Perry v. Michigan, State of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAMIE PHILLIP PERRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHIGAN, STATE OF, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
Case No. 1:26-cv-1103
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action brought by a county detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner
action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. Plaintiff sues the State of Michigan, the United States of America,
Berrien County, and the City of Niles. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992). Applying these standards, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the
Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the Berrien County Jail. The events about which he
complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff alleges that he has been falsely imprisoned since
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October 3, 2023. He asserts that his imprisonment is unlawful because the complaint and warrant
provided to the City of Niles Circuit Court was not signed by a judge finding probable cause. (ECF
No. 1 at PageID.4.) Plaintiff alleges the unsigned complaint and warrant resulted in a malicious
prosecution. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he has suffered many injuries as a result of his incarceration,
has been denied effective assistance of counsel, and has suffered cruel and unusual punishment
due to being held in segregation since October 17, 2023. (Id.)
For relief, Plaintiff requests punitive damages against the State of Michigan in the amount
of $11 billion up to $500 billion. (Id. at PageID.5.)
II. Failure to State a Claim
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
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notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 	Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged— but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994).
III. Discussion
A. 	United States
Plaintiff does not indicate why he has sued the United States. Nonetheless, the Court lacks
jurisdiction because Plaintiff fails to allege a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. See FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (sovereign immunity, which is jurisdictional in nature, deprives
a court of subject matter jurisdiction absent a waiver). It is well established that under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, the United States may not be sued without its consent. Hercules, Inc. v.
United States, 516 U.S. 417 (1996); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981). “Absent a waiver,
sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” Gao v. Jenifer,
185 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden
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of identifying a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Reetz v. United States, 224 F.3 794, 795 (6th
Cir. 2000). A plaintiff's failure to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity requires dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction. Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to identify an express waiver of sovereign immunity
by Congress that allows him to sue the United States in this action. Accordingly, his complaint
against the United States is properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
B. 	State of Michigan
Plaintiff names the State of Michigan as a Defendant. (Id. at PageID.3.) Section 1983,
however, expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Courts have long held that the State of Michigan is not a “person”
who may be sued under Section 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S.
613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison v.
Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted against the State of Michigan.
In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Michigan are barred in this federal Court
by the Eleventh Amendment. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the States and their
departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the
state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity
by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994).
Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in
federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986).
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C. 	Berrien County and City of Niles
Plaintiff also names Berrien County and the City of Niles, but he fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. The City and County cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions
of their employees under Section 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). Instead, a municipality is liable only when its official
policy or custom causes the injury. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. This policy or custom must be the
moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury, and the plaintiff must identify the policy or
custom, connect it to the governmental entity, and show that his injury was incurred because of
the policy or custom. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005).
A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated” by the municipality. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has explained that a custom “for purposes of Monell liability
must ‘be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.’”
Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). “In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal
institution’ not memorialized by written law.” Id. at 508. Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any
allegation suggesting that his alleged constitutional injuries were the result of official policies or
customs employed by Berrien County or the City of Niles. Therefore, I recommend that the Court
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Berrien County and the City of Niles. See Bilder v. City of Akron,
No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983
action when the plaintiff’s allegation of custom or policy was conclusory, and plaintiff failed to
state facts supporting the allegation).
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IV. Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, I recommend that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim and
for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of this action, I discern no good faith
basis for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11.
Date: April 13, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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