner or registrant of a vehicle must
“maintain” no fault insurance. 	Dye by Siporin & Assocs., Inc. v. Esurance Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 504 Mich. 167, 186, 934 N.W.2d 674, 684 (2019). 	Therefore, it is
recommended that the Court dismiss Adams’s claim asserting that the Michigan law
requiring drivers to obtain automobile insurance is unconstitutional.
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Adams asserts two sources in support of his constitutionality claim. 	Adams
asserts that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants.
Plaintiff contends that the 	defendants conduct violated his rights under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. However, while the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause restricts the activities of the states and their instrumentalities, the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause circumscribes only the actions of the federal
government. Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee, 205 F.3d 867, 873 n. 8 (6th Cir. 2000).
Therefore, because the named defendants are state actors, Adams’s Fifth Amendment
claims are without merit.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
Plaintiff attached to his amended complaint a copy of a State of Michigan Uniform
Law Citation that he received on July 3, 2025. 	(ECF No. 7-1, PageID.30.) 	Plaintiff
was cited for three things:
(1) motor vehicle operation without security (driving without automobile
insurance);
(2) driving an unregistered vehicle; and
(3) unlawful license plate use. (Id.)
Adams has failed to explain how his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Here,
Plaintiff has asserted that there are criminal charges pending against him in the
Marquette County Court. (ECF No. 7.)
Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to interfere with his ongoing state
criminal proceeding. 	“Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has,
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subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
Generally, federal courts should abstain from deciding a matter that would interfere
with 	pending 	state 	proceedings 	involving 	important 	state 	matters 	unless
extraordinary circumstances are present. 	Id. at 44−55. 	This principle is based on
notions of equity and comity, “and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id. at 44.
Younger generally permits a federal court to abstain from considering a
plaintiff's 	claims 	where: 	(1) 	the 	state 	proceedings 	are 	ongoing; 	(2) 	the 	state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 	Criminal defendants “need be
accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the
ongoing 	state 	proceedings 	. 	. 	. 	and 	their 	failure 	to 	avail 	themselves 	of 	such
opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate.” Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973)).
Exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine have been recognized in the following
circumstances: (1) where “the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or
is conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); (2)
where 	“[a] 	challenged 	statute 	is 	flagrantly 	and 	patently 	violative 	of 	express
constitutional prohibitions,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979) (quoting
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Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611); and (3) where there is “an extraordinarily pressing need
for immediate federal equitable relief,” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975).
These exceptions have been interpreted narrowly. 	Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d
199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986).
The three factors supporting Younger abstention are present in this case.
First, 	Plaintiff’s 	case 	is 	pending 	in 	state 	court. 	Second, 	Plaintiff’s 	criminal
proceedings 	involve 	important 	state 	interests. 	See 	Younger, 	401 	U.S. 	at 	43
(recognizing that when the state proceeding is criminal in nature, the policy against
federal interference is “particularly” strong); see also Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8
(6th Cir. 1980) (stating that “Younger established a near-absolute restraint rule when
there are pending state criminal proceedings”). 	Third, the state court proceedings
provide an adequate opportunity for Plaintiff to raise his claims. 	Moreover, Adams
has set forth no factual allegations asserting that he cannot challenge the pending
charges in the state courts.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Adams’s civil claims, assuming that they are
actionable, are premature. 	Adams’s damage claims are not cognizable until his
criminal proceeding is resolved in his favor. 	Dismissal without prejudice is
appropriate where the complaint seeks both equitable and legal relief and the Court
abstains under the Younger. 	See Schwab v. Wyoming 	Police Dep’t., 2020 WL
3603283, at *7-8 (W.D. Mich. July 2, 2020) (noting that dismissal without prejudice
is an option when both equitable and legal relief is sought but deciding to stay
pending final resolution of the criminal prosecution). Adams seeks both types of relief
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in this action.
IV. 	Recommendation
The 	undersigned 	respectfully 	recommends 	that 	the 	Court 	dismiss 	the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because it is frivolous and fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	December 16, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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