Davis #223815 v. Russo et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
RONALD DAVIS #223815, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-92
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
DANYA RUSSO, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC) Defendants Stain, Nagy, Marsh, and Peters’ motion for
summary judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
ECF No. 48.
Plaintiff – state prisoner Ronald Davis – filed a civil complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments while he was a prisoner at the Chippewa Correctional
Facility (URF). 	ECF No. 12 (Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint). 	In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff named the following six MDOC Defendants: Nurse Practitioner
(NP) Danya Russo, Health Unit Manager (HUM) Bethany Stain, Registered Nurse
(RN) Minai Nagy, RN Elizabeth Marsh, RN Gabraielle Peters, and RN Evelyn Ross.
Id. This Court previously granted RN Ross’s motion for summary judgment based on
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exhaustion and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to her. ECF No. 52 (Opinion
and Order Approving and Adopting Report and Recommendation).
The Defendants remaining in the case at this time are:
 	HUM Bethany Stain,
 	RN Minai Nagy,
 	RN Elizabeth Marsh,
 	RN Gabraielle Peters, and
 	NP Danya Russo
Plaintiff’s allegations are summarized in the table below.
Number 	Claim 	Defendant(s) 	Date Range
of Incident(s)
I 	First Amendment
Retaliation
(Identified as “Counts 1 & 2”)
ECF No. 12, PageID.458-59.
All Defendants 	October 2023-
April 2024
II 	Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment
Deliberate Indifference
ECF No. 12, PageID.460.
All Defendants 	October 2023-
April 2024
III 	“Conspiracy Against Rights
Under 18 U.S.C. 241”
ECF No. 12, PageID.463-64.
All Defendants 	October 2023-
April 2024
Defendants Stain, Nagy, Marsh, and Peters assert that all claims should be
dismissed 	against 	them 	because 	the 	relevant 	grievances: 	(1) 	do 	not 	name 	or
sufficiently identify Defendants, and (2) were rejected during the grievance process.
ECF No. 49, PageID. 865-66. In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants: (1) filed
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a successive motion for summary judgment 1 , (2) never sought concurrence, and (3)
thwarted Plaintiff’s ability to grieve. 	ECF No. 50. 	And in reply, Defendants assert
that Davis has not sufficiently developed his thwarting argument and it is therefore
waived. ECF No. 51, PageID.879-80.
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. 	The records before the Court establish that no
genuine issue of material fact remains with respect to the issue of Plaintiff’s
exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury[2] or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421
F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
1 	The prior motion for summary judgment in this case only concerned former
Defendant Ross. Accordingly, the present motion before the Court is not successive.
2 	The Seventh Amendment does not always require courts to submit factual
disputes about exhaustion to a jury. 	Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.
2015). However, when the exhaustion issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim,
the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on the exhaustion issue. 	Perttu v.
Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 479, 145 S.Ct. 1793, 1807 (2025).
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251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and
admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing
the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A prisoner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. 	Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 212-16 (2007). “[W]here the moving party has the burden -- the plaintiff on
a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense -- his showing must be
sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than
for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that
the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.”
Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,
summary 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	party 	with 	the 	burden 	of 	persuasion 	“is
inappropriate 	when 	the 	evidence 	is 	susceptible 	of 	different 	interpretations 	or
inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). 	A
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prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner
may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative
process. Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215
F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable
procedural rules. 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91
(2006). 	“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is
required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19. 	In rare
circumstances, the grievance process will be considered unavailable where officers
are 	unable 	or 	consistently 	unwilling 	to 	provide 	relief, 	where 	the 	exhaustion
procedures may provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can navigate it, or “where
prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 	Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.
632, 644 (2016).
“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [Section] 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. In the Court’s view,
this objective was achieved in three ways. 	First, the exhaustion requirement
“afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” 	Id. at 525. 	Second, “the internal
review might ‘filter out some frivolous claims.’” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at
737). And third, “adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that
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clarifies the contours of the controversy.” Id. When institutions provide adequate
notice as required under the PLRA, the opportunity to address the claims internally
furthers 	the 	additional 	goals 	of 	limiting 	judicial 	interference 	with 	prison
administration. Baker v. Vanderark, 1:07-cv-004, 2007 WL 3244075, *5 (W.D. Mich.,
Nov. 1, 2007).
Michigan Dept. of Corrections (MDOC) Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective
September 25, 2023) sets forth the applicable grievance procedures for prisoners in
MDOC custody at the time relevant to this complaint. Inmates must first attempt to
informally resolve a grievable issue within two business days of becoming aware of
the issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. 	Id. at ¶ W.
