Rosales Carmenate v. Raycraft, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
YUSNIEL ROSALES-CARMENATE,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-503
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.30–31.) In an Order entered on February 17, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
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by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on
February 20, 2026, (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 24, 2026, (ECF No. 6).
The day before Respondents filed their response, the San Antonio, Texas Immigration
Court entered an order that drastically changed Petitioner’s situation—at least from Respondents’
perspective. The Immigration Court reopened Petitioner’s immigration proceedings, proceedings
that had otherwise been resolved years before by the entry of a removal order that was final.
Respondents had responded to the habeas petition accordingly, contending that Petitioner was
properly detained under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1231. That statutory section is not applicable
to “reopened” proceedings. For that reason, Respondents moved for leave to file an amended
response in opposition to the petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 7), attaching the proposed
response with exhibits. The Court will grant Respondents’ motion to file an amended response.
The Court will consider the proposed amended response as Respondents’ response to the petition.
Fortunately, because Petitioner’s immigration proceedings have been reopened, it returns
the opposing positions of the parties to exactly the point that was addressed in the petition.
Petitioner contends that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and Respondents contend
that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 1225(b). That has been the starting position for hundreds
of these disputes considered by the Court over the last six months. No further replies or responses
are necessary.
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.15; Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 5-2, PageID.58.) Petitioner applied for admission to enter the United States at
the Port of Entry in Laredo, Texas, on May 30, 2009. (NTA, ECF No. 5-2, PageID.58.) The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
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(INA) because Petitioner was an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, [was]
not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id.) Petitioner requested
political asylum. (Form I-213, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.53.) The INS authorized Petitioner’s parole
into the United States for a period of one year pending removal proceedings. (Id., PageID.54.)
Petitioner was scheduled for a hearing in the San Antonio, Texas, Immigration Court on
April 30, 2013. (Memorandum and Order, ECF No. 5-3, PageID.60.) He did not appear. (Id.)
Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States to Cuba. (Id., PageID.61.)
ICE arrested Petitioner on June 24, 2018. (Form I-213, ECF No. 5-4, PageID.64.) Petitioner
was placed under an order of supervision and released. (Id.; Order of Supervision, ECF No. 5-5,
PageID.67–70.)
On January 14, 2026, Petitioner appeared for his yearly ICE check-in in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.16.) He was immediately detained and then transferred to
the North Lake Processing Center. (Id.) On January 24, 2026, ICE conducted an informal interview
with Petitioner regarding revocation of release. (ECF No. 5-7.) Thereafter, ICE provided Petitioner
with a written notice of revocation of release. (Notice, ECF No. 5-6.)
A few weeks later, the Immigration Court entered the order reopening Petitioner’s
immigration proceedings.
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
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related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that three provisions of the INA divest this Court of jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s habeas action: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
The Court concludes that § 1252(e)(3), § 1252(g), and § 1252(b)(9) do not preclude the
Court’s review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth in the Court’s jurisdiction
analysis in each of the following cases: Avila Maltos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1299, 2025 WL
3550605, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2025); Aguilar-Duran v. Unknown Party, No. 1:25-cv-
1418, 2025 WL 3458572, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2025); Flores Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1387, 2025 WL 3458531, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2025); Hernandez Lopez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1412, 2025 WL 3290655, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2025).
V. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
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cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).1
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner received notice of
the removal charges, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge, may
1 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At this time, this non-
binding case does not change the Court’s analysis.
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request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by
ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VII. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VIII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
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To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment with notice to the
Parties as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the
alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody.2 The Court will also order Respondents
to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to
certify compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall
include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
granted, the conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the
2 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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Court will dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney
General, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated: 	March 9, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
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