Conde Cuenca v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
HECTOR MARIO CONDE CUENCA,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBERT LYNCH et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1796
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on December 15, 2025, by filing a counseled petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake
Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter
alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 requiring that Respondents release Petitioner from custody immediately and provide notice
and a hearing before an immigration judge prior to re-detaining Petitioner. (Id., PageID.7–8.)1 For
the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1 In an order entered on December 17, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on December 19, 2025,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on December 22, 2025, (ECF No. 6).
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Discussion
I. Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Columbia. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) On January 15, 2025,
Petitioner entered “the United States of America at the Nogales, AZ Port of Entry.” (Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.37.) The Department of Homeland Security issued
Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging him with inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who, at the time of
application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel documents].” (Id.,
PageID.40.) At that time, Petitioner was paroled into the United States for two years pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.37 (stating that
Petitioner was “paroled into the United States of America pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act,” which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)); Record of
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.42.) Petitioner filed an application for
asylum; the application remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
On November 13, 2025, Petitioner was detained by ICE agents. (Id., PageID.1.) Petitioner
was scheduled for a hearing before the Detroit Immigration Court on January 9, 2026.2 (Notice of
Hearing, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.51.)
II. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
2 The parties do not provide any other information about the January 9, 2026, hearing.
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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3
(E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
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402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. Here, Petitioner’s § 2241 petition presents principally legal
questions of statutory interpretation, which do not require the record that would be developed if
the Court required Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this Court is not
bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that “courts need not and
under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the
law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges generally do not require exhaustion
because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process
challenge generally does not require exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable
procedural errors,” such as a claim “that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an
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‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful
that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court
reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings. And, recently the
BIA proclaimed that all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any
administrative review by the BIA would lead the Government to change its position, and thereby
obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would likely be futile. Moreover, it is
clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
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In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry, seeking asylum, and was
subsequently paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4; NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.37; Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, ECF No. 4-
2, PageID.42.) Petitioner also filed an application for asylum, which remains pending. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited removal
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
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Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[3] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
3 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
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benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner fled from Colombia, seeking asylum in the
United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which
provides for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (See NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.37.) Further, Petitioner filed
an application for asylum, which remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Thus, when
Petitioner was recently arrested and detained, Petitioner was still seeking asylum. (See id.)
Moreover, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public
benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Indeed, Respondents make no argument
about whether the requirements for termination of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations
have been satisfied.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
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a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner). But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025)
(reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the
termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these
grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”).4 Here, in Respondents’
4 Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025), is distinguishable from the present case. As the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota recently explained in Gabriel B.M. v.
Bondi, a case that is similar to the present action:
First, unlike here, the government in Doe did make a determination that the purpose
of the plaintiffs’ parole had been accomplished. The plaintiffs, non-citizens who
entered into the United States through the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
(“CHNV”) parole program, lost parole status when the government, via a lengthy
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response, without providing any further explanation or citing any exhibits, Respondents make
passing reference to “the April 2025 expiration of [Petitioner’s] parole.” (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.31.) However, there is nothing in the record before the Court to show that Petitioner’s
parole expired at that time and there is nothing in the record to indicate that any case-by-case
determination regarding the termination or revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made.
and thorough notice published in the Federal Register, decided to terminate the
CHNV program altogether, determining that the program no longer served its
implementing purpose. In contrast, for Petitioner’s revocation, there is no evidence
to suggest that such a determination or other finding was made at all, and the
evidence in the record strongly suggests it wasn’t.
Second, the Doe court did not address the regulatory requirements established by
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which implement the parole statute and illuminate the
procedural requirements for termination of parole. . . . Part 212.5(e)(2)(i) not only
restates the revocation authority enumerated in § 1182(d)(5)(A), but also clarifies
the (admittedly minimal) procedures the Respondents must follow when invoking
the parole statute’s revocation authority. The Respondents’ failure to follow the
governing regulation is equally unlawful. . . .
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Doe court’s interpretation of
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) reads the bulk of the revocation clause out of the statute. That
interpretation rests entirely on the fact that the revocation clause does not include
the same “case-by-case” language. But such a myopic focus on that omission elides
a significant portion of the text of the revocation clause. The revocation clause in
the parole statute gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to revoke
parole “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary . . .,
have been served.” If Respondents were not required to make such a determination
to effect termination of parole, then there would be no reason for this language to
have been included in the statute. This contradicts “one of the most basic
interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up).
Instead, because the parole statute (and its implementing regulation) require such a
preconditional determination to be made, the Court enforces it here.
Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec.
1, 2025). Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the present action for these same reasons.
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In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have
rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at
*5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL
3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025
WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025
WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196,
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2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
(See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5–6.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments, arguing that
Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time because “Petitioner has had access to counsel,
is scheduled to appear before an immigration court, may request bond, has the right to appeal the
denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for five weeks.” (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.32–33.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
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in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the
United States at a port of entry, and Respondents granted Petitioner parole into the United States,
determining that Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained
Petitioner, and there is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding
detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s
conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from
criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025)
(citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the
deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income
earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See
Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk
of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized
determination regarding the revocation of his parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit
evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a
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revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citation omitted).
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown
that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would
be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights.5
V. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp.,
ECF No. 4, PageID.34.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
5 Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
does not, and need not, address other claims raised in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the
United States Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General of the United States as
Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.)
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
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In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s grant of habeas relief in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District
of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings.
The Court will, however, dismiss the Attorney General of the United States as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the Attorney General of
the United States as a Respondent.
Dated: January 14, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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