Nabhani v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
MOHAMMAD NABHANI,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-314
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1). For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Iran. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Suriano Decl. ¶ 4,
ECF No. 4-1, PageID.58). Petitioner entered the United States in 2003 at an unknown location
without inspection. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Suriano Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.58).
Petitioner subsequently filed an application for asylum, which was denied by an immigration judge
on July 7, 2006, and Petitioner was ordered removed. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Suriano Decl.
¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.58–59). Petitioner’s appeal was unsuccessful and the order became
final on March 30, 2009. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6; Suriano Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.59).
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Petitioner was not removed to Iran immediately following the final order of removal. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.6). Accordingly, Petitioner was placed on an order of supervision on October
22, 2009. (Id., PageID.7). In 2011, 2012, and 2021, the Iranian Consulate denied ICE’s requests
for travel documents for Petitioner. (Suriano Decl. ¶¶ 12–13, 17, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.59–60).
On July 3, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7; Suriano Decl.
¶ 18, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.60). On September 29, 2025, ICE Headquarters indicated that it “has
identified Nabhani for a third country removal and [is] working to schedule Nabhani for removal
to a third country.” (Suriano Decl. ¶19, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.60).
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, among other things, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.21–22). In an order entered on January 30, 2026, the Court directed Respondents
to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3). Respondents filed their response (ECF
No. 4) on February 4, 2026, and Petitioner filed his reply (ECF No. 5) on February 5, 2026.
HABEAS CORPUS LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-related matters. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91,
94 (2025).
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DISCUSSION
The parties agree that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal. As a result,
Petitioner’s present detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. However, Petitioner contends that
his detention is unlawful and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In
response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention for purposes of removal is
authorized by Zadvydas.
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) further provides:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title,
removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes
indefinite detention when no other country is willing to take a person who has been ordered
removed. 533 U.S. at 682. In answering that question, the Court noted that the purpose of the
statute was to assure the “alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. Therefore, the
Court concluded that for post-removal-order detention to be authorized by the statute, the removal
itself must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. The Court indicated that this inquiry would vary from
case to case and that there was no specific point in time at which the detention became
constitutionally impermissible. Id. Still, to assist the lower courts in making the difficult judgment
calls about when the detention was no longer authorized by the statute, the Court designated six
months as a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. Even after six months
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has passed, though, the Court made clear that the alien may continue to be held unless the alien
“provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Id.
Under this framework, it is the petitioner’s burden to come forward with evidence showing
that removal is not significantly likely to occur sometime soon. Id. Only after the petitioner has
come forward with such evidence does the burden flip to the respondents, who must then show
evidence that the removal is, in fact, reasonably foreseeable. See Abdalla v. Johnson, No.
16-14422, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2017) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that
detention of more than a year violated Zadvydas when the petitioner “provide[d] no evidence” that
removal was unlikely to occur in the near future).
Here, Petitioner has pointed to the fact that respondents have repeatedly tried—and
failed—to obtain travel documents for Petitioner. (ECF No. 5, PageID.64; Suriano Decl. ¶¶12–17,
ECF No. 4-1, PageID.59–PageID.60). Even assuming for the sake of argument that such evidence
is sufficient to allow the petitioner to satisfy his burden under Zadvydas, the government has
responded by showing that ICE Headquarters have identified a third country that is willing to
accept Petitioner and by stating, through an affidavit, that the government is engaged in ongoing
talks with that country to arrange for the removal. (Suriano Decl. ¶19, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.60)
Thus, at this point in time, Petitioner is not in the state of “indefinite, perhaps permanent,
detention” that the Court in Zadvydas said would violate the constitution. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
699; see also Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a detention of
over two years was constitutionally permissible because the removal was likely to occur once
Petitioner’s appeals were concluded).
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The Court recognizes that continued detention may, over time, come to resemble the kind
of indefinite confinement that Zadvydas forbids. “[A]s the period of prior postremoval
confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely [has] to shrink.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Courts applying this principle recognize that even where the
Government continues to pursue removal in good faith, the passage of time can eventually erode
the reasonableness of continued detention. See Martinez, 968 F.3d at 565 (explaining that
prolonged detention may become unreasonable if the petitioner later demonstrates that removal is
no longer likely).
Here, however, the Court is not yet faced with that situation. An immigration official has
testified that the government remains in active discussions with a third country to coordinate
Petitioner’s removal. Although nearly six months have passed since ICE Headquarters provided
that update, such a length of time is not unreasonably long for negotiating and coordinating
removal to a third country. See Abdalla, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (finding continued detention
reasonable where the Government anticipated progress in the near future and no country had
declined repatriation). At this point, it seems to the Court that Petitioner’s removal remains
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Accordingly, the petition will be denied
without prejudice. Should the Government’s efforts to secure removal ultimately stall or fail to
bear fruit, Petitioner remains free to file a new petition asserting that continued detention is no
longer reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: April 7, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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