Gutierrez Urbina v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
DIEGO A. GUTIERREZ URBINA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1032
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.19–20.) In an order entered
on March 30, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days,
why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted.
(Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on April 2, 2026, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner
filed his reply on April 3, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
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II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.35.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about October 29, 2023, at the Brownsville,
Texas, Port of Entry. (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued
Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time
of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel
document].” (Id., PageID.38.) Petitioner was then paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A). (Most Recent Form I-94, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.44 (indicating that Petitioner’s
“Class of Admission” is “DT”1 ).) Petitioner filed an application for asylum and withholding of
removal on October 28, 2024. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.41.) Petitioner has no criminal
history. (Id.)
On March 25, 2026, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner.2 (Id.) Later that same
day, ICE issued a letter to Petitioner stating that his parole was terminated, retroactive to April 18,
1 	See 	United 	States 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration 	Services 	Guidance 	Website,
https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to-
parole-and-temporary-protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies 	(under 	“Non-Categorical 	Parole”
heading, select “What does ‘Non-Categorical Parole’ mean?”) (“Aliens who are outside of the
United States may request to be paroled into the United States based on urgent humanitarian
reasons or a significant public benefit. These aliens are not paroled into the United States under a
categorical parole program or process. Often, the Class of Admission (COA) for these aliens is
‘DT’ though other parole related COAs may have been used.”).
2 Respondents indicate that ICE encountered Petitioner while “in search of an alien who is the
target of an approved enforcement action.” (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.41.) Respondents
do not argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and
there is nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner was a law
enforcement target for any reason other than his status as a noncitizen. (See id.)
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2025.3 (Parole Termination Letter, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.46.) Petitioner was scheduled for a master
calendar hearing on April 10, 2026, in the Detroit Immigration Court.4 (Notice of In-Person
Hearing, ECF No. 4-5, PageID.48.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the 	United 	States.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2241. 	This 	includes 	challenges 	by 	non-citizens 	in
immigration-related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R.
P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.35; Most
Recent Form I-94, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.44.) Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for
Asylum and Withholding Removal, and this application remained pending at the time of
Petitioner’s arrest by ICE. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.41; Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.54.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
3 Petitioner was arrested by ICE agents at approximately 9:50 a.m. on March 25, 2026, and the
parole termination letter was signed at 4:06 p.m. the same day. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.41; Parole Termination Letter, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.46.)
4 The parties do not provide any other information about the April 10, 2026, hearing.
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governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
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To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[5] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
5 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that Petitioner departed from the United
States. Additionally, the record before the Court does not indicate that Petitioner’s parole expired
prior to his arrest. Respondents submitted a Form I-94 which listed the “Admit Until Date” of
Petitioner’s Parole as April 18, 2025. (Most Recent Form I-94, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.44.) But
April 18, 2025, was the effective date of the retroactive termination of Petitioner’s parole,
according to the letter DHS issued Petitioner after his arrest. (Parole Termination Letter, ECF
No. 4-4, PageID.46.) When DHS terminates a noncitizen’s parole, it will update the information
on the Form I-94. See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Guidance Website,
https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to-
parole-and-temporary-protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies 	(under 	“Non-Categorical 	Parole”
heading, select “Is DHS revising the parolee’s Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, Admit Until
Date if parole is terminated early?”) (“Yes. If DHS terminates an alien’s parole before the
expiration date of the parole period, DHS will update the Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record to
reflect the new parole termination date.”). Therefore, the Form I-94 that Respondents submitted
does not establish that the original termination date of Petitioner’s parole was April 18, 2025.
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to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Venezuela, seeking asylum in the United
States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.35;
Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.41.) At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. 	§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 	which 	provides 	for 	parole 	into 	the 	United 	States 	“for 	urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Most Recent
Form I-94, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.44.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding Removal, which remained pending at the time of Petitioner’s arrest. (Form I-213,
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.41; Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.54.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently
arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum.
Moreover, the record before the Court does not establish that the humanitarian reason or
public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applied at the time of Petitioner’s arrest.6
After Petitioner was arrested, DHS issued Petitioner a letter stating that Petitioner’s parole was
terminated, retroactive to April 18, 2025. (Parole Termination Letter, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.46.)
In this letter, DHS stated that “ICE has thoroughly reviewed the specific facts of your case,” and
that “[n]either humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrant your continued parole.” (Id.) But
6 This letter contains no facts specific to Petitioner in support of the statement that “[n]either
humanitarian 	reasons 	nor 	public 	benefit 	warrant 	[Petitioner’s] 	continued 	parole.” 	(Parole
Termination Letter, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.46.) That conclusory language is insufficient to establish
that neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrant Petitioner’s continued parole when
that conclusion is not accompanied by any facts specific to Petitioner.
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this letter was issued after Petitioner’s arrest, so it does not establish that the humanitarian reason
or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applied at the time of Petitioner’s arrest.
Indeed, Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination of parole
in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations were satisfied prior to Petitioner’s arrest.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner).7
7 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing
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Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made prior to his arrest. Instead,
the Form I-94 indicates that Petitioner’s parole expired on April 18, 2025, (Most Recent Form I-
94, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.44), the retroactive termination date contained in the parole termination
letter DHS issued to Petitioner after his arrest. (Parole Termination Letter, ECF No. 4-4,
PageID.46.)
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole prior to his arrest. If Respondents did not
follow those requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner,
“unless there [wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145;
cf. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec.
2, 2022) (discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its
own regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d
541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound
to follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations
tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a
violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation
that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole]
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the
present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
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marks omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. As set forth in Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL
621359, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-
cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026), this Court
and other courts throughout the country have rejected the argument that any noncitizen, regardless
of whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is an “alien seeking admission
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225.8
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, has attended hearings with an immigration judge,
and has an appeal pending with the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Petitioner’s 	current 	detention 	violates 	Petitioner’s 	Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
8 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents.
The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the Department
of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office for
Immigration Review as Respondents.
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the Department of
Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review as Respondents.
Dated: 	May 1, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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