Molina Arteaga v. Unknown Party #1 et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
WILLIANS DAVID MOLINA ARTEAGA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-843
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4–5.) In an order entered on
March 18, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why
the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order,
ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on March 20, 2026. (ECF No. 4.)
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II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.74.) Petitioner entered the United States on February 28, 2024, at a port of entry in Laredo,
Texas. (Id.) At that time, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862,
NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for
admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id.,
PageID.77.) Petitioner was then paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) for
a period of two years. (2024 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.72.) Petitioner later filed an
application for asylum and withholding of removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.81.) Petitioner has no criminal history. (2026
Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.81.) DHS sent an e-mail terminating Petitioner’s parole in April
of 2025. 1 (Email Notice, ECF No. 1-7, PageID.21.) This email did not provide a reason for the
termination. (Id.)
On February 10, 2026, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. 2 (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.3; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.80.) Petitioner was scheduled for a master
calendar hearing on March 26, 2026, in the Detroit Immigration Court. (Notice of Internet-Based
Hearing, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.84.)
1 In April of 2025, DHS “issued a blanket termination of parole.” See Rodriguez Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025) (citation
omitted).
2 Respondents indicate that ICE encountered Petitioner while “in search of an alien who is the
target of an approved enforcement action.” (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.80.)
Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c), and there is nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner
was a law enforcement target for any reason other than his status as a noncitizen. (See id.)
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III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by noncitizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court declines to enforce
the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude
that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is
appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following
cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL
570449, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) for a period of two years. (NTA, ECF
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No. 4-2, PageID.74.) Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding
of Removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; 2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3,
PageID.81.) When Petitioner was arrested by ICE on February 10, 2026, Petitioner was still on
parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A). (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.80 (stating that Petitioner
was paroled into the United States for a period of two years beginning on February 28, 2024).)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
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significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[3] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
3 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
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to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that, at the time that
Petitioner was arrested, the purpose of Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left
Venezuela, seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port
of entry. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2, 3.) At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. 	§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 	which 	provides 	for 	parole 	into 	the 	United 	States 	“for 	urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Form I-94,
ECF No. 1-6, PageID.19.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and Withholding
Removal, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently
arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (See id.) Moreover, there is nothing
before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s
parole no longer applies.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
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(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner). 4
Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made before Petitioner was
arrested. Instead, DHS notified Petitioner, as well as many other noncitizens nationwide, via e-mail
in April 2025 that humanitarian parole was being terminated. (Email Notice, ECF No. 1-7,
PageID.21); see Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025) (discussing that in early 2025, DHS “‘issued a blanket termination of
parole in the first half of 2025’ to noncitizens throughout the country” (citation omitted)).
However, “a blanket termination of parole” nationwide, even if sent via e-mail to each noncitizen,
4 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing
that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole]
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the
present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
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does not constitute a case-by-case determination. See Rodriguez Martinez, 2025 WL 3511093,
at *6 (concluding that “Respondents[’] . . . ‘blanket termination of parole’ to noncitizens
throughout the country[] . . . does not constitute a case-by-case determination” (citation omitted)).
And, Respondents themselves make no argument about whether the requirements for termination
of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations have been satisfied.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. As set forth in Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547,
2026 WL 621359, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026
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WL 607704, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr.
Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026),
this Court and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument. 5
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Therefore, when ICE arrested and detained Petitioner on February 10,
2026, he was still on parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A).
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge,
may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Petitioner’s 	current 	detention 	violates 	Petitioner’s 	Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
5 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondent. 6 In this case, the Court
will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director as a Respondent. The Court will dismiss the
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report
within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with
this opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement as a Respondent.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
6 The Court previously dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent.
(Order, ECF No. 3.)
April 2, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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