Abuhaltam v. Abuhaltam et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ISMAIL IBRAHIM ABUHALTAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
MUSTAFA MUHAMMAD SAIED
ABUHALTAM, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
Case No. 1:26-cv-1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ismail Ibrahim Abuhaltam (Ismail) paid the filing fee and filed his pro se
complaint in this action on January 2, 2026, against numerous Defendants, most of whom he
identifies as his uncles and cousins residing in the United States, alleging that they violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Having reviewed
the complaint, I recommend that the Court sua sponte dismiss it “for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . [because its]
allegations . . . are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no
longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1999). See Burmaster
v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 18-3312, 2019 WL 11866985, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2019) (affirming
dismissal of “fee-paid complaint” alleging RICO violation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to Apple).
I. Background
Ismail alleges that Defendants “are all signatories to the ‘Declaration of Disavowal of
Blood’ signed on April 10. 2022.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3.) He alleges Defendants are members
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of an organized criminal enterprise operating under the guise of the Al-Qawasmi Academy (the
Academy). (Id.) Ismail alleges that the Academy has engaged in a continuous pattern of
racketeering activity directed at him while residing in the United States, including incitement to
murder, interstate threats, extortion, and malicious prosecution.1 (Id.)
This is not the first action in this Court involving Ismail and the Academy. In Al Qassimi
Academy, et al. v. Ismail A. Abuhaltam, No. 1:23-cv-289 (W.D. Mich.), the Academy and one of
its directors sued Ismail for defamation and other torts. In a recent opinion granting Ismail’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings in that case, Judge Maloney described the action as follows:
Al Qassimi Academy is an educational and religious institution serving the Muslim
Arabic community in Israel. Abd Al-Raof Al-Qawasmi is a director and trustee on
the Board of the Academy. He is also a member of the clergy in the Islamic
community. Defendant resides in Okemos, Michigan. Using Facebook and other
social media platforms, Defendant insults and mocks the Academy, its leaders and
its faculty members.
Case No. 1:23-cv-289, ECF No. 118 at PageID.2483. The Plaintiffs alleged, among other things,
that Ismail issued calls for violence against the Academy and its institutions; used fighting words
to incite violence against the Academy’s board members, educational staff, and their families; used
computer graphics to mock, insult, and defame the Academy and its members; and accused the
Academy and its members of serving as “agents” and “proxies” of the Israeli government. Id. at
2488.
In the present action, Ismail alleges that Defendants formed the Academy—the RICO
enterprise—for the purpose of silencing him through a coordinated campaign of incitement,
threats, and legal violations. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.5–6.) The campaign included an event held on
1 Ismail indicates that he seeks to add approximately 300 additional individuals residing abroad to
his complaint upon the grant of his motion for alternative service on them. These individuals
include the Academy’s members/followers, whom he identifies as members of the RICO enterprise
and co-conspirators. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.5.)
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July 16, 2024, in the city of Hebron in the West Bank, Palestine, called the “Blood Festival,” that
was filmed and broadcast over the internet. The “Blood Festival” included three phases of
incitement to justify the religious, social, and national legitimization of Ismail’s murder. Phase
one, direct incitement to murder, was conveyed through a speech by the Mayor of Hebron urging
listeners to “fight this imbecile, wage war on him, and remove the cover from him . . . .” (Id. at
PageID.6.) Speaker Abdul Majeed Al-Amarneh presented phase two, excommunication and
exclusion of Ismail from humanity/national rank, by providing religious and social cover for
violence against him. (Id.) Speaker Salahuddin Mustafa Muhammad Abu Haltam presented the
final phase, disavowal of blood (blood money), by reading the “Declaration of Disavowal of
Blood” signed on April 10, 2022. (Id.)
Ismail alleges that on July 29, 2024, the enterprise launched a targeted English-language
defamation campaign against him on Facebook using his family name to announce that the “Abu
Haltam Family” had “legally disavowed” Ismail. He alleges that the campaign of threats and
incitement culminated in a failed assassination attempt against him in which he was assaulted on
August 3, 2024. 2 (Id.) Finally, members of the enterprise, including Defendant Ayman Abu
Haltam, used the federal and state courts as tools for extortion, harassment, and malicious
prosecution to further the enterprise’s goal of financially draining and silencing him. (Id. at
PageID.6–7.)
