Tirkashev v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
SHOKHZODBEK TIRKASHEV,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1696
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action on December 9, 2025, by filing a counseled combined petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and
issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to conduct a
bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.32.) Petitioner
also sought a temporary restraining order compelling Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to
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satisfy the requirements of due process. (Id., PageID.2.) Alternatively, Petitioner asked the Court
to order Respondents to show cause, within three days, why the petition should not be granted.
(Id.)
In an order entered on December 10, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on December 15,
2025, (ECF No. 4.), and Petitioner filed his reply on December 17, 2025, (ECF No. 6).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Uzbekistan. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1; Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-2, PageID.66.) Petitioner applied for admission into the United States
on May 21, 2023, at Calexico, California. (NTA, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.69.) The Department of
Homeland 	Security 	issued 	Petitioner 	an 	NTA, 	charging 	him 	with 	inadmissibility 	under
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an
immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired
[immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.69.) Petitioner was released and,
on September 11, 2023, Petitioner filed an application for Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and
Withholding of Removal under the Covenant Against Torture (Asylum Application). (Ord. of
Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.71.)
On September 29, 2025, Petitioner was detained by the Department of Homeland Security.
(Id., PageID.73.) On December 12, 2025, an immigration judge found that Petitioner had waived
or abandoned his Asylum Application, and ordered Petitioner removed to Uzbekistan. (Id.,
PageID.74.)
Prior to his detention, Petitioner resided in New York with his United States citizen wife
and served as the primary financial support for his family. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
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III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).1
1 On December 12, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Uzbekistan. That
order does not impact the Court’s decision as to the proper statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention.
Section 1231 of Title 8, titled “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Here, Petitioner has 30 days in which to file an appeal
of the December 12, 2025, order of the immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b). Therefore,
§ 1231 does not apply. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (recognizing that § 1226
is “applicable to certain detention-related decisions in [the] period preceding entry of final
removal order” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
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B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for only a short period time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
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Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.2 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	December 26, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
2 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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