Rodriguez Gaviria v. Unknown Party et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JHONY ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ
GAVIRIA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1251
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)1
1 In addition to filing the § 2241 petition, Petitioner also filed two motions in this action, asking
the Court to take certain actions during the pendency of the case. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.) As set forth in
this opinion, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, which resolves the
case. In light of this, the entry of the Court’s opinion and corresponding judgment moots
Petitioner’s pending motions.
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In an order entered on April 21, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 8.) 2 Respondents filed their response on April 22, 2026, (ECF
No. 9).
II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 9-1, PageID.58.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about
December 5, 2021 without inspection. (NTA, ECF No. 9-1, PageID.58.) After Petitioner entered
the United States, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered Petitioner, and at
that time, DHS paroled Petitioner into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) until
December 21, 2021, with instructions to report to the nearest ICE office within sixty days of his
arrival at his destination in the United States. (Parole Stamp, ECF No. 3-4, PageID.26; see 2026
Form I-213, ECF No. 9-2, PageID.65.)
Thereafter, on February 25, 2022, DHS issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 9-1,
2 In the order to show cause entered on April 21, 2026, the Court also granted Petitioner leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Order, ECF No. 8.)
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PageID.58, 61.) In 2024, Petitioner applied for and was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS)3
from July 19, 2024, to April 2, 2025. (TPS Approval Notice, ECF No. 3-3, PageID.19.)
On 	February 	5, 	2026, 	ICE 	encountered 	Petitioner 	while 	conducting 	“target[ed]”
surveillance for noncitizens in Detroit, Michigan.4 (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 9-2, PageID.65.)
3 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security
may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals of that state cannot return
there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other “extraordinary and
temporary conditions,” unless the Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens]
to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the
United States.”
Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)).
“Such a designation permits certain nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided
in the United States since the effective date of the designation, to register for employment
authorization and protection from deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Id. (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). Additionally, there are other restrictions, including, for example,
that applicants for TPS “must not have been ‘convicted of any felony or 2 or more misdemeanors
committed in the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i)). Further, “TPS does
not provide beneficiaries with a pathway to permanent resident status, nor does it include any right
to petition for visas on behalf of family members in the United States or abroad.” Id.
“On January 17, 2025, Secretary Mayorkas extended the 2023 [TPS] Designation [for Venezuela]
by eighteen months, through October 2, 2026.” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 751 (9th
Cir. 2026) (footnote and citation omitted). “The extension was set to become effective on April 3,
2025,” the day after the 2023 TPS Designation was due to expire. Id. (citation omitted). “On
January 24, 2025, DHS began drafting the decision to vacate the TPS extension” for Venezuela.
Id. Thereafter, on January 26, 2025, “DHS began drafting a termination of Venezuela’s TPS.” Id.
On January 28, 2025, Secretary Noem signed off on the decision to vacate the January 17, 2025,
extension of TPS for Venezuela, meaning that the 2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela effectively
expired on April 2, 2025. (Id.) Subsequently, on February 1, 2025, “Secretary Noem signed off on
the termination [of TPS]” for Venezuela. Id. (citation omitted). Secretary Noem did not terminate
the 2021 TPS Designation for Venezuela, however, the 2021 TPS Designation “had only been
extended to September 10, 2025.” Id. (citation omitted).
4 As noted above, Respondents indicate that Petitioner was encountered while ICE was conducting
“targeted” surveillance. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 9-2, PageID.65.) Respondents do not argue
that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and there is
nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner was a law enforcement
target for any reason other than his status as a noncitizen.
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Petitioner was scheduled for a master calendar hearing on April 27, 2026, in the Detroit
Immigration Court. 5 (See Resp., ECF No. 9, PageID.48.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that Petitioner should first exhaust his administrative remedies before
pursuing habeas relief in federal court.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
5 The parties do not provide any other information about the April 27, 2026, hearing.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to the mandatory detention provisions set
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation. 6
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases7 : Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
6 In addition to arguing that Respondents are unlawfully subjecting Petitioner to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2), Petitioner contends that Respondents have unlawfully detained
Petitioner despite Petitioner’s TPS. Based on this, Petitioner seeks immediate release, suggesting
a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4), which provides that if a noncitizen has TPS, then the
noncitizen “shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s immigration
status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). As set forth above, Secretary Noem vacated
the extension of the 2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela and then signed off on the termination
of TPS for Venezuela. See supra note 3. The validity of Secretary Noem’s actions regarding TPS
for Venezuela is currently being litigated. In October 2025, the United States Supreme Court
allowed the termination of TPS for Venezuela to take effect pending the Government’s appeal and
“disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.” Noem v. Nat’l TPS
All., 146 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2025). On January 28, 2026, in National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 166 F.4th
739 (9th Cir. 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California’s finding that Secretary Noem
exceeded her statutory authority by revoking TPS protections for Venezuelans and Haitians. At
this time, based on the procedural history of National TPS Alliance v. Noem, this Ninth Circuit
case does not affect the Court’s analysis in this habeas action. Cf. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. at 24
(allowing 	the 	termination 	of 	TPS 	for 	Venezuelan 	nationals 	to 	take 	effect 	pending 	the
Government’s appeal). Therefore, although the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241
petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will not grant Petitioner’s request for immediate
release based on Petitioner’s prior TPS.
7 Additionally, for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610,
2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 due to his manner of entry into the United States.
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(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).8
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, and may attend hearings with an immigration
judge.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
8 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper
Respondent. The Court concludes that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in the following
cases: cf. Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578,
2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain all of the named Respondents in this action.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.9 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
9 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: April 29, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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