Lopez Mendez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
EDGAR ELEAZAR LOPEZ MENDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1425
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.7.) In an order entered on May 4, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on May 6, 2026, (ECF
No. 5.)
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 5-1,
PageID.54.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2012 at an unknown location without
inspection. (NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.54); Op., Lopez Mendez v. Raycraft (Lopez Mendez I),
No. 1:26-cv-497 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2026) (ECF No. 8). On January 7, 2025, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because
Petitioner was an immigrant “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or
who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General.” (NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.54.) DHS subsequently lodged an additional charge against
Petitioner, claiming that Petitioner was also inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) “as an
immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, [was] not in possession of a valid
unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card or other valid entry document.”
(Form I-261, ECF No. 5-4, PageID.64.)
On July 15, 2025, the Cleveland Immigration Court considered Petitioner’s request for a
custody redetermination. (Jul. `5, 2025, Immigration Judge Order, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.62.) The
Immigration Judge concluded that, under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A), the court lacked jurisdiction to
grant bond. (Id.) Alternatively, though, the Immigration Judge also concluded that Petitioner
would not be eligible for bond because he is a danger to the community, as evidenced by his two
prior arrests—one for reckless driving and the other for domestic violence. (Id.)
By order entered August 15, 2025, the Immigration Judge found Petitioner to be
removable, denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal, and granted Petitioner’s
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application for “post-conclusion” voluntary departure. (Aug. 15, 2025, Immigration Judge Order,
ECF No. 5-5, PageID.66.) According to the order for voluntary departure, Petitioner had until
October 14, 2025, to voluntarily depart. (Id.) Failure to do so would result in an automatic order
of removal to Guatemala that would take effect immediately. (Id.). Petitioner did not depart by the
date specified; instead, he appealed the Immigration Judge’s order. Op., Lopez Mendez I, No. 1:26-
cv-497 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2026) (ECF No. 8).
This is Petitioner’s second § 2241 petition before this Court. See Lopez Mendez I, No. 1:26-
cv-497. On February 12, 2026, Petitioner filed his first § 2241 petition in Lopez Mendez I. In Lopez
Mendez I, the Court dismissed Petitioner’s § 2241 petition without prejudice, finding that
Petitioner received the bond hearing to which he claimed to be entitled and there was no evidence
to suggest that Petitioner’s detention violated the Constitution. Op., id. (W.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2026)
(ECF No. 8).
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
As in Petitioner’s prior § 2241 petition in Lopez Mendez I, Petitioner requests that this
Court order a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) However,
Petitioner had a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 in the Cleveland Immigration Court on
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July 15, 2025. The Cleveland Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s request for a bond, concluding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant bond and, alternatively, that Petitioner would not be
eligible for bond because he is a danger to the community due to his prior arrests.
Noncitizens “who are held in custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), while their petitions for
review of their removal orders are pending, are entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see, e.g.,
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). If the noncitizen is “dissatisfied with the
[immigration judge’s] bond determination,” the noncitizen ordinarily must “file an administrative
appeal so that ‘the necessity of detention can be reviewed by . . . the BIA.’” Leonardo, 646 F.3d
at 1160 (citation omitted). There are exceptions to this general rule. For example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges that are not premised
on “correctable procedural errors” generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot
review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006)
(discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require exhaustion” because
“the BIA lacks authority to review constitutional challenges,” but noting that an “alien must raise
correctable procedural errors to the BIA”). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative
remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the
proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo,
646 F.3d at 1160.
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In this case, although Petitioner argues that his detention generally violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Petitioner’s specific claims involve challenges to the immigration
judge’s discretion, alleging a failure to consider alternatives to detention before denying bond.
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Petitioner does not argue that the procedures of the bond hearing itself
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Under these circumstances, as previously discussed in Lopez Mendez I, the issues raised in
the present § 2241 petition are issues that must first be raised to the BIA. Petitioner’s appeal to the
BIA remains pending. Therefore, Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and
Petitioner has not demonstrated grounds for excusing the exhaustion requirement in this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: 	May 22, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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