Suarez Mejia v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JAIRO ANDRES SUAREZ MEJIA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-981
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.7–8.)
In an order entered on March 26, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on March 30, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on April 2, 2026, (ECF No. 6).
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.51.) Petitioner entered the United States on August 12, 2024, at the port of entry in San
Ysidro, California. (Id.; Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.57.) Thereafter, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because
Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a
valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.51, 54.) DHS
then paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.14; Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.67; Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.57.)1 Subsequently,
Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.4; Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.72.) Petitioner has no criminal history. (Form I-213,
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.57.)
On March 22, 2026, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (Form I-213, ECF
No. 4-2, PageID.56.) Following Petitioner’s arrest, a DHS agent completed a Form I-213 on March
22, 2026, documenting Petitioner’s arrest. (Id., PageID.55–58.) In a section of that form titled
“Recommendation / Disposition,” it states that Petitioner “had his parole terminated and is being
1 Petitioner’s Form I-213 states that on August 12, 2024, Petitioner was “paroled into the United
States.” (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.57.) The phrase “parole into the United States,” as
distinct from “conditional parole” under § 1226, specifically refers to parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A), which “allows the executive to permit certain aliens ‘on a case-by-case basis’ to
enter or remain in this country only for ‘urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.’”
Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2011).
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processed as a custody redetermination and will be held in DHS custody pending immigration
proceedings.” (Id., PageID.58.) Petitioner states that he “was still in valid parole status” when ICE
agents arrested him on March 22, 2026. (Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.67.) Petitioner was scheduled
to appear in the Detroit Immigration Court on April 8, 2026.2 (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.15.)
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court declines to enforce
the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude
that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is
appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following
cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL
2 The parties do not provide any other information about the April 8, 2026, hearing.
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570449, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Resp., ECF
No. 4, PageID.14; Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.57; see supra note 1.) Petitioner also filed a
Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains pending. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.72.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
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Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[3] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
3 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
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benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Colombia, seeking asylum in the United
States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 4.)
At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides
for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.14; Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.17; Form
I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.57.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding Removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Reply, ECF No. 6,
PageID.72.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking
asylum. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.72.) Moreover, the record
presently before the Court does not suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that
justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Respondents assert that “[n]either humanitarian
reasons nor public benefit warrant Petitioner’s continued discretionary release on parole,” but
provide no explanation or support for that conclusion. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.14.)
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Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner).4
4 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing
that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole]
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the
present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
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Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made. Indeed, Respondents do
not specifically argue that Petitioner’s parole was terminated before his recent arrest; instead, they
simply state that “[n]either humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrant Petitioner’s continued
discretionary release on parole.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.14.) Petitioner’s Form I-213, which
was completed following his arrest on March 22, 2026, by ICE, includes a section titled
“Recommendation / Disposition,” which states that Petitioner “had his parole terminated and is
being processed as a custody redetermination and will be held in DHS custody pending
immigration proceedings.” (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58.) The Form I-213 was
completed following Petitioner’s arrest by ICE on March 22, 2026, and although ICE may have
made a “recommendation” or “disposition” regarding Petitioner’s parole after they arrested him,
there is nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner’s parole was
terminated prior to his arrest. Respondents do not explain, and the Court fails to discern, how a
determination made after Petitioner’s arrest could show that ICE made any individualized
determination about Petitioner’s parole prior to Petitioner’s arrest. Under these circumstances,
Respondents have not provided the Court with any facts that would suggest that Petitioner’s parole
was terminated or revoked before his March 22, 2026, arrest.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
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(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. As set forth in Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547,
2026 WL 621359, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026
WL 607704, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr.
Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026),
this Court and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument.5
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
5 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge,
may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents.
The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
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at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Dated: April 13, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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