Williams v. Long et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROOSEVELT LASHAWN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CRAIG LONG, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-718
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
ORDER
Plaintiff Roosevelt Lashawn Williams, proceeding pro se, brings this lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the Battle Creek Police Department, two of its officers, and a
private individual. Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Maarten Vermaat’s report and
recommendation (R&R) that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for lack of standing and failure to
state a claim (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff has filed objections to the R&R (ECF No. 7). Under Rule 72
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the district judge must determine de novo any part of the
magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). For
the reasons explained below, the Court will sustain in part and overrule in part the objections,
adopt the disposition recommended by the R&R, and dismiss the case.
The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendant Amber Lamott falsely informed
the Battle Creek Police Department that Plaintiff was living at an apartment in Battle Creek that
was leased to another individual. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) That apartment’s address
differed from the address that Plaintiff, who is a registered sex offender, had reported to the police
as his home address. (See id., PageID.25.) Based on Lamott’s allegedly false statement, the Battle
Creek Police contacted the landlord who owned the apartment at issue; the landlord, in turn, told
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the tenant that she would not renew their lease and that Plaintiff was not allowed to stay at the
apartment. (See id., PageID.8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions violated his right to be
free from search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution; his right
to be free from unlawful takings under the Fifth Amendment; and his right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution. He also alleges that Defendants
committed the tort of malicious prosecution and violated the Privacy Act of 1974, as well as
various criminal statutes.
The magistrate judge recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims because he
did not sufficiently allege an injury from Defendants’ actions that would confer standing, and
because his allegations are not specific enough to state a claim against any Defendant. In response,
Plaintiff notes that he alleged in his complaint that he had been operating a business out of the
Battle Creek apartment at issue, and that Defendants’ actions prevented him from continuing to
operate the business. The Court agrees that this is an injury sufficient to confer standing. However,
as discussed below, even if Plaintiff has alleged standing, he has still failed to state a federal claim.
Although Plaintiff points to several federal constitutional provisions, he has not stated a
claim under any. “The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.’” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). Plaintiff does
not state a Fourth Amendment claim because he does not allege that the Battle Creek Police
searched or seized any of his property. Plaintiff argues that “[f]orcing a person out of their home”
can constitute a seizure (Compl., PageID.15), but he has not alleged that he was forced from his
home; indeed, he takes great pains to emphasize that he was not living at the apartment at issue.
Plaintiff also asserts a claim for malicious prosecution, which is cognizable under the Fourth
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Amendment, but such a claim is inapplicable here because Plaintiff has not alleged that he was
prosecuted. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010).
Next, the Fifth Amendment’s “Takings Clause provides that ‘private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation.’” Slaybaugh v. Rutherford County, 114 F.4th
593, 596 (6th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original). A taking occurs when the government “infringe[s]
on the [plaintiff’s] legally cognizable property interests.” Id. at 597. Plaintiff provides no legal
basis for the suggestion that he possessed a property interest in the operation of a business in
someone else’s apartment, or was even legally authorized to operate the business. Finally, “[t]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: ‘[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986). Plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived of life, liberty, or property. As
noted, Plaintiff has not established any property interest in his ability to operate a business in
someone else’s apartment. And though he argues that the right to “earn a living” is a liberty interest
(Pl.’s Objs. 7, ECF No. 7), he does not explain how preventing him from staying at another
person’s apartment violated that right. In sum, Plaintiff does not state a federal constitutional
claim.
Nor does Plaintiff state a claim for violation of any federal statute. The Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a, “applies exclusively to federal agencies,” so neither the Battle Creek Police
Department nor a private individual can violate it. Schmitt v. City of Detroit, 395 F.3d 327, 331
(6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff also cites various federal criminal statutes that Defendants allegedly
violated, including 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (making false statements in a matter under federal
jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury), and 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of federal rights). But
“criminal statutes cannot be used to sustain [a] civil complaint,” and “[t]his Court does not have
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jurisdiction to order that a criminal complaint be filed.” Walker v. Hastings, No. CIV. 09-CV-
074-ART, 2009 WL 2914402, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 4, 2009).
Finally, Plaintiff brings state law claims for malicious prosecution and violations of
Michigan’s Constitution. But having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court will decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Moon
v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 7) are SUSTAINED IN PART and
OVERRULED IN PART. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has standing to sue, but finds that he
has not stated a federal claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the R&R (ECF No. 6) is APPROVED as to its
recommendation that the Court dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s federal claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
them.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court CERTIFIES that an appeal of this order
would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
A judgment will issue in accordance with this order.
Dated: March 27, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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