Boada Mogena v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
LUIS BOADA MOGENA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1941
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action on December 31, 2025, by filing a counseled combined petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and
issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to conduct a
bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.32–33.)
Petitioner also sought a temporary restraining order compelling Respondents to conduct a bond
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hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Id., PageID.2.) Alternatively, Petitioner asked
the Court to order Respondents to show cause, within three days, why the petition should not be
granted. (Id.)
In an order entered on January 5, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 8, 2026,
(ECF No. 4.), and Petitioner filed his reply on January 8, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1; Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.66.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2022 and was granted
humanitarian parole for two months pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration Act, which
is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) He subsequently filed an
application with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services for lawful permanent
residency and was granted authorization to work in the United States. (Id., PageID.2, 4.)
Petitioner remained in the United States following the expiration of his parole. Prior to his
present detention, he lived with his partner in Louisville, Kentucky and served as the primary
financial support for his family. (Id., PageID.2.)
On December 10, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner without a warrant
while Petitioner was driving his truck. (Id.) The following day, the Department of Homeland
Security issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under
§§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA because Petitioner is an immigrant “present
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any
time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of
application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel
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document].” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.66–69.) Petitioner has not been provided with a bond
hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Respondents further contend that Petitioner is subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)
under the so-called “entry fiction” because he was, at one time, paroled into the United States
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and, upon expiration of his parole, is to be regarded as stopped at
the border. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.59.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
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U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). Then, “when the purpose of the parole
has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to
the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in
the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Jennings, 583
U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
It is undisputed that Petitioner was, at one time, an “arriving alien,” who was granted
humanitarian parole into the United States as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). It is also
undisputed that Petitioner’s parole has now expired.
As the court in Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. Noem, No. 25-CV-872 (JMC),
2025 WL 2192986 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (“Coalition”), explained:
[S]ection 1182(d)(5)(A) does not, as Defendants insist, say that parolees return,
upon the termination or expiration of their parole, to “the position of an applicant
for admission standing at the threshold of entry.” ECF 26 at 46. Rather, the
provision says that two things happen to such a parolee: (1) he “shall forthwith
return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled”; and (2) “thereafter
his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.” In other words, the noncitizen is
physically brought back into immigration detention (“custody”) and then legally
continues to be treated as an “applicant for admission,” because his parole itself did
not constitute an admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (stating that parole “shall
not be regarded as an admission of the alien”). That does not prove that the law
treats the parole as if it never happened. At minimum, it recognizes that the parole
physically happened, because it contemplates that the noncitizen must be returned
to detention. Moreover, it does not imply a return to the status of an applicant for
admission, because a noncitizen is already an “applicant[ ] for admission” while
their parole is active. See, e.g., Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 806 [(2022)] (“[T]he
INA expressly authorizes DHS to process applicants for admission under a third
option: parole.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
Coalition, 2025 WL 2192986, at *24 (parallel citations omitted). Therefore, while § 1182(d)(5)(A)
may permit Petitioner to be returned to ICE custody, there is “nothing in this text that affirmatively
authorizes . . . indefinite detention . . . [t]o the contrary, it provides that, when parole is revoked,
‘the alien shall . . . be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter “his case
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shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.’”
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (emphasis in original). For the reasons previously set
forth in detail, the Court has concluded that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs “any other
applicant for admission” who has resided in the United States and was already within the United
States when apprehended and arrested. Section 1226(a) therefore governs Petitioner’s detention.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.1 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
1 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: January 16, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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