II. Discussion
RICO authorizes a private right of action by “[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C.] section 1962[.]” Ismail alleges that Defendants
violated the following provisions of Section 1962:
2 The complaint alleges no fact connecting the assault to any Defendant or the Academy.
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(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d).
A. 	Ismail Fails to Allege a Pattern of Racketeering
A plaintiff must sufficiently allege the following for a RICO violation: “(1) conduct (2) of
an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Heinrich v. Waiting Angels
Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). “To state a claim for violation of § 1962(d), a ‘plaintiff[] must
successfully allege all the elements of a RICO violation, as well as alleg[e] “the existence of an
illicit agreement to violate the substantive RICO provision.’” Aces High Coal Sales, Inc. v.
Community Bank & Trust of W. Ga., 768 F. App’x 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Heinrich,
668 F.3d at 411). “Racketeering Activity” is defined as acts that constitute violations of various
state and federal criminal laws. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). A “pattern of racketeering activity” is defined
as “at least two acts of racketeering activity” within a ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). “[T]wo
acts are not necessarily sufficient,” though, and a “plaintiff must show ‘that the racketeering
predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.’”
Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 795 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237–39 (1989) (italics in original)).
1. 	Predicate Acts
Ismail alleges that Defendants committed several predicate acts of racketeering. He is
mistaken.
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a. 	Interstate Threats
First, Ismail alleges that the statements made during the “Blood Festival” and the
“Disavowal of Blood” that were broadcast on social media, as well as the so-called defamation
campaign, constituted transmission of an interstate threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875. (ECF
No. 7.) However, 18 U.S.C. § 875 is not an indictable offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), so a
violation of that statute cannot serve as a predicate offense. See Williams v. Hollingsworth Grp.,
Inc., 00-1313, 2000 WL 1720922, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000) (“The defendants’ alleged
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 371 and 1001 could not be predicate acts for purposes of a civil
RICO suit because these statutory sections are not listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).” (citing Annulli
v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rotella v. Wood,
528 U.S. 549 (2000))); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Shea, No. 5:03-CV-61, 2003 WL 23200250, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 20, 2003) (holding that the counterclaimant’s assertion of 18 U.S.C. § 876 could not
“support a RICO claim because 18 U.S.C. § 876 is not listed as a predicate offense in 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)).
b. 	Extortion
Next, Ismail alleges that Defendants committed extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951. In particular, he alleges that Defendants filed frivolous lawsuits in both state and federal
court in order “to extort [his] compliance and silence under the threat of expending significant
legal effort and financial resources[.]” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.7.) Here again, Ismail fails to
establish a predicate act. As one court has observed, “the overwhelming weight of authority” from
courts around the county holds that threatening or initiating frivolous litigation does not constitute
a RICO predicate act of criminal extortion. Edelson PC v. Bandas Law Firm PC, No. 16 C 11057,
2018 WL 723287, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2018). The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] threat of
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litigation if a party fails to fulfill even a fraudulent contract . . . does not constitute extortion.”
Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994). Other circuits have reached the same
result with respect to filed litigation. See Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that “allegations of frivolous, fraudulent, or baseless litigation activities—without more—cannot
constitute a RICO predicate act”); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that filing of an allegedly malicious lawsuit did not constitute extortion under Section
1951); Deck v. Engineered Laminates, 349 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003) (joining “multitude
of other courts in holding that meritless litigation is not extortion under [the Hobbs Act]”). As the
Second Circuit observed in Kim, permitting litigation activity to support a RICO claim “would
chill litigants and lawyers and frustrate the well-established public policy goal of maintaining open
access to the courts because any. . . pleading . . . in an unsuccessful lawsuit could lead to drastic
RICO liability.” Kim, 884 F.3d at 104. Thus, Defendants’ litigation activity, even if frivolous, does
not qualify as a RICO predicate act.
c. 	Mail and Wire Fraud
Next, Ismail alleges that Defendants committed mail and wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. In particular, he alleges that Defendants’ “use of the stolen ‘Abu Haltam
Family’ name in the defamation campaign . . . to falsely claim a ‘legal disavowal’ constitutes a
scheme to defraud the public and [Ismail’s] community by lending false legitimacy to their
criminal actions.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.7.) He further alleges that Defendants’ filing of malicious
lawsuits based on false or misleading claims constituted a scheme to defraud the court system and
Ismail. (Id. at PageID.7.)
