Badraldiyn v. Raycraft

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ADAM BADRALDIYN,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1162
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.8.)
In an order entered on April 10, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
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not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on April 15, 2026. (ECF No.
4.)
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Sudan. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.23.) Petitioner was admitted to the United States on or about October 5, 2019, as an
Diversity Immigrant. (Id.)
On June 29, 2023, Petitioner was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct – Second Degree
(Personal Injury) for an offense committed on April 24, 2022, and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). (Id.; 2025 Form I-213, ECF
No. 4-1, PageID.20.)
On October 2, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner upon Petitioner’s release from the
MDOC. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.20.) The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with removability under
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner was “convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after admission for which a
sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. (NTA, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.23.) Thereafter, on
February 17, 2026, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Sudan. (Immigration
Judge Order, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.30.) Petitioner did not appeal that order. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3.)
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
The parties do not dispute that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. As a result,
Petitioner’s present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. However, Petitioner contends that
his detention is unlawful and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In
response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention for purposes of removal is
authorized by Zadvydas.
Under § 1231, Petitioner’s detention is not unlawful. Section 1231 provides that “when an
alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States
within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) further provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes
indefinite detention when no other country is willing to take a person who has been ordered
removed. 533 U.S. at 682. In answering that question, the Court noted that the purpose of the
statute was to assure the “alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. Therefore, the
Court concluded that for post-removal-order detention to be authorized by the statute, the removal
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itself must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. The Court indicated that this inquiry would vary from
case to case and that there was no specific point in time at which the detention became
constitutionally impermissible. Id. Still, to assist the lower courts in making the difficult judgment
calls about when the detention was no longer authorized by the statute, the Court designated six
months as a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. Even after six months
has passed, though, the Court made clear that the alien may continue to be held unless the alien
“provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id.
Under this framework, it is the petitioner’s burden to come forward with evidence showing
that removal is not significantly likely to occur sometime soon. Id. Only after the petitioner has
come forward with such evidence does the burden flip to the respondents, who must then show
evidence that the removal is, in fact, reasonably foreseeable. See Abdalla v. Johnson, No.
16-14422, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2017) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that
detention of more than a year violated Zadvydas when the petitioner “provide[d] no evidence” that
removal was unlikely to occur in the near future).
Here, Petitioner has not provided any evidence showing that his removal is not significantly
likely to occur soon. In fact, the parties do not dispute that Petitioner’s order of removal recently
became administratively final on or about March 19, 2026, when the 30-day window for appealing
the immigration judge’s removal decision expired. See 8 CFR § 1003.38. As such, Petitioner has
been in post-removal detention for only one month—which is within 90-day removal period
requiring mandatory detention, and well within Zavydas’s “presumptively reasonable period of
detention.” 533 U.S. at 701. Thus, at this point in time, nothing in the record indicates that
Petitioner is in a state of “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention” that the Court in Zadvydas
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said would violate the constitution. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699; see also Martinez v. Larose, 968
F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a detention of over two years was constitutionally
permissible because the removal was likely to occur once Petitioner’s appeals were concluded).
To the contrary, everything indicates that petitioner’s detention is reasonable.
The Court recognizes that continued detention may, over time, come to resemble the kind
of indefinite confinement that Zadvydas may not permit. “[A]s the period of prior postremoval
confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely [has] to shrink.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Courts applying this principle recognize that even where the
Government continues to pursue removal in good faith, the passage of time can eventually erode
the reasonableness of continued detention. See Martinez, 968 F.3d at 565 (explaining that
prolonged detention may become unreasonable if the petitioner later demonstrates that removal is
no longer likely).
Here, however, the Court is not yet faced with that situation. Petitioner’s one-month-long
post-removal detention is not unreasonable. At this point, it seems to the Court that Petitioner’s
removal remains significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Accordingly, the
petition will be denied without prejudice. Should the Government’s efforts to secure removal
ultimately stall or fail to bear fruit, Petitioner remains free to file a new petition asserting that
continued detention is no longer reasonable.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: April 23, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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