Perez v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
OMAR GARCIA PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1488
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on November 18, 2025, by filing a counseled combined
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency
injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in
Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to accept jurisdiction over this action; to declare that Respondents’ actions to
detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA); to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering
Respondents to promptly schedule a bond hearing; and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this
action. (Id., PageID.23–24.) 1 For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1 In his petition, Petitioner sought an initial temporary restraining order compelling Respondents
to conduct a bond hearing to ensure Petitioner’s due process rights, or alternatively, Petitioner
asked the Court to order Respondents to show cause, within three days, why the petition should
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Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; Hoppe Decl. ¶ 4,
ECF No. 6-1, PageID.129.) Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in “the early
1990’s when he arrived as a minor.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 4.) Petitioner has remained in the
United States since that time, and prior to Petitioner’s present detention, he resided in Wyoming,
Michigan, with his United States citizen wife and three United States citizen children. (Id.,
PageID.4.)
On September 17, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner and served him with a Form I-200, Warrant
of Arrest, and a Form I-862, Notice to Appear (NTA), charging Petitioner with inadmissibility
under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA because Petitioner is an immigrant
“present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of
application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel
document].” (Hoppe Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.130.) Prior to Petitioner’s arrest by ICE on
September 17, 2025, it appears that Petitioner had been in a car accident on September 16, 2025,
while he was driving to work, and that as a result of that accident, Petitioner encountered the Grand
Rapids Police Department (GRPD). (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Hoppe Decl. ¶ 7, ECF
No. 6-1, PageID.130.) During this encounter, GRPD determined that Petitioner had an outstanding
not be granted. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) In an order entered on November 20, 2025, the Court
directed Respondents to show cause, within twenty-one days, why the writ of habeas corpus and
other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed
their answer and response on December 10, 2025, (ECF Nos. 5 and 6), and Petitioner filed his
reply later that same day, (ECF No. 7). As to Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order,
because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, as set forth herein, the Court
does not, and need not, separately address Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order.
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warrant for an operating while intoxicated charge from August 2006, and they arrested Petitioner.
(See Hoppe Decl. ¶¶ 6–7, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.129–130.) ICE then arrested Petitioner the
following day. (Id. ¶ 7, PageID.130.)
On October 28, 2025, Petitioner “appeared in the Detroit Immigration Court with his
attorney,” and Petitioner indicated that he intended to file a Form EOIR 42-B, Application for
Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Non-Permanent Residents
(Cancellation Application). (Id. ¶ 11, PageID.131–132.) Petitioner then filed his Cancellation
Application on December 4, 2025, with the Detroit Immigration Court. (Id. ¶ 12, PageID.132.)
The next day, December 5, 2025, Petitioner appeared in the Detroit Immigration Court with his
attorney, and the Immigration Judge “informed [Petitioner] that his case would be scheduled for a
hearing on his Cancellation Application and set a scheduling order for evidentiary submissions.”
(Id. ¶ 13.) “A final hearing date has not been set.” (Id.)
II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and, therefore,
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.108–111.) Respondents
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further argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id., PageID.108.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
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(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination is
principally a legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that would
be developed if the Court required Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover,
this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a
statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that
“courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency
interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
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recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. There is no evidence
in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait for a bond hearing to be scheduled.
Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado.
Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision to the BIA.
Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” Rodriguez
v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is “unmistakable
that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates
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to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.”
See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (See
Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.22–23.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every
element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were
ambiguous, its structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation of the statute.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 6, PageID.111.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[2 ] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Although Petitioner has one operating while intoxicated conviction and one
outstanding operating while intoxicated charge, the parties do not contend that Petitioner has been
convicted of any crime listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A). (See, e.g., Resp. to Ct.’s Questions,
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(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But, “the ‘meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’”
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-
Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also “use every tool
ECF No. 6-3, PageID.141 (stating that “Respondents are relying on the detention authority
contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1225 to detain Petitioner”).)
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at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13).
The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the dictionary definition
of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry (last visited Dec. 11, 2025).
“Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre,
14 I&N Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” is also undefined in
the statute. The dictionary definition of “seeking” is “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Dec. 11, 2025), and the word
“seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp.
3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
Respondents argue that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless of
whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission”
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subject to mandatory detention under § 1225.3 However, that reading of § 1225 would render the
qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to use different
terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will
presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United
States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have different
meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because he already entered the United States over thirty years ago. (See Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.1.) As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
3 The Court posed a series of questions to Respondents regarding the application of § 1225 to
Petitioner. (See Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 3, PageID.29–30.) Respondents provided their
answers in Exhibit C to their response. (ECF No. 6-3.) Respondents’ answers essentially repeat
the legal arguments that are set forth in their response to the petition. As set forth herein, the Court
disagrees with Respondents’ legal argument and concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs noncitizens who have resided in the United States and were already within the United
States when apprehended and arrested.
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Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action – something that is currently occurring,
and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025). Section 1226 provides that
“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Looking at both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed
in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101
(citation omitted); see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but
as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 	is 	titled: 	“Inspection 	by 	immigration 	officers; 	expedited 	removal 	of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled: “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
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‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
explained that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining
. . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in
Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to
the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who
are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe
a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted
Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, then § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (“[W]e follow the cardinal rule that statutory language
must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it. . . . [And,] [t]he
rule against superfluities complements the principle that courts are to interpret the words of a
statute in context.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
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Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.4
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.21–22.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by
stating that Petitioner has received due process because:
Petitioner has received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, has
attended hearings with an immigration judge, will attend additional hearings in
immigration court, has filed a Cancellation Application, may request bond, has the
right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for
less than three months.
(Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.124.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
4 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions
filed by immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL
3077589, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL
3041827, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025
WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232,
2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271,
2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez
v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And, this Court
is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion.
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1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 6, PageID.124.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own
supporting evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing
has been scheduled. Respondents claim further “that statutory provisions denying bond during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.123
(citation omitted).)
If 	the 	Court 	agreed 	with 	Respondents 	that 	Petitioner’s 	detention is 	governed 	by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed 	by 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Instead, 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by 	§ 1226(a).
Section 1226(a) clearly sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien
subject to that provision. The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested
alien, or release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney 	General,” 	or 	“conditional 	parole.” 	See 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(1)–(2). 	This 	discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an
individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
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in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he has a wife and three children, all of whom are United
States citizens, and that Petitioner “is the main financial provider for the family.” (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.1.) There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of
incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack
of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F.
Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”
of his rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
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Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not
established a significant interest in “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator,
following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.”
See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would
impose 	significant 	“administrative 	or 	financial 	costs” 	in 	this 	case—“[t]o 	the 	contrary,”
Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s]
detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
V. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the United States Secretary of Homeland Security as
a Respondent. (Resp., ECF No. 6, PageID.125.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
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Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE and the
United States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 3.)
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
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District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these
proceedings.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	December 12, 2025 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
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