Zimmermann Luja v. Hinkley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
DANIEL ALBERTO PINEDO NINO,
proceeding by his next friend ERIC
ALEJANDRO ZIMMERMANN LUJA,
Petitioner,
v.
STEVEN HINKLEY et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1133
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility in Battle Creek, Michigan, proceeding by his
next friend Mr. Zimmermann Luja, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the
following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Mr. Zimmermann Luja to proceed as next friend of
Petitioner in this action.
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ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.8.)
In an order entered on April 22, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondents filed their response on April 27, 2026, (ECF
No. 6).
II. 	Next Friend Status
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Mr. Zimmermann Luja may
proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing
and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her]
behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163
(1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which
[she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the
real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore,
is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is
unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence,
or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see
West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.
1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to
the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with
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that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety
of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted).
Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically
to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee
if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly
and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements”
because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise
deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most
significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not
set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163.
In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately
demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an ICE
detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Mr. Zimmermann Luja has
demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner and that he is truly dedicated to acting
in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Mr. Zimmermann Luja to proceed
as next friend to Petitioner.
III. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 6-1,
PageID.33.) Petitioner entered the United States on October 20, 2023, at the Paso Del Norte Port
of Entry in El Paso, Texas. (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued
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Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time
of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel
document].” (Id., PageID.33, 36.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1185(d)(5) for a period of two years. (Id., PageID.33; 2023 Form I-213, ECF No. 6-2,
PageID.39.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed an asylum application. (See 2025 Form I-213, ECF
No. 6-4, PageID.46.)
On November 30, 2025, United States Customs and Border Protection encountered and
arrested Petitioner after he made a wrong turn at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan. (Id.,
PageID.45.) ICE then took Petitioner into custody and transported him to the Calhoun County
Correctional Facility. (Id., PageID.47.)
On February 11, 2026, the Detroit Immigration Court granted DHS’s motion to pretermit
and ordered that Petitioner be removed to Ecuador. (Feb. 11, 2026, Order Immigration Judge, ECF
No. 6-7.) Petitioner appealed the order of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and his
appeal remains pending. (See Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.23.) Because Petitioner’s appeal to the
BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of
the INA.2 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
2 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
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IV. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
V. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
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cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases3: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).4
3 Additionally, for the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610,
2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 due to his manner of entry into the United States.
4 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi, 170
F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases do not change the Court’s analysis.
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B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, and may attend hearings with an immigration
judge.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VII. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VIII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action. The Court concludes that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
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cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). The Court will retain both
named Respondents in this action.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.5 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: May 5, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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