If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the
grievance process and submit a completed grievance form within five business days
of the attempted informal resolution. 	Id. at ¶¶ W, CC. 	The inmate submits the
grievance to a designated Grievance Coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. Id.
at ¶ CC. 	The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing
grievance forms: “The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information
provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what,
when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the
issue being grieved are to be included.” Id. at ¶ Y (emphasis in original).
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a
timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten
business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after
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the response was due. 	MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 at ¶¶ JJ. 	The respondent
at Step II is designated by the policy, e.g., the regional health administrator for
medical care grievances. Id. at ¶ LL.
If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive
a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same appeal form. 	Id.
at ¶¶ NN. 	The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving
the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days
after the date the Step II response was due. 	Id. 	The Grievance Section is the
respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. Id. at ¶ OO.
Where the grievance procedures are not available because the issue presented
is non-grievable, exhaustion of prison grievance procedures is not required. It is well-
established that a prisoner “cannot be required to exhaust administrative remedies
regarding non-grievable issues.” Figel v. Bouchard, 89 F. App’x 970, 971 (6th Cir.
2004); Mays v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 2018 WL 4603153, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept.
25, 2018) (“It is beyond debate that an inmate cannot be required to exhaust
administrative remedies regarding non-grievable issues.”); Reeves v. Hobbs, 2013 WL
5462147 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 3, 2013) (“Defendants cannot treat a complaint as non-
grievable, and therefore not subject to the grievance procedure, and then turn around
and maintain the claim fails because [the plaintiff] failed to follow the grievance
procedure. As the well known proverb states, they cannot have their cake and eat it
too.”).
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However, where other administrative remedies are available, the prisoner is
required to exhaust those available remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit. For
example, where an inmate claims that he received a retaliatory false misconduct,
whether a Class I misconduct or a Class II or III misconduct3 , the inmate must first
raise the issue during the Misconduct Hearing. 	Siggers v. Campbell, 652 F.3d 681,
693−94. If the inmate is claiming to have received a retaliatory Class I misconduct,
he or she must then must “file a motion or application for rehearing [of his misconduct
conviction] in order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review of the final decision or order.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.255(1); see also
Siggers, 652 F.3d at 693−94.
When prison officials waive enforcement of these procedural rules and instead
consider a non-exhausted claim on its merits, a prisoner’s failure to comply with those
rules 	will 	not 	bar 	that 	prisoner’s 	subsequent 	federal 	lawsuit. 	Reed-Bey 	v.
Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010). 	The Sixth Circuit has explained:
[A] 	prisoner 	ordinarily 	does 	not 	comply 	with 	MDOCPD 	130—and
therefore does not exhaust his administrative remedies under the
PLRA—when he does not specify the names of each person from whom
he seeks relief. See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324-25 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“Requiring inmates to exhaust prison remedies in the
manner 	the 	State 	provides—by, 	say, 	identifying 	all 	relevant
defendants—not 	only 	furthers 	[the 	PLRA’s] 	objectives, 	but 	it 	also
3 	Violations of written rules within the MDOC are classified as either Class I,
Class II or Class III misconducts. Class I consists of the most severe violations, and
Class III consists of the least severe. 	While Class I misconducts are considered
“major” misconducts and are “subject to all hearing requirements set forth in MCL
791.252”, Class II and III misconducts are considered “minor” misconducts and are
“subject to all requirements currently set forth in Department Administrative Rules
and policy directives for ‘minor’ misconducts.” MDOC Policy Directive (PD) 03.03.103
¶ B (eff. date 07/01/18).
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prevents 	inmates 	from 	undermining 	these 	goals 	by 	intentionally
defaulting their claims at each step of the grievance process, prompting
unnecessary and wasteful federal litigation process.”). 	An exception to
this rule is that prison officials waive any procedural irregularities in a
grievance when they nonetheless address the grievance on the merits.
See id. at 325. 	We have also explained that the purpose of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement “is to allow prison officials ‘a fair opportunity’
to address grievances on the merits to correct prison errors that can and
should be corrected to create an administrative record for those disputes
that eventually end up in court.” Id. at 324.
Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590−91 (6th Cir. 2017).4
V. Grievances Identified by Defendant(s)
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants incorporate the grievances
identified in Defendant Ross’s motion for summary judgment. 	They claim that a
review of these grievances will demonstrate that Davis has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
The undersigned previously provided the following Grievance Report and
summary of the relevant grievances in the R. & R. regarding Defendant Ross’s motion
for summary judgment.
4 	In Mattox, the Sixth Circuit held that a prisoner may only exhaust a claim
“where he notifies the relevant prison . . . staff” regarding the specific factual claim
“giving the prison staff a fair chance to remedy a prisoner’s complaints.” 	Id. at 596.
For example, grieving a doctor about his failure to give cardiac catheterization did
not grieve the claim that the doctor erred by not prescribing Ranexa.
