Lugo Colina v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
IRVING LUGO COLINA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-784
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1). For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8; 2025 Form
I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.46.) On October 30, 2019, Petitioner voluntarily departed the United
States under an order of removal. (2022 Form I-871, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.44.) On January 13,
2022, Petitioner unlawfully reentered the United States. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.47–48.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered Petitioner that day
and processed him as a “Reinstatement.” (Id., PageID.48.) Petitioner was then apparently released
into the United States. On December 18, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and detained at an ICE
check-in appointment. (Id.)
Case 1:26-cv-00784-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/09/26 Page 1
of 6

2
On January 20, 2026, Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 challenging his detention without a bond hearing in Lugo Colina v. Raycraft (Lugo Colina
I), No. 1:26-cv-205 (W.D. Mich.). In Lugo Colina I, the Court denied Petitioner’s § 2241 petition
because Petitioner has a final order of removal, is subject to mandatory detention under § 1231,
and both the 90-day removal period, and the “presumptively reasonable” six-month period after
the removal period, had not expired. Op. & Jud., Lugo Colina I, (W.D. Mich. March 2, 2026),
(ECF Nos., 8, 9).
In Petitioner’s second § 2241 petition, he challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, among other things, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.21–22). In an order entered on March 12, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3). Respondents filed their response (ECF
No. 4) on March 17, 2026.
HABEAS CORPUS LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-related matters. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); 	see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91,
94 (2025).
Case 1:26-cv-00784-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/09/26 Page 2
of 6

3
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. 	As a result,
Petitioner’s present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. However, Petitioner contends that
his detention is unlawful and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 	In
response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention for purposes of removal is
authorized by Zadvydas.
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). 	“During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) further provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes
indefinite detention when no other country is willing to take a person who has been ordered
removed. 	533 U.S. at 682. 	In answering that question, the Court noted that the purpose of the
statute was to assure the “alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. Therefore, the
Court concluded that for post-removal-order detention to be authorized by the statute, the removal
itself must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. The Court indicated that this inquiry would vary from
case to case and that there was no specific point in time at which the detention became
constitutionally impermissible. Id. Still, to assist the lower courts in making the difficult judgment
calls about when the detention was no longer authorized by the statute, the Court designated six
months as a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. Even after six months
Case 1:26-cv-00784-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/09/26 Page 3
of 6

4
has passed, though, the Court made clear that the alien may continue to be held unless the alien
“provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id.
Under this framework, it is the petitioner’s burden to come forward with evidence showing
that removal is not significantly likely to occur sometime soon. Id. Only after the petitioner has
come forward with such evidence does the burden flip to the respondents, who must then show
evidence that the removal is, in fact, reasonably foreseeable. 	See Abdalla v. Johnson, No.
16-14422, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2017) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that
detention of more than a year violated Zadvydas when the petitioner “provide[d] no evidence” that
removal was unlikely to occur in the near future).
Here, Petitioner’s detention is plainly reasonable. As the Respondents indicate, Petitioner
has been detained since December 18, 2025, and Petitioner’s 90-day removal period only recently
expired on March 18, 2026. At this point, then, he has remained in detention for roughly 3-and-a-
half months—which is well within Zavydas’s “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” 533
U.S. at 701. Petitioner has not offered any other evidence indicating “that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. In fact, the Respondents indicate
that “ICE submitted a travel documents request, which remains pending.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.41).
Petitioner has not shown that his circumstances have changed in any material way in the 8 days
between the Court’s dismissal of his first habeas petition on March 2, 2026 and when he filed his
second petition on March 10, 2026. Thus, at this point in time, Petitioner is not in the state of
“indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention” that the Court in Zadvydas said would violate the
constitution. 1 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699; see also Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir.
1 The only exception to removal after reinstatement of a prior order is if the noncitizen requests withholding
of removal “by expressing a fear of returning to the country designated in that order.” See 8 C.F.R. §
Case 1:26-cv-00784-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/09/26 Page 4
of 6

5
2020) (holding that a detention of over two years was constitutionally permissible because the
removal was likely to occur once Petitioner’s appeals were concluded).
The Court recognizes that continued detention may, over time, come to resemble the kind
of indefinite confinement that Zadvydas may not permit. 	“[A]s the period of prior postremoval
confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely [has] to shrink.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 	Courts applying this principle recognize that even where the
Government continues to pursue removal in good faith, the passage of time can eventually erode
the reasonableness of continued detention. 	See Martinez, 968 F.3d at 565 (explaining that
prolonged detention may become unreasonable if the petitioner later demonstrates that removal is
no longer likely).
Here, however, the Court is not yet faced with that situation. Petitioner’s three-and-a-half-
month detention, while the government actively pursues removal, is not unreasonable. At this
point, it seems to the Court that Petitioner’s removal remains significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future. 	Accordingly, Petitioner’s second petition, like his first one, will be denied
without prejudice. Should the Government’s efforts to secure removal ultimately stall or fail to
bear fruit, Petitioner remains free to file a new petition asserting that continued detention is no
longer reasonable.
241.8(e). In such a case, the noncitizen “shall be immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview
to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.31 of this
chapter.” Id. The Form I-213 provided by Respondents indicates that Petitioner expressed a fear of returning
to Venezuela. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.48.) But Respondents have the right to detain
Petitioner even if he is seeking withholding of removal. In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021),
the Supreme Court “was asked to decide which of two provisions [8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 U.S.C. § 1231]
applies to aliens who were removed from the United States but later reentered without authorization, were
subject to reinstated orders of removal, and then sought withholding of removal based on fear of persecution
in the particular countries designated by their removal orders.” See id. at 526. The Supreme Court concluded
that “§ 1231, not § 1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal, meaning
those aliens are not entitled to a bond hearing while they pursue withholding of removal.” Id. Therefore,
Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing while he pursues withholding of removal. See id.
Case 1:26-cv-00784-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/09/26 Page 5
of 6

6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: 	April 9, 2026 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
Case 1:26-cv-00784-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 5, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/09/26 Page 6
of 6