Bowman v. Kent, County of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN BOWMAN, JR.
Plaintiff,
v.
KENT COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:25-cv-1807
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Kevin Bowman, Jr. filed his complaint in this action on December 16, 2025,
alleging federal law claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kent County, Kent County Sheriff
Michelle LaJoye-Young, Unknown Party #1 identified as the Kent County Jail Administrator, and
Unknown Part(y)(ies) #2 identified as John/Jane Does 1–10 unknown Kent County officials.
Bowman alleges Section 1983 claims for: (1) unlawful pretrial detention without a bond revocation
hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) failure to arraign
him in circuit court after the bind-over from district court, in violation of the Due Process Clause;
(3) denial of conflict-free counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (4) malicious
prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Bowman also asserts a claim
of false imprisonment under Michigan law.
On December 17, 2025, I granted Bowman’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
No. 4.) Accordingly, I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Based on this review, I recommend that the federal claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim
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upon which relief can be granted. I further recommend that the Court dismiss the state law claim
without prejudice.
I. Background
Bowman alleges that he was arrested in Kent County on July 6, 2022, and charged with
assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Following a preliminary examination on October 3,
2022, Bowman was bound over to the Kent County Circuit Court. At the preliminary examination
hearing, his counsel, Denise Buswa, moved to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. Although
Bowman agreed with the withdrawal and requested substitute counsel, the judge denied the motion
and required Bowman to proceed with Ms. Buswa as his counsel, but advised him that he could
obtain substitute counsel later.
Bowman alleges that he was never arraigned in the Kent County Circuit Court following
the bind-over, notwithstanding his request for an arraignment. On October 6, 2022, the judge
issued an order revoking Bowman’s bond without a written motion, notice, or a hearing. Bowman
was arrested on October 11, 2022, and detained in the Kent County Correctional Facility for about
90 days, during which time he did not receive a bond revocation hearing.
On November 12, 2022, Damian Nunzio, Bowman’s newly appointed counsel, visited him
at the jail. At some point, the charges were amended to discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle
causing injury, without proper arraignment or “procedural safeguards.” On January 3, 2023, the
prosecution dismissed the case by nolle prosequi in the interest of justice. (ECF No. 1 at pageID.2.)
The docket report in Bowman’s criminal case, No. 22-09322-FH, shows that on October
6, 2022, the trial judge entered an order revoking bond. On December 9, 2022, attorney Nunzio
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filed a motion to reinstate bond. However, the motion was not heard before the case was
dismissed.1
II. Failure to State a Claim
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted).
As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. 	Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged— but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
1 See https://www.kentcountymi.gov/1036/Search-Court-Records (last visited Dec. 17, 2025).
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Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
III. Discussion
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v.
Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because Section 1983 is a method for
vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under
Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, to state a claim, a plaintiff must make
sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant
did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir.
2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where
a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject
to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the
complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th
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Cir. 1998)); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990)
(“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally
devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to
his injuries.”).
Here, Bowman alleges that his failure to receive a bond revocation hearing and an
arraignment in Kent County Circuit Court violated his right to due process, but he fails to articulate
in his complaint how any Defendant—Kent County, Sheriff LaJoye Young, the Kent County Jail
Administrator, or any John/Jane Doe Defendant did anything to deprive him of his right to due
process. Indeed, these Defendants were not obligated to provide Bowman a bond revocation
hearing, as they had nothing to do with such a proceeding. As noted above, the trial judge entered
the order revoking Bowman’s bond and would have been required to schedule a revocation
hearing. Likewise, Bownman’s counsel could have, and ultimately did, move to reinstate his bond
To the extent that Bowman contends Kent County is responsible for providing a bond hearing or
an arraignment, both the district and circuit courts and the judges of those courts are deemed
arms/employees of the State of Michigan rather than Kent County. See Pucci v. 19th District Court,
628 F.3d 752, 760–74 (6th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Skryzynski, No. 2:16-CV-12129, 2016 WL
3230701, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2016) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state
employees, such as prosecutors, judges, and court clerks who are sued in their official capacities.”);
Salaam El v. City of Dearborn, No. 09-12136, 2010 WL 582773, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2010)
(“[A]s a state employee sued in his official capacity, the suit is really against the State of Michigan
and, therefore, Judge Hultgren is entitled to immunity from suit pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). The same is true of Bowman’s Sixth
Amendment claim; no Defendant was obligated to provide Bowman counsel, let alone “conflict-
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free” counsel. Again, the trial judge was responsible for providing Bowman counsel.2 For this
reason Bowman’s conclusory municipal liability claim against Kent County under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 (1978)—which is simply a conclusory assertion
subject to dismissal under Twombly, as well—fails as a matter of law.
As for Bowman’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, to succeed on such a
claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) a prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the
defendant participated in the decision; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal
prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty as a consequence of the legal
proceedings; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Sykes v.
Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, Bowman fails to allege that any Defendant
participated in the decision to initiate the prosecution against him. Moreover, Bowman fails to
allege a lack of probable cause. His conclusory allegation that probable cause did not exist does
not suffice to support a plausible malicious prosecution claim. Indeed, his allegation that the
district court bound him over to the circuit court following the preliminary examination negates
any conclusory assertion that probable cause did not support the criminal charge. See Cummings
v. Flint Police Dep’t, 735 F. Supp. 3d 810, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (holding that the plaintiff failed
to state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim because “the plaintiff specifically
pleaded that he was bound over for trial after a preliminary examination, which forecloses any
claim for malicious prosecution premised on a lack of probable cause” (citing Parnell v. City of
Detroit, 786 F. App’x 43, 47 (6th Cir. 2019))).
2 Any damage claim against the state trial judge for violation of Bowman’s rights would be barred
by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, as the judge was clearly performing a judicial
function in presiding over the case. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991).
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Finally, regarding Bowman’s state-law claim of false imprisonment, I recommend that the
Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised
jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction, and the federal
claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state law claims. See
Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, once a
federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims.”
(citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))); Landefeld v. Marion
Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain
supplemental jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding
state law issues.” Id. at 1182; see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial
economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly
deciding state law issues.” (internal quotations omitted)). Dismissal, however, remains “purely
discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)).
Here, because the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, I recommend that Bowman’s state-law claim be dismissed
without prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss Bowman’s Section 1983
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim and dismiss his state-law
claim without prejudice.
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The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and
an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an
arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.
2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis
for an appeal and recommend that, should Bowman appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.
Date: December 22, 2025 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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