Colina v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
IRVING LUGO COLINA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-205
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court deny without prejudice Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.29–30.) In an order entered on January 27, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
Case 1:26-cv-00205-PLM-SJB ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/02/26 Page 1
of 5

2
by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on
January 29, 2026, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 1, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8; Record of
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.44.) On October 30, 2019, Petitioner entered
the United States at the Miami International Airport. (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien,
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.45.) Petitioner was removed by expedited removal. (Id.)
Petitioner reentered the United States on January 13, 2022, near Eagle Pass, Texas. (Id.,
PageID.44.) He was encountered by Border Patrol Agents that day and processed as a
“Reinstatement.” (Id.) The Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) provides that “[i]f the
Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been
removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is
reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not
eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under
the prior order at any time after the reentry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
Neither Petitioner nor Respondents explain how Petitioner, as a person subject to removal,
was released into the country. Nonetheless, Petitioner was apparently released into the country and
lived with his family in Ohio for nearly four years. On December 18, 2025, Petitioner was arrested
during an ICE check-in. (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.45.)
Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner claimed a fear of removal to Venezuela. (Id.)
Respondents argue:
Section 1231 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) applies to aliens, like
Petitioner, who are subject to a final order of removal. It provides that during the
90-day removal period, “the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This period of mandatory detention was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001),
Case 1:26-cv-00205-PLM-SJB ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/02/26 Page 2
of 5

3
where the Court noted that “[a]fter entry of a final removal order and during the
90–day removal period . . . aliens must be held in custody.” Here, because Petitioner
did not appeal the order of removal and was not in non-immigration detention or
confinement, the removal period began on December 11, 2025—the date the order
of removal became “administratively final.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Thus,
Petitioner is still within the 90-day removal period, during which his detention is
mandatory pursuant to the INA.
(Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.36.) Petitioner’s reply brief does not challenge Respondents’ position
in any way. (Pet’r’s Reply, ECF No. 5.) Indeed, Petitioner instead addresses arguments that
Respondents did not make.
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Petitioner argues that he is instead properly detained, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” See id. § 1231(a)(2)(A).
Case 1:26-cv-00205-PLM-SJB ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/02/26 Page 3
of 5

4
Respondents state the order or removal became final on December 11, 2025. Petitioner
does not contest that statement. Accordingly, the 90-day removal period, therefore, will expire on
March 11, 2026.
Moreover, after the 90-day removal period has expired, a noncitizen may continue to be
detained. See id. § 1231(a)(6). The Supreme Court has held that after expiration of the 90-day
removal period, the Government may continue to detain the noncitizen “for a presumptively
reasonable period” of time, which the Supreme Court concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
The only exception to removal after reinstatement of a prior order is if the noncitizen
requests withholding of removal “by expressing a fear of returning to the country designated in
that order.” See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e). In such a case, the noncitizen “shall be immediately referred
to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of
persecution or torture pursuant to § 208.31 of this chapter.” Id.
The Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien supplied by Respondents indicates that
Petitioner has expressed such a fear. (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.45.) But Respondents have the right to detain Petitioner even if he is seeking withholding
of removal. In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021), the Supreme Court “was asked
to decide which of two provisions [8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 U.S.C. § 1231] applies to aliens who
were removed from the United States but later reentered without authorization, were subject to
reinstated orders of removal, and then sought withholding of removal based on fear of persecution
in the particular countries designated by their removal orders.” See id. at 526. The Supreme Court
concluded that “§ 1231, not § 1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to reinstated orders of
Case 1:26-cv-00205-PLM-SJB ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/02/26 Page 4
of 5

5
removal, meaning those aliens are not entitled to a bond hearing while they pursue withholding of
removal.” Id.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
amended § 2241 petition. That denial, however, will be without prejudice to Petitioner’s right to
file a new § 2241 petition challenging his continued detention should Petitioner’s detention
continue past the presumptively reasonable six-month period set forth in Zadvydas. 1
Dated: 	March 2, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
1 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2002). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
Case 1:26-cv-00205-PLM-SJB ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/02/26 Page 5
of 5