Atabong v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
PETER EFUANGU ATABONG,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1568
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the
Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the
requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.) In an order entered on May 14, 2026,
the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas
corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.)
Respondents filed their response on May 19, 2026. (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner filed a reply on May
26, 2026. (ECF No. 5.)
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II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cameroon. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-7,
PageID.81.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2024 and has remained in the United States
since that time. (Id.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initially placed Petitioner in
expedited removal proceedings. (2024 Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.63; 2024 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.68.) Petitioner was then released on his own
recognizance. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.71; Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.52.)
On June 2, 2025, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered and
arrested Petitioner. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.71.) At that time, DHS again issued
Petitioner a notice of expedited removal. (2025 Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF
No. 4-6, PageID.79.) Thereafter, DHS found that Petitioner had demonstrated a credible fear of
persecution or torture. (NTA, ECF No. 4-7, PageID.81.) DHS then issued Petitioner a Form I-862,
NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time
or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of application
for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document],” which
placed Petitioner in standard, non-expedited removal proceedings under § 240 of the INA. (Id.)
On December 4, 2025, the Cleveland Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s application
for asylum and withholding of removal and ordered that Petitioner be removed to Cameroon.
(Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-8, PageID.87–90.) Petitioner appealed that removal order
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and that appeal remains pending. (Appeal Receipt,
ECF No. 4-9, PageID.92; Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.53.) Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA
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remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of the
INA.1 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
Respondents have not provided Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).2
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
1 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
2 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) because Petitioner is in expedited removal proceedings. But this argument is
belied by Respondents’ acknowledgment that after being initially processed for expedited removal,
Petitioner was later “placed in removal proceedings under INA § 240” (i.e., standard, non-
expedited removal proceedings), and that those “removal proceedings are still pending.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 4, PageID.56.)
Based on the facts presented by the parties, and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 1969, 1978, 1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th
Cir. May 11, 2026), the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Lopez-Campos, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not
deny “notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
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Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *11. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond under
§ 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at *13.
Petitioner is likewise detained under § 1226(a) and has been denied an individualized bond
hearing. Therefore, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory
detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights. See id.; see also Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL
3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025
WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action. They seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding habeas relief
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will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred
outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office, the Court will retain all of the
remaining Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon
as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.3 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	June 12, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
For the Honorable Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
3 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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