Ismail fails to allege a predicate act based on mail or wire fraud for two reasons. First, he
fails to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) applicable to a mail or wire fraud
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claim. That rule requires that a complaint: “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends
were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and
(4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Frank v. Dana Corp., 547 F.3d 564, 570 (6th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Gupta v. Terra Nitrogen Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 879, 883 (N.D. Ohio 1998)).
Regarding the so-called defamation campaign, he simply alleges that “the Enterprise launched
[it],” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.6), but he fails to identify which Defendant(s) actually sent the
defamatory messages. As for the court filings, Ismail does not identify the alleged fraudulent
statements, the person asserting them, and the documents in which they were contained, and he
fails to explain why they were fraudulent.
More importantly, apart from non-compliance with Rule 9(b), Ismail fails to allege a
fraudulent scheme, which he must do to support his mail and wire fraud predicate acts. Henrich,
668 F.3d at 404 (citing United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2005). “‘A scheme
to defraud includes any plan or course of action by which someone uses false, deceptive, or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises to deprive someone else of money.’” Id.
(quoting Jamieson, 427 F.3d at 402). The complaint does not allege that Defendants employed the
defamation campaign or their court filings to deprive Ismail or any other person of money,
property, or anything else for that matter. See United States v. Kotvas, 941 F.2d 1141, 1146 (11th
Cir. 1991) (holding that mail fraud charge “was fatally flawed because it failed to allege that either
the county or state was deprived of property or money by the alleged scheme”). Absent an
allegation that any Defendant deprived Ismail or anyone else of money or property, there is no
basis for mail or wire fraud.3
3 The fact that Ismail was required to incur legal fees in defending the lawsuits identified in the
complaint does not satisfy the fraudulent scheme requirement. Ismail paid the legal fees to his
lawyers, not Defendants.
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d. 	Witness Tampering
Last, Ismail alleges that Defendants violated the witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1512, by intimidating, threatening, and harassing witness Omar Taha Abu Haltam to withhold a
record or testimony by threats of legal action and financial ruin in a formal “Demand for Retraction
and Withdrawal of False Affidavit.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.8.) Ismail fails to establish a predicate
act here, as well. The witness tampering statute prohibits certain acts directed towards witnesses
and others in connection with “an official proceeding.” An “official proceeding” is “a proceeding
before a judge or court of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A). Although Ismail includes
no information about the legal proceeding he references in his complaint, the Demand for
Retraction and the Affidavit of Omar Taha Abu Haltam attached to the complaint (ECF No. 1-3 at
PageID.67–72) show that the affidavit was submitted in Case No. 25A-PL-01410 in the State of
Indiana Court of Appeals. In other words, this was not a “proceeding before a judge or court of the
United States.” Thus, Ismail fails to show a violation of Section 1512. See Jaye v. Oak Knoll Vill.
Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 751 F. App’x 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Because the alleged tampering
took place in connection with state judicial proceedings, it cannot serve as a RICO predicate
offense.”); Azima v. Dechert LLP, No. 22-CV-8728, 2024 WL 4665106, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
26, 2024) (“Neither state court nor foreign court proceedings meet the definition of “official
proceeding” under 18 U.S.C. § 1515.”).
Ismail’s RICO claim thus fails for the basic reason that the complaint does not allege even
a single predicate act.4
4 Even if the complaint alleged the minimum two predicate acts—which it does not—Ismail would
face another obstacle. That is, in a multi-Defendant RICO case such as this, the plaintiff must
allege that each Defendant “’conduct[ed] or participate[d], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of’
the [a]lleged RICO [e]nterprise’s affairs,” Kerrigan v. ViSalus, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 580, 602
(E.D. Mich. 2015), and that each Defendant individually committed at least two predicate acts. Id.
at 604–06. The complaint alleges neither of these things with regard to any Defendant.