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Grievance 	Person
Named
Allegation 	Results at
Step 1
Results
at Step 2
Results
at Step 3
URF-399 	Heidi
Washington,
Danya Russo,
Unknown
Nurse, 	Sgt.
Lumsdus
Feb. 20, 2024, Russo called
Davis to health services
for 	treatment. 	Davis
refused treatment. Nurse
and Lumsdus attempted
to 	force 	him 	to 	sign 	a
medical 	release 	form.
States issue is ongoing.
Rejected for
issue being
“vague.” Notes
there was no
date of
incident on
grievance.
Rejection
upheld.
Rejection
upheld.
URF-679 	Food Services
Director
Alson
Davis states that he has
not 	received 	Halal 	food
items 	in 	his 	Ramadan
meal bags since March 28,
2024.
Denied. 	Denied. 	Denied.
URF-935 	Ellison 	Ellison packed up Davis’s
property 	when 	he 	was
moved 	to 	segregation.
Some of the property has
been missing.
Rejected for
failure to
attempt to
resolve.
Rejection
upheld.
Rejection
upheld.
URF-1872 	Danya Russo 	Russo 	belittled 	and
degraded 	Davis 	during
treatment. 	Threatened
retaliation against him for
Denied. 	Rejected
as
untimely.
Rejection
upheld.
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Grievance 	Person
Named
Allegation 	Results at
Step 1
Results
at Step 2
Results
at Step 3
filing 	grievance 	against
her.
URF-2103 	Officer
Newcomb
Davis 	states 	that
Newcomb did not conduct
a 	proper 	Class 	III
Misconduct 	Hearing,
conducted 	herself
unprofessionally, 	and
made retaliation threats
against him.
Denied. 	Rejected
as
untimely.
Denied.
URF-2269 	Bethany
Stain, Nelson
Duncan,
Mihal 	Nagy,
Elizabeth
Marsh,
Gabraielle
Peters,
Danya Russo,
MDOC, 	and
Unknown
Healthcare
Company
After 	Davis 	filed 	a
grievance against Russo,
other healthcare providers
refused 	to 	provide 	him
treatment for chronic back
pain 	without 	her
permission.
Rejected for
containing
multiple
unrelated
issues.
Rejection
upheld.
Rejection
upheld.
ECF No. 41, PageID.780-81 (citing ECF No. 32-3, PageID.698−743.)
VII. Analysis
A review of the documents associated with Davis’s six grievances arising out
of URF filed after October 16, 2022, shows that only three of Davis’s grievances are
relevant to the claims in this lawsuit: URF-399, URF-1872, and URF-2269. ECF No.
32-3, PageID.698−743. 	Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his claims against the
Defendants through URF-679, URF-935, or URF-2103 because these grievances do
not concern events relevant to the claims in his complaint. 	Id. The undersigned
analyzes the remaining potentially relevant grievances in more detail below.
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A. URF-399 and URF-1872
First, Defendants argue that any claims against them must be dismissed
because the two grievances do not name HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Manager Marsh,
or RN Peters. ECF No. 49, PageID.864.
In Step I of URF-399, Davis identifies MDOC Director Heidi Washington, NP
Danya Russo, and Sgt. Lumsdus. 	ECF No. 32-3, PageID.713 & 715. 	Davis also
references “all of the nurses and doctors at this facility” and an unnamed nurse but
does not name HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Manager Marsh, or RN Peters in either the
grievance form or attached declaration. 	Id. 	In his Amended Complaint, Davis
identifies the unnamed nurse in URF-399 as RN Marsh. ECF No. 12, PageID.448.
In Step I of URF-1872, Davis states the following concerns about NP Russo:
ECF No. 32-3, PageID.742. 	Again, Davis does not name HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN
Manager Marsh, or RN Peters.
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Ultimately, the purpose of the grievance system is to alert prison officials to
problems within their facilities. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001). To
provide adequate notice to officials through the grievance process, the grievant must
provide facts underlying the issue being grieved including the “names of all those
involved” at Step I. 	PD 03.02.130 ¶ S. 	When a grievance identifies specific
individuals at Step I, exhaustion is limited to those specific individuals. 	Reed-Bey,
603 F.3d at 324; Brown v. McCullick, No. 18-2226, 2019 WL 5436159, at *3 (6th Cir.
Apr. 23, 2019). Issues within the scope of review at Step II and Step III appeals are
limited to those issues addressed on the merits at each step of the grievance process.
PD 03.02.130 ¶ S; Brown, 2019 WL 5436159, at *3.