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2. 	Continuity
To establish a pattern, a plaintiff “must show that the racketeering predicates are related,
and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 239
(1989) (italics in original). Continuity may be either closed-ended or open-ended. Id. at 241. Open-
ended continuity exists where there is a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity or the
predicate acts or offenses are a part of the entity’s regular way of doing business. Aces High Coal
Sales, Inc., 768 F. App’x at 456. In a closed-ended situation, the plaintiff must show a series of
related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Acts extending over a few weeks or
months do not suffice. Id. at 457.
In either case, there must be a threat of future criminal conduct. If the alleged scheme
involved a single scheme and a single goal, the continuity requirement is not met. Id. For example,
in Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2006), the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants violated RICO through a “coordinated scheme to wrongfully terminate his workers’
compensation benefits.” Id. at 725. The court found that the circumstances indicated a lack of
continuity:
All of the predicate acts—the mailing of the Notice and Second Notice cutting off
his benefits and the mailing of Dr. Ray's fraudulent medical report—were keyed to
Defendants’ single objective of depriving Moon of his benefits. No other schemes,
purposes, or injuries are alleged, and there are no facts suggesting that the scheme
would continue beyond the Defendants accomplishing their goal of terminating
Moon’s benefits. In circumstances such as these, the purported racketeering activity
does not bear the markings of the “long-term criminal conduct” about which
“Congress was concerned” when it enacted RICO. H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 242, 109
S. Ct. 2893.
Id. at 725–26. See also Vemco, Inc., 23 F.3d at 134–35 (concluding that the continuity requirement
was not satisfied because the instrumentality was a single construction job with a single victim,
and the scheme was complete once the defendant received the money it was requesting in the
billing statements); Thompson v. Paasche, 950 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
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scheme involving the sale of property ceased when the property was sold and there was no showing
of continuing opportunity or scheme); McCormick v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Div., No. 2:19-cv-3329, 2020 WL 5513566, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2020)
(“Critically, ‘[a] single, fraudulent scheme to accomplish a single objective does not establish
RICO continuity.’” (quoting Dimov v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 1:09-CV-211, 2010 WL 2506717,
at *7 (E.D. Tenn. June 17, 2010))); Caise v. Austin Props. P’ship No. Three, No. 92-71716, 1993
WL 652705, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 1993) (holding that there was no pattern of racketeering
where the alleged scheme had only one victim and one scheme involving two investments by the
plaintiff over the course of two years); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F. Supp. 1405, 1409 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (finding no “pattern of racketeering” under RICO as “the plaintiffs have alleged only one
scheme, viz., to borrow money from them without intending to pay it back”).
Here, Ismail alleges that Defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering with a single
scheme or goal: to silence Ismail. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.5, 7–8.) In addition, Ismail is the alleged
scheme’s sole victim. Under these circumstances, where all of the alleged acts were directed at
accomplishing the single purpose or goal, there can be no RICO pattern because there is no threat
of continuing criminal activity. See Cyr v. Battah, No. 22-10290, 2023 WL 1798733, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 7, 2023) (stating that “a scheme involving a single objective to defraud a single victim
cannot sustain a closed-period continuity § 1962(c) claim”); Percival v. Girard, 692 F. Supp. 2d
712, 723 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding that a single scheme to deprive a single victim of rights under
a settlement agreement is not a RICO pattern). While it is true that the alleged scheme could
continue for some time, perhaps months or even years, Ismail’s own allegations show that the
scheme has a “built-in ending point,” Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 410—when Ismail is silenced, by
whatever means, be it a voluntary cessation of his online activity directed toward the Academy, a
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mutual truce between the two sides, or some form of injunctive relief from a court with appropriate
subject matter jurisdiction. In short, there is no RICO pattern.
B. 	Ismail Fails to Allege RICO Injury
As an aside, I note that Ismail’s claim also fails because he alleges no injury to his business
or property. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter” may bring a civil action to recover damages,
costs, and a reasonable attorney’s fee. Although the Supreme Court has said that RICO injury
encompasses business or property injuries resulting from personal injury, the statute still
“implicitly excludes recovery for harm to one’s person.” Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, 604
U.S. 593, 601–02 (2025). Thus, a plaintiff may invoke RICO only if he has been injured in some
way in his business or property. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 U.S. at 496.
Ismail fails to allege that he suffered a RICO injury as a result of any alleged predicate act.
The absence of such injury is an additional ground for dismissal.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss Ismail’s complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Date: January 21, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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