Here, the only remaining Defendant named in Step I of URF-399 and URF-
1872 is NP Russo and an unnamed nurse later identified as RN Marsh. 	Davis’s
failure to name HUM Stain, RN Nagy, or RN Peters at Step I left them without notice
of the issue at hand. 	However, Davis did include an unnamed nurse in his Step I
grievance and later identified RN Marsh as this individual. 	Accordingly, in the
opinion of the undersigned, this was sufficient notice for RN Marsh of Davis’s
potential claims.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that Davis did not properly exhaust his claims
through URF-399 or URF-1872 because neither grievance was addressed through
Step III of the grievance process. 	The record supports that both grievances were
rejected before Step III. 	ECF No. 32-3, PageID. 694-95. 	URF-399 was rejected at
Step I because the issue was vague, as shown below.
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Id., PageID.714. Furthermore, URF-1872 was rejected at Step II as untimely.
Id., PageID.739.
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Grievances that are rejected are not reviewed on the merits and thus do not
satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Both URF-399 and URF-1872 were rejected and
therefore fail to exhaust Davis’s claims against HUM Stain, RN Marsh, RN Nagy,
and RN Peters.
In his response, Davis asserts that he was thwarted from properly exhausting
his administrative remedies concerning URF-399 and URF-1872. 	ECF No. 50,
PageID.872.
A prisoner need only exhaust available administrative processes. 	Ross, 578
U.S. at 638. 	In three rare circumstances, the grievance process will be considered
unavailable to prisoners. 	This occurs (1) where officers are unable or consistently
unwilling to provide relief, (2) where the exhaustion procedures may provide relief,
but no ordinary prisoner can navigate them, or (3) “where prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644. For an inmate to successfully claim
that the grievance process was not “capable of use,” they must claim that they hit a
“dead end” in the grievance process—not merely that they failed to consider other
options. 	Booth, 532 U.S. at 738; Ratliff v. Graves, 761 Fed.Appx. 565, 567 (6th Cir.
2019).
Consistent with the undersigned’s analysis of Davis’s arguments in the
previous R. & R., Davis once again states that he was thwarted without factual
support for his assertion. Davis does not assert that he was prevented from filing a
grievance against HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Marsh, or RN Peters, or that prison
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officials interfered with his ability to do so. 	Davis also does not assert that he was
prevented from filing grievances generally. In fact, Davis’s Grievance Report shows
that after he filed URF-1872 and URF-399, he proceeded to file and appeal two other
grievances through Step III. 	ECF No. 32-3, PageID.694. 	Evidence showing that a
prisoner filed grievances demonstrates that the grievance process was available to
them and defeats a thwarting claim. 	Sango v. Fleury, No. 2:20-cv-186, 2021 WL
2942556, at *4 (W.D. Mich. May 6, 2021).
Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, there remains no genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Davis properly exhausted his administrative
remedies as to his claims against HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Marsh, and RN Peters
through URF-399 or URF-1872. 	He did not. 	Davis failed to identify HUM Stain,
RN Nagy, or RN Peters in URF-399 and URF-1872. Davis only identified RN Marsh
in URF-399. Nevertheless, URF-399 or URF-1872 do not satisfy exhaustion because
the grievances were rejected and not addressed on the merits. 	While Davis alleges
he was thwarted, he fails to do more than provide a conclusory statement to this
effect.
B. URF-2269
Unlike in URF-399 and URF-1872, Davis did name the Defendants in URF-
2269. Step I of this grievance includes the following statement with identifying HUM
Stain, RN Nagy, RN Marsh, and RN Peters.
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ECF No. 32-3, PageID.735.
However, URF-2269 was also rejected and not addressed on the merits for
containing multiple unrelated issues.
Id., PageID.738. 	Accordingly, URF-2269 did not sufficiently exhaust Davis’s claims
against HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Marsh, or RN Peters because the grievance was
not addressed on the merits.
Davis 	makes 	the 	same 	assertion 	that 	he 	was 	thwarted 	from 	properly
exhausting 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	concerning 	URF-2269. 	ECF 	No. 	50,
PageID.872. 	The undersigned has addressed Davis’s general thwarting argument
above and finds it to be conclusory in nature.
Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to whether Davis properly exhausted his administrative remedies as
to his claims against HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Marsh, and RN Peters through URF-
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2269. 	He did not. 	URF-2269 was rejected at Step I and never addressed on the
merits.
VIII. Recommendation
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. 	The records before the Court establish that no
genuine issue of material fact remains with respect to the issue of Plaintiff’s
exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
The undersigned respectfully recommends that this Court dismiss all of
Davis’s claims against HUM Stain, RN Nagy, RN Marsh, and RN Peters. If the Court
adopts this recommendation, only Davis’s claims against NP Russo will remain.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	April 13, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 2:24-cv-00092-JMB-MV ECF No. 53, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/13/26 Page